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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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

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

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

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

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

HENRY A. KISSINGER, Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs; author of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" * * * *CARYL P. HASKINS,* President, Carnegie Institution of Washington; member of the President's Science Advisory Committee * * * *JEAN-MARIE DOMENACH,* Editor of *Esprit,* Paris; a member of the Catholic left, active in the French Resistance during World War II; author of "La Propagande Politique" and contributor to "Communism in Western Europe" * * * *KWAME NKRUMAH,* Prime Minister of Ghana; Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, 1952–57 * * * *COMMANDER SIR ROBERT JACKSON,* Chairman, Development Commission, Ghana; Director, Middle East Supply Center, 1942–45; Deputy Director-General of UNRRA, 1945–47; Chairman, Preparatory Commission for the Volta River project, 1953–56 * * * *TOWNSEND HOOPES,* Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1948–55; Secretary of the Military Panel of the Rockefeller Special Studies Project; recently Consultant to the White House on overseas bases * * * *ARTHUR H. DEAN,* Chairman of the United States Delegation to the recent United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; representative of U.N. members in the Korean negotiations at Panmunjom, 1953; senior partner in the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell * * * *PHILIP W. QUIGG,* Assistant Editor of *Foreign Affairs* * * * *G. L. MEHTA,* Indian Ambassador to the United States, 1952–58; former member of the National Planning Commission and Chairman of the Tariff Commission * * * *WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,* Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; recently in Asia on a Ford Foundation research fellowship; author of "The Economic Development of Japan" * * * *SIR SYDNEY CAINE,* Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 1947–48; Vice-Chancellor, University of Malaya, 1952–56 * * * *PERCY W. BIDWELL,* former Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; author of "The Tariff Policy of the United States," "The Invisible Tariff" and of a forthcoming volume, "Raw Materials: A Study of American Policy * * * *BENJAMIN HIGGINS,* Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Monetary and Fiscal Adviser, National Planning Bureau, Indonesia, 1952–53; former Professor of Economics, McGill University; author of "Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development" and other works * * * *JEAN HIGGINS,* formerly with the Netherlands East Indies Information Service in Australia, now with the Lowell Institute's educational television channel in Boston.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 37 OCTOBER 1958 No. 1

NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

By Henry A. Kissinger

PRESIDENT Eisenhower's announcement of the suspension for one year of all nuclear weapons tests and his invitation to the Soviet Union to negotiate a permanent ban on tests has raised hopes all over the world that a beginning has been made in controlling nuclear weapons and that a big step forward has been taken in the quest for peace.

The hopes which have been focused on a nuclear test ban are intense and varied. Many thoughtful people concerned about the danger of radioactive fall-out maintain that the quest for security must not be allowed to endanger the health of future generations. Others argue that the end of nuclear testing is essential to build confidence for more fundamental agreement, especially in the field of disarmament. It would prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other Powers. It would lessen the dangers of thermonuclear wars. And these arguments are reinforced by an insistent Soviet campaign to the effect that nuclear tests should be unconditionally prohibited and nuclear weapons outlawed.

The yearning for an end of the cold war reflects the deepest aspirations of the free world. So intense is it that we have been ready to stigmatize as more immoral than other weapons the weapon around which we have built our defense of that world. But the very intensity of our desire for peace may increase our peril. It may make us seek agreement for its own sake and thus set in motion a train of events which will divide the non-Communist world and undermine its resolution. The hopes which have been attached to a complete ban on nuclear tests are surely understandable. But they should not have been raised so high without a careful analysis of the political and psychological implications of such a step and its relationship to our defense policies and long-term goals. Instead we became preoccupied with technical problems of

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a test ban, which are by no means the most important. When we agreed to meet with Soviet scientists at Geneva, we clearly implied that if inspection was found to be technically feasible, we would be willing to discuss a complete ban. Therefore, when the scientists had made their report, we felt impelled to make a critical policy decision, although only its technical aspects had been fully explored.

This article questions whether a complete suspension of nuclear testing is desirable, whatever the possibilities of inspection. It argues that we should deal with the health hazard by ending tests which involve appreciable fall-out but that we should agree to a complete ban only as part of a general disarmament agreement which includes conventional weapons. The desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust and to achieve a lasting peace should be taken for granted in any debate on this problem. At issue can only be the best means to achieve these ends.

II

Because of the emphasis laid on the technical aspects of ending nuclear tests, it may be useful at the start to discuss these and to point out some of the difficulties involved. It is generally agreed that surface nuclear explosions can be detected at considerable distances by equipment which measures radioactivity and shock waves.[1] The difficulty arises with underground testing, high altitude testing and testing underneath the polar icecaps, and with the increasing civilian uses of nuclear energy.

With respect to underground testing it is argued that a system of inspection stations spaced 300 miles apart could detect all ununderground explosions of about 1 kiloton explosive power except in the seismic belt where earthquakes are more frequent, requiring inspection stations on a 100-mile grid. Nevertheless serious problems remain. Methods of "buffering" explosions so that the seismic shock is weakened have barely been explored, but indications are that they can reduce the seismic wave by a very substantial percentage. Moreover, the seismic equipment can locate the shock only within an area several miles in diameter. Some but not all of the characteristics of an underground explosion can be distinguished from those of an earthquake. Conclusive proof can be obtained only by finding the precise location of the suspected eva-

[1] For a very good account of methods of detecting nuclear weapons testing see "The Detection of Nuclear Weapons Testing," by Jay Orear, in "Inspection for Disarmament," edited by Seymour Melman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 85 *f.*

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sion either by means of boring for radioactive samples or by discovering an entrance to the test site. This is a considerable task in an area which may cover more than 30 square miles. And the negotiators at Geneva agreed that the problem of high altitude testing was very little understood at this stage. The same difficulty may apply to testing underneath the polar icecaps.

Again, as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become more widespread other means of evasion may be developed. In fact, the United States explicitly and the Soviet Union by implication have both exempted peaceful applications of nuclear energy from their announced test bans.[2] One of the obvious applications of nuclear energy is in mining. It will not be easy to prevent a country from using devices for blasting which also have military applications, or from gaining militarily useful knowledge by checking the results with scientific instruments. To be sure, inspection teams could be invited to witness each peaceful use of nuclear explosives; but as the peaceful applications of nuclear energy grow more common, this will become increasingly difficult. A nation determined on evasion could overload the inspection mechanism by hiding test explosions among hundreds of ordinary ones.

In any event we must keep in mind that the best inspection system can guard only against presently known methods of evasion. In the nature of things it is difficult to protect against a contingency not yet imagined. And finally, evasion will be easier to attempt and to conceal in the Soviet Union than in the West. In the West a ban on nuclear testing will be largely self-policing, because public opinion will not countenance evasion and scientists will not lend themselves to it.[3] No such inhibitions will exist in the U.S.S.R.

Yet the most vexing problem of inspection is not that of obtaining information, difficult as it is, but the political consequences to be drawn from whatever information does become available. Obviously a violation of the nuclear test ban is not a *casus belli.* It may not even be a sufficient cause for the injured party to start testing again. Once nuclear tests have been banned, the free world will not abrogate its agreement easily, even in the face of strong provocation. Even if it reached a decision to do so,

[2] *The New York Times,* August 23, 1958.

[3] For an interesting analysis of the degree to which public opinion in free world countries would support a test ban see "An International Public Opinion Poll on Disarmament and 'Inspection by the People': A Study of Attitudes Toward Supranationalism," by William M. Evan in Melman, *op. cit.,* p. 231 *f.*

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years might be consumed before tests could be resumed. For one thing, a nation like the United States which had observed the ban might by then have nothing to test. A ban extended over a period of years would almost certainly lead to the attrition of our weapons laboratories, whose ablest scientists would be increasingly tempted to concentrate on more promising fields. For another, the United States would have great difficulty reassembling its testing machinery. Present tests involve scores of installations and thousands of personnel. It would be impossible to keep these teams together once a test ban had been agreed upon. Even a strong indication of Soviet violation might therefore leave the United States at a serious disadvantage or at least without adequate recourse.

Moreover, there is a great difference between obtaining information which is technically reliable and establishing a similar degree of political and psychological clarity. It is often maintained that a violation of the test ban would have a catastrophic impact on world opinion. But this assumes a degree of certainty about Soviet intentions which is belied by all past experience. The Soviet Union has always been skillful in presenting its challenges in an ambiguous manner, partly by masking its own actions, partly by charging its opponents with similar transgressions. According to its usual tactic, the Kremlin, within a short time of signing an agreement to end nuclear tests, would quite probably accuse us of violating it.[4] In the resulting atmosphere of recrimination it would be difficult to separate sincere charges from the customary exchanges of the cold war. The result might well be a further weakening of the will of the free world.

Finally, it is quite possible that a complete ban on testing would enable the Soviet Union to overtake us in the military applications of nuclear energy. Whereas a complete test ban would magnify our already great difficulty in inducing our ablest scientists to work on nuclear weapons, it would not prevent the Soviet Union from keeping its research teams together either by compulsion or by arranging appropriate incentives. Also, the Soviets may feel less dependent on testing in order to achieve scientific progress. The experimental method is instinctive to the West. Marxist dogmatism places much greater reliance on theory. For example, the Kremlin announced its first nuclear explosion sev-

[4] This process may already have started. See the Soviet charge that the United States "hid" 18 test explosions in the Pacific. *The New York Times*, August 24, 1958.

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eral days before it took place. Thus even if the rate of scientific progress were the same, the Soviets may gain an advantage because of greater confidence in untested data. Or else they may use a temporary cessation to prepare tests of superior weapons.

Nevertheless, the deepest concern about a complete ban on testing does not arise from the danger that it may permit Soviet technical advances or from the political and practical difficulty of inspection. We must consider whether the basic motive behind Communist pressure for a complete ending of nuclear tests may not be the Soviet Union's conviction that it would gain a substantial advantage from a complete ban which it scrupulously observed. The wisdom of a complete end of nuclear tests so often advocated as a "first step" depends on the answer to the question "first step towards what?"

III

It may be argued that such a question is a symptom of the distrust which has produced the cold war. Unless both sides are willing to take some risks in the quest for peace, it will be said, the world will be doomed to an indefinitely continued armaments race and eventual destruction. Since the death of Stalin, great changes have occurred in the Soviet Union, brought about by the appearance of a new bureaucracy, the increasing demand for consumer goods, and the creation of the entire apparatus of an industrialized society. According to this line of thought, the Russians' expressed desire for peaceful coexistence represents a concession to the pressures of these new forces. Given time and patience, the Soviet Union may evolve into a society not unlike ours.

Because these assertions derive from attitudes which have contributed so much to the stability and often the freedom of our society and that of many of our allies, it is difficult to contradict them. A status quo Power always has difficulty in understanding a revolutionary state. All its instincts tempt it to accept peaceful professions and to refuse to believe in implacable hostility.

Were it not for this difficulty of understanding, no revolution would ever have succeeded. A revolutionary movement always starts from a position of inferior strength. It owes its survival to the reluctance of its declared victims to accept its professions at face value. It owes its success to the psychological advantage which single-minded purpose confers over an opponent who does not believe that some states may prefer victory to peace. The

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ambiguity which makes the Soviet challenge so deadly derives in part from the skill of the Soviet leadership; but the danger is magnified by the tendency of the free world to choose the interpretation of Soviet motivations which best accords with its own preconceptions. Neither Lenin's writings, nor Stalin's utterances, nor Mao's published works, nor Khrushchev's declarations, have availed against the conviction of the West that a basic change in Communist society and aims was imminent and that a problem deferred was a problem solved. It is only to posterity that revolutionary movements appear unambiguous. Thus a status quo Power is never certain until too late that another state intends to overthrow the international system, especially as the revolutionary Power will present each demand as a specific, limited objective, which often in itself seems quite reasonable. However weak at the beginning, it can substitute psychological strength for physical power; it can use the very enormity of its goals to defeat gradually an opponent who cannot come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives.

This becomes a particular problem if the revolutionary Power exploits this weakness systematically. In Soviet terminology, for example, the concepts war and peace are inherently confusing. Since, according to Communist theory, the social structure of capitalist states necessarily produces war, real peace can be achieved only by the world-wide triumph of Communism. Therefore any act by the Soviet Union, however warlike on the surface, is pacific by definition and any measure by a capitalist state, however seemingly conciliatory, tends toward war. Thus the slogan peaceful coexistence has never had more than a tactical significance in Communist terminology. "Marxism-Leninism," wrote Mao, "does not allow concessions to be regarded as something purely negative. . . . Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, should always be regarded as part of the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line. . . ."[5] To be sure, the protestations of peaceful coexistence have recently become more insistent; but the reason is not very flattering to the West, since it consists in the assertion that war has become unnecessary in order to encompass the downfall of the free world.

[5] Mao Tse-tung, "Selected Works," v. 2, 1937–1938 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 263–4.

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The argument outlined here may not prove persuasive to the increasing number of people in the free world who desire an end to the cold war so intensely that they ignore the lessons of the past and the fundamental professions of Communist doctrine. But even the most optimistic should ask themselves why Khrushchev can be expected to deal any more gently with the countries of the free world than with his erstwhile colleagues in the Soviet Presidium. What was the doctrine of collective leadership but the principle of peaceful coexistence applied among the Soviet leaders? Yet it was used ruthlessly by Khrushchev first to paralyze opposition by branding it contrary to the principle of collective leadership and then to defeat his opponents one by one. Khrushchev could not have succeeded domestically had he not been able first to convince his colleagues of his sincerity. Is it not at least possible that the men who arrested the leaders of the Hungarian revolution while negotiating an armistice with them and who executed them despite a promise of safe conduct are now seeking to apply these same methods to weaken the cohesion of the free world and then to destroy its members piecemeal? A wise policy will at least consider this contingency and will not risk everything simply for the sake of agreement.

Certainly the free world has a duty to seek to spare mankind the horrors of another war. It must strive for any agreement that offers such prospects. But a real relaxation of tensions can come about only if the Soviet leaders become convinced that they cannot use negotiations to induce us to disarm unilaterally, that any agreement must be *mutually* advantageous. We must consider, then, whether insistent Soviet demands for a complete ban on nuclear testing are not designed to paralyze the free world rather than to bring about peace as we understand the word.

IV

Rightly or wrongly, the free world has based its defense on nuclear weapons. We need not here review the circumstances nor analyze the motives that led to this decision. It is enough to note that nowhere in the Western world are there sufficient conventional forces to resist the Soviet preponderance in conventional strength; and nowhere is there any immediate prospect of developing them. Nothing now stands in the way of Soviet domination of Eurasia save the Soviet reluctance to pay the price of a nuclear war.

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That is why the Soviet Union has systematically sought to paralyze the West's will to use the weapons around which its entire defense effort has been built. It has done this both by creating a substantial nuclear stockpile of its own and by seeking to have nuclear weapons outlawed. Appealing to the most basic fears of humanity, the whole apparatus of Soviet policy, from diplomacy to "peace" congresses, has sought to undermine our reliance on the most effective—or at least the only available—means of resistance to Soviet domination.

The free world should therefore have no illusions about the implications of a complete ban on nuclear tests. For if a cessation of nuclear testing is a "first step" to anything it is to an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. If these weapons are too dangerous to test, so the argument will go, they are surely too terrible to use. That this is the aim of Soviet policy was made explicit by Khrushchev: "After the termination of nuclear weapons tests, it would be possible to raise the question of the Powers making a solemn undertaking not to use hydrogen and atomic weapons and henceforth to adopt a decision on the total prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. . . ."[6] In the present state of Western defenses such a prohibition is tantamount to unilateral disarmament. The onesidedness of our military establishment has deprived our diplomacy of flexibility. If the free world possessed a conventional force sufficiently powerful and mobile to blunt Soviet aggression by similar forces, the complete cessation of nuclear testing would not be so dangerous. But none of the advocates of a nuclear test ban has been prepared to champion—and many have actively opposed—a build-up of conventional forces sufficient to offset the grave risks which their proposals invite.

Nor will the weakening of the free world be compensated for by a victory in the battle for the minds of men. In the current atmosphere where all attention has been focused on the most cataclysmic uses of nuclear weapons and we have failed to develop or to offer a plausible alternative, a complete cessation of tests will merely serve to shift pressures to the banning of nuclear weapons. We must be sensitive to world opinion. But we have also an obligation to contribute to shaping it. We must succeed in conveying the fact that unless the free world is prepared to accept a settlement on Soviet terms, we must have a military establishment which we are prepared to invoke for our defense. If we are not

[6] *The New York Times*, June 29, 1958.

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willing to run some risks for the preservation of our values and our interests, the collapse of the free world is inevitable and no amount of rhetoric can eliminate this fact.

V

The willingness to run risks depends in part on the options afforded by our military establishment. We require more conventional forces. We must have a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons. We must stop pretending that we can have security on the cheap.

One of the penalties of being on the defensive is that the choices which we must make are more difficult than the aggressor's, if only because the dangers against which we must protect ourselves are more varied. The aggressor can choose his point of attack; he can select the weapons system which seems most promising; he can concentrate on the area where his opponent is weakest either geographically or in weaponry. The defender must be able to defend all likely targets of aggression and against any weapons system that may be employed. Two consequences follow: (a) at equal levels of military effort the aggressor usually has an advantage; and (b) the defensive requires a more advanced weapons technology than its opponent. The side which concedes the first blow must have a more mobile and better protected retaliatory force, for it must be able to withstand the attrition of the initial attack. Its weapons must be lighter so that they can be rapidly moved to threatened areas. It must possess a range of capabilities which deters the aggressor from tilting the scales by expanding either the area or the intensity of the conflict. The side which concedes the first blow therefore runs major risks if it compounds the disadvantage of the defensive by having a frozen weapons technology. This is particularly true in the present stage of weapons development.

The nuclear weapons with which we are most familiar and which are most fully tested are also the most destructive. Any war would have to be conducted in their shadow. Under present circumstances they even inhibit recourse to conventional weapons, for the danger of a nuclear showdown will be thought to be inherent in *any* conflict. This view has already been articulated in Great Britain where Lord Russell has insisted that even surrender is preferable to running the risk of war.[7]

It is therefore essential that we develop nuclear weapons of

[7] Bertrand Russell, "Freedom to Survive," *The New Leader*, July 7–14, 1958, p. 23.

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finer discrimination, less destructive power and greatly reduced fall-out. This need exists regardless of whether we intend to rely on a conventional or on a nuclear defense. As long as the defensive effort of the free world is polarized between inadequate conventional forces and nuclear weapons of enormous destructiveness, the Soviet bloc will be able to pose the dilemma of suicide or surrender in a variety of forms. By engaging in or encouraging aggression with conventional forces it can force our leaders to choose between yielding or invoking a strategy which will involve catastrophic casualties. Even if we build up conventional forces and resist initially without recourse to nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union may be tempted to utilize a few weapons of low yield unless deterred by the knowledge that we have ample weapons of similar discrimination and superior technology.[8] A conventional war can be kept conventional only if we are prepared with a wide variety of nuclear weapons.

This will be true whether or not the Soviet Union follows suit. The rhetorical question "Why develop clean weapons if they use dirty weapons against us?" is surely no more pertinent than the argument "Why rely on bullets if the opponent has nuclear weapons?" This reasoning would loosen all constraints and would lead to the continued elaboration of ever more destructive weapons. Moreover, the availability of clean weapons is of great importance for the protection of our own troops and also civilian populations, which may be endangered by fall-out from our own weapons. But the essential purpose of having a wide range of clean and discriminating weapons is to give the free world an option which does not involve either immediate catastrophe or surrender. Possession of them will improve the plausibility of our deterrent and reduce the possibility of Soviet atomic blackmail which has been so central a feature of Soviet diplomacy in recent years. And they will provide a shield behind which to build up conventional forces if we are prepared to make the sacrifices. The difference in will power between the Soviet bloc and the free world must not reach the point where we assume an unlimited willingness on the part of our opponent to run risks, while we recoil before the risks of even a limited defense.

In a revolutionary world rife with possibilities for upheavals,

[8] The aggressor employing nuclear weapons against conventional forces will have a relatively concentrated target because massed firepower is difficult to achieve otherwise in a conventional war. He can therefore employ relatively crude nuclear weapons, having first dispersed his own forces.

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perhaps unsought by any major Power, it is imperative to couple the quest for peace with efforts to mitigate the consequences of conflicts that may occur either by accident or design. If this effort is not made, the result must be an increasing pacifism which will produce appeasement if not surrender; or else, if a decision to resist is taken, it will lead to the most catastrophic kind of war. Is it not possible that Soviet leaders have been so insistent on a complete and unconditional end of nuclear tests precisely because they are aware of the paralysis produced by such prospects?

VI

Would not the end of nuclear testing avoid the diffusion of nuclear weapons among other Powers? Of course, a nuclear test ban will serve only to inhibit the independent development of nuclear weapons by "fourth" Powers; it will not necessarily prevent the distribution of nuclear weapons from the stockpiles of the major nuclear Powers, nor will it stop them from turning over blueprints to an ally. Nevertheless a complete ban on nuclear testing will have psychological and political consequences which will make it difficult for other Powers to acquire nuclear weapons, particularly in the free world. The issue of a ban on nuclear testing is therefore inseparable from that of nuclear sharing.

The situation with respect to nuclear sharing can be summarized as follows: The Communist bloc possesses a decisive military superiority in all contiguous areas. The Soviet Union can threaten with nuclear weapons all peripheral areas and much of Africa from its own territories; Communist China is overwhelmingly stronger than any neighboring state in conventional weapons. In these circumstances the Soviet Union may have decided that it has little to gain and a greal deal to lose from the diffusion of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in view of the political unreliability of some of the satellite régimes, it probably has a positive interest in keeping nuclear weapons out of their hands.

The immediate Soviet objective is therefore to prevent the development of a nuclear capability under local control on the European continent, for then Western Europe and other contiguous areas will eventually become neutralized. Without a nuclear capability of its own, Europe will find it impossible to resist the increasingly bold Soviet threats of nuclear warfare, which have been a cardinal aspect of Soviet diplomacy in every crisis since Suez. Europe, should it want to be defended, would then become

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entirely dependent on the American assessment of its danger. In such a situation the Soviet leaders may well calculate that the United States would be reluctant to invoke its own destruction for the defense of Europe, or that even in an all-out war they could not be prevented from seizing Europe. For after the initial exchange of blows the Soviet Union would remain supreme in Eurasia.[9] That the Soviet Union is concerned with making Europe impotent and not with the threat offered by a European nuclear establishment is demonstrated by the Soviet protest against the plan to equip the Swiss army with nuclear weapons.[10] By no stretch of the imagination can Switzerland be suspected of aggressive intent against the U.S.S.R.

In negotiating about a nuclear test ban we must therefore take care not to contribute to a climate of opinion which will make our position on the Continent untenable and a local defense of Europe impossible. Already influential groups in Britain argue for a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and considerable pressures exist in Germany against equipping German forces for nuclear war. In both countries the cessation of nuclear tests is considered as an initial move away from atomic weapons. The more the Soviet Union succeeds in building up a distinction between nuclear weapons and other weapons, while retaining full control of its own stockpile, the more it will undermine the will of the Western alliance to resist. Once the Soviet Union has succeeded in bringing about a divergence between our military establishment and that of our European allies, it may hope that our NATO partners will be paralyzed by their impotence and we by our unwillingness to risk all-out war.

If we permit a distinction to grow up between our military establishment and that of our NATO allies, our expulsion from Europe is almost inevitable. Further delay in the distribution of nuclear weapons to our European allies will give the Soviet Union more time to persuade Europeans that they will be able to escape involvement in any conflict by refusing to permit nuclear installations on their territory. Logically, this denuclearization of Europe will be followed by a demand that American troops withdraw, since their equipment is so obviously nuclear. At the very least it will expose us to great pressure to withdraw all our nu-

[9] See Peregrine Worsthorne, "Our Bomb and Theirs: As the Russians See It," *Encounter*, July 1958. Also Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age," New York: Praeger, 1958.

[10] *The New York Times*, August 9, 1958.

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clear installations from the Continent. Western Europe would then be impotent, at the mercy of Soviet Russia. NATO would cease to have meaning.

This is not to say that Europe must obtain nuclear weapons from its own production or that these weapons must be under national control. From many points of view it would be highly desirable if NATO's nuclear components were under NATO control, or if a European atomic force were formed on the model of E.D.C. Similarly it is not essential that nuclear weapons be locally produced, but only that there be European participation in their use and control. Before we go much further in the direction of a complete ban on testing, we should at the very least amend our Atomic Energy Act to permit wider nuclear sharing. And our approach to the question of nuclear testing should be based on premises which do not inhibit nuclear sharing and which will not give impetus to Soviet ban-the-bomb propaganda.

Will not the possession of nuclear weapons by our allies increase the danger of war? This would be true if our allies felt thereby encouraged to attack the Soviet Union, or if they were to use nuclear weapons in their own quarrels outside of Europe. But excessive adventurousness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union can hardly be considered a European failing. Even in the less preferred contingency that nuclear weapons were under national rather than NATO control, it is difficult to conceive the circumstances which would induce any European country to unleash a unilateral attack on the Soviet Union. The individual nuclear capability will remain so small, the disproportion in vulnerability is so great, that they could not, by any rational calculation, use these weapons for offensive ends. Their purpose would be to make the costs of aggression, particularly of local adventures, prohibitive, and to discourage Soviet atomic blackmail.[11]

As for the use of these weapons to settle private quarrels outside Europe, this could be effectively forestalled by placing them under NATO or an over-all European control. But even should they be under national control, the likelihood of their use outside of NATO is slight. The difficulty which the French army has in Algeria is not inadequate firepower but that of finding targets against which this firepower can be used. Atomic weapons have little significance in guerrilla-type operations.

[11] For a fuller discussion of the problems of the defense of Europe see the author's "Missiles and the Western Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958.

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But what of the uncommitted nations? Is there to be no end to the diffusion of nuclear weapons? First, it must be recognized that from a technical standpoint the diffusion of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly difficult to prevent, regardless of what decision is reached with respect to nuclear testing. As the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become widespread, more and more nations will become familiar with nuclear technology. The end product of many atomic reactors is plutonium, which is also the basic component of nuclear weapons. As nuclear energy becomes more familiar, its military applications will be very difficult to control. Nothing short of the original Baruch-Lilienthal plan seems capable of arresting this trend.

It does not follow, moreover, that because the diffusion of nuclear weapons must be stopped at *some* point it must be stopped at this point, or that the most effective method is a ban on nuclear testing. To be sure, the more nuclear Powers exist the more difficult it will be to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. But we must weigh this risk against the danger of collaborating with the Soviet Union in the neutralization of Europe. This would leave us without powerful allies. It would place us ultimately in the position of having to defend the whole Soviet periphery alone against Soviet nuclear attack or Soviet atomic blackmail. Bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to the exclusion of our European allies are fraught with danger. It would be much better to deal with the problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons directly rather than through the indirect method of a test ban, and to include our NATO allies as nuclear Powers in any agreement, preferably through a European Atomic Community.

Of possible methods to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, a test ban is the most disadvantageous to the free world. Its relevance to nuclear sharing is primarily that it will contribute to a psychological attitude in the West making it impossible for any of our allies to acquire nuclear weapons. Communist China will not be similarly inhibited from obtaining nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union. Even if reports that the U.S.S.R. has already agreed to give nuclear weapons to Communist China are premature,[12] it does not seem likely that the Soviet Union would in the long run risk its most important alliance by refusing to share nuclear weapons in any form. It is idle to argue that in these circumstances the United States would be free to give nuclear weapons

[12] *The New York Times*, August 18, 1958.

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to its own allies. By that time, the public opinion of our NATO partners would not permit the possession of nuclear weapons, especially as the direct threat to these countries is not markedly increased if China possesses nuclear weapons.

The difficulty with a total ban on nuclear testing is that it stakes too much on a measure which in itself is of problematical significance. It will build up world-wide reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, the only means of defense now existing against Soviet aggression or Soviet military pressure. It will impede if not prevent the articulation of a strategy for the defense of Europe. It will increase the danger that any war that does break out will take the most catastrophic form. By freezing weapons development after only the most fearful applications of nuclear power have been fully explored, it will increase the possibilities for Soviet atomic blackmail without reducing the free world's peril. As a first step it goes too far and in a too uncertain direction.

VII

One of the difficulties the free world has had in dealing with the Soviet bloc is that we have been clearer about the things we oppose than those we stand for. This has given much of our negotiations with the Soviet Union the quality of a stubborn rear-guard action designed primarily to thwart Soviet overtures. It has enabled the Soviet leadership to define the issues in international debate, putting us in the position of respondent rather than initiator. World-wide pressures are built up against us before we have a chance to demonstrate our own purposes and values.

So it has been with the issue of nuclear testing. Our diplomacy has concentrated on problems of inspection or on belittling the danger of fall-out. Whatever the scientific basis of the fear of radiation,[13] there is no question that we should respect the depth of that fear among many peoples exposed to fall-out from tests outside their control and against which they have no protection. Control over radioactive fall-out is therefore a requirement of any United States policy on nuclear testing. But the United States should not be asked at the same time to initiate the control of armaments by paralyzing itself and its allies without at least the beginning of a reduction of Soviet conventional strength and of some protection against surprise attack. The fact that the Soviet

[13] See for example the recent U.N. report on radiation. *The New York Times*, August 11, 1958.

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Union has proved obdurate on a general disarmament scheme indicates only that it wants to use negotiations to disarm us unilaterally, not that such a scheme lacks merit. If we negotiate only on issues the Soviets declare soluble, we can be sure that diplomacy will become increasingly a device to undermine the free world.

In the negotiations on a nuclear test ban which are about to begin, the United States should therefore propose that we are willing to address ourselves immediately to the problem of fall-out but that a complete ban would depend on a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Pending such an agreement, we should propose that, while nuclear weapons are essential to the defense of the free world, we are prepared to take immediate steps to mitigate the effects either of testing or of using them. We should invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. committee which would immediately set a maximum dosage of permissible fall-out from testing well below the level brought about by recent tests. The U.N. committee should then assign a quota to the United States and its allies and another to the Soviet bloc on a 50-50 basis. (Since most of the potential "fourth" Powers are in the West, this would be a considerable concession to the U.S.S.R.) For two years all Powers would agree to register with the U.N. all tests which involve fall-out and both sides would agree not to exceed their quota. During those two years the quota would be progressively reduced, ultimately to zero. Afterwards, unless there were by then a general disarmament agreement, nations would remain free to conduct surface tests of "clean" weapons, underground tests and tests in outer space, so long as they did not cause fall-out. Technical experts from both sides would agree on an adequate inspection mechanism, which could be relatively simple.

While such an agreement would impede the arms race, it would not stop weapons development altogether. It would permit the continued elaboration of defensive weapons and of weapons which can be applied with discrimination, both in terms of fall-out and in terms of yield. Indeed it will put a premium on such development because these weapons can be tested most easily underground or within established "fall-out" quotas. It will avoid placing the United States in the position of not trusting its allies with the development of weapons which are essential to their defense and which their opponent already possesses in quantity. At the same time, it will impede the too rapid diffusion of nuclear technology and thereby afford time for a careful study of this problem.

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The easiest weapons to develop are those with major fall-out effects. The least complicated method of testing is above ground. Thus a limited ban could channel future weapons development into the least destructive channels. It would reduce and ultimately eliminate whatever health hazard there may be in present testing.

Such a proposal would counteract the Soviet effort to elaborate a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers or zones or warfare, a distinction which can only paralyze the free world. At the same time, it would call attention to a distinction between forms of warfare which are unnecessarily destructive and those which seek to confine devastation to the smallest possible proportions—a condition which is essential to make our deterrent posture plausible and to strengthen the will of the free world. If the Soviet Union rejected our proposal, we and our allies should impose a steeply decreasing quota on ourselves, thus forcing the Soviet Union into the position of being solely responsible for any health hazard in nuclear testing. In this manner, increasing pressure of world opinion could be built up against the most catastrophic use of nuclear weapons and in favor of a general disarmament agreement. This approach to the problem of nuclear testing would have the additional advantage that it would be much easier to inspect. Inspection could concentrate on one problem reasonably well understood: that of fall-out. If no radioactivity were found, no violation was taking place.

A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would meet many of the fears of humanity without exposing the free world to incalculable peril. It would be a "first step" which avoids most of the dangers of a complete ban and yet achieves many of its goals. If the limitation of nuclear tests proved workable, the inspection system could be expanded, reduction of arms might follow, and efforts could be made to reduce the danger of surprise attack. None of these measures is possible, however, as long as the Soviet Union is encouraged to believe, by the irresolution and evasions of the free world, that through skillful and persistent diplomacy it can break up the cohesiveness of the Western alliance and undermine the will to resist aggression with the only effective weapon now at our disposal.

VIII

It is widely believed in the West that the issue of nuclear testing is a touchstone of our sincerity. Many argue that the Soviet

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Union scored a major gain by renouncing nuclear tests and that we exhibited lack of imagination and the absence of a moral dimension by not following suit immediately. The reluctance to end nuclear testing, so the argument goes, is a symptom of the sterility and over-concern with military problems which have been at the root of so many of our difficulties.

There is no doubt that the Western world is in deep trouble. It has not been able to articulate either a philosophy or a program adequate to the challenge of the times. It has failed to identify itself with the revolutionary period through which we are living and it has not had the vision or the willingness to carry through a sustained program of world economic development. Because we have not been clear about our purpose we have often found it easier to concentrate on defensive measures than on those which might give a sense of direction to a world in turmoil.

But even in the military field we are inadequately prepared to deal with most of the issues with which we are likely to be confronted. We have insufficient strength for limited war. We are falling behind in the over-all strategic equation. The answer to our political dilemma is not to be found in reducing our defenses—for even here more effort and imagination are required—but in injecting a greater sense of purpose into our over-all performance.

As a nation of specialists we like to believe that a problem is either political *or* economic *or* military. The challenge we face, however, is that contemporary problems involve a combination of all these factors. Our choice is not between working for the things in which we believe or attending to our necessities. If we cannot do both, we will not be able to do either.

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SCIENCE IN OUR NATIONAL LIFE

By Caryl P. Haskins

IT is a year since, at 5:58 p.m. on October 4, 1957, the Moscow radio announced that the Soviet Union had placed in orbit the first man-made, man-launched earth satellite. In many ways it has been an extraordinary year. There can be no doubt about some of the positive gains which it has brought, stimulated in part by the shock of sudden nation-wide realization that we have no easy superiority in that world of military technology that had so long been a special pride. The focusing of renewed attention on vital and extraordinarily difficult questions of organization in the military departments, the partial stemming of some very dangerous relaxations in military posture which threatened us in 1957, some real expansions in the scale of research and development for new weapons, and increased emphasis on certain vital elements in our defense technology—all these represented welcome immediate reactions.

There was also much, of course, that was noisy and transitory, bearing the stamp of an all-too-human eagerness to wish away unpleasant questions or to dismiss them with quick and facile answers. On second thought, some of this discussion already appears rather meaningless and of little permanent significance. But there is a residue which, because it shows continuing vitality and may lead to erroneous and even dangerous sequiturs, deserves attention.

At the close of this turbulent year the frenetic quality of our concern has already begun to wear away. Subsequent Soviet satellite launchings, for better or for worse, have not excited anything like the same public anxiety as the historic first, though their significance was no less. We have begun to realize that the basic pattern of our technological effort in national defense was firmly established long before the satellite launchings and that its present magnitude, scope and direction, in the larger sense, are projections from this base, affected far less by the event of the satellite than by more massive and permanent domestic considerations—technical, fiscal, organizational and political.

In this somewhat lengthened perspective, there may be an opportunity now—which perhaps will not be vouchsafed us in quite the same way ever again—to bring this experience into focus, to

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assess its message at a deeper level than that of immediate defensive reactions, while the experience itself is fresh in mind. If we can do this with the intensity that is required, demanding of ourselves the long view of the kind of world that we and our children may expect, our own proper place in it, and the severe requirements that our rôle imposes on us, then the year past will indeed have been worth while.

One misconception which has survived from the year must excite particular concern, not only because it is erroneous and may lead to harmful conclusions, but because it vividly illuminates the change of scale that is required in our thinking, in both magnitude and time. It is the notion that the October launching demonstrated that the United States had irrevocably lost a technological race with the Soviet Union and must now think of itself as occupying a "second place" in the technical competition of the world. It was a viewpoint, of course, which was not lost on the Soviets—indeed they recognized it instantly as a substantial propaganda asset and capitalized on it vigorously in the foreign-language broadcasts that issued from Moscow in Arabic, French, German and English within hours of the original announcement.

There can be no question today of the magnitude, skill, capability, drive and imagination of Russian science and technology to which this remarkable achievement, among others, attests. There can be no stint in our admiration for it, and, above all, in our respect for it. There can be no doubt of the significance of the achievement itself in scientific terms, nor of its sinister potential in military terms. Above all, there can be no doubt of the tremendous strides that it symbolizes for a nation, in skill and organization and intellect, now and in the future. But the image that we sometimes posed to ourselves last fall and winter, and that even today we have not wholly outgrown—the image of a technological race lost by our nation—is not only wrong but paltry because it poses the easy image of the single contest—the image, almost, of the playing field—where one event, one action, one failure, could be conclusive. It is a dangerous view, not only because it could encourage the human temptation to relax effort in the face of a fait accompli, whether of failure or success, but even more because it misreads the whole nature of our world and its challenges.

The factual error is easily disposed of. It lies in the very basis of science and technology itself. In one important respect, science

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and technology, like the twentieth-century patterns of industrialism which accompany or follow them, are great common denominators of modern states. Regardless of the divergent natures of their cultures, regardless of the chasms of history, of political orientation, of values, of self-image, of conduct, of deepest belief which sunder them, when nations deal in the realm of science and technology they deal in a common discipline. Here the parameters of content are set not by men or social systems but by the nature of the physical world, a constant for all states. The rate and the success of a nation's technical progress will be an important function, among other things, of its organizational capacity, application and zeal, and of how well the modes which it chooses fit its aptitudes and traditions. But an indispensable element, the stock of knowledge upon which it can draw, is a common heritage of all states, derived from the whole body of learning. From this unalterable condition, and from the richness and the immensely varied character of the world's technology and its protean character, it follows that no meaningful assessment of the relative position of two technically gifted and powerful states can ever be made at a given time from the evidence of a single achievement, regardless of how spectacular.

Far more important than the factual incorrectness of the conception is a dangerous conclusion which may follow from it. It reasons that, because the Soviet Union has transformed itself from a technically rather backward state to a modern and vastly powerful one in a breathtakingly short time, the operating *forms* by which this was accomplished themselves have a special validity. It follows, of course, that, in a literal sense, they may serve as practical models for our own efforts. Imitations that have been suggested run all the way from placing exaggerated emphasis on specific technical areas to which the Soviets are known to be devoting special attention to detailed comparisons of the numbers of Soviet and American students in training in various scientific fields, and the means of their selection.

This reasoning entirely ignores a complementary all-important truth. Though the factual basis of knowledge and insights about the natural world and their use in the service of man is indeed available to all modern peoples, the modes by which that knowledge can be most effectively assimilated and used and new knowledge created are highly human factors, conditioned by the basic assumptions of each society. They must be as profoundly charac-

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teristic of each society, indeed, as the very concepts of what, out of total experience, is genuine and relevant—of what indeed constitutes reality. We may—and we must—learn a very great deal from Soviet science, as the Russians, with possibly greater diligence, are learning from ours. We shall find that in some areas our needs are similar and their efforts superior, and here it is imperative that we catch up. But to make the assumption that failure to parallel their pattern is remiss is gravely to risk the autonomy of our own scientific effort.

And there can be few things more precious to us than our autonomy, in science no less than in other areas of our national life. In the most literal sense it is the only firm guarantee that we have of the originality and boldness of our scientific effort, the only certain assurance that our technical growth will be adaptive and truly our own, achieved and assimilated in our own way. Beside this central point ancillary arguments seem slight. Yet it is worth recalling that if this autonomy were ever lost, and with it the strength, balance and confidence that it conveys, we could easily fall prey to false leads in our scientific and technical emphasis, in substance no less than in approach. It is worth noting, too, that the impression we give of autonomy, strength and audacity in science must be as convincing abroad as at home. As of today, there is much evidence that the Soviets are at least as impressed by the dimensions of our technology and as eager to profit from them as we are by theirs—that indeed a principal ambition is to surpass us. Clearly it is our own garden that we must cultivate.

We must not forget, however, that there is a corollary to all of this, which alone can make it valid. It would be exceedingly dangerous were we to consider the autonomy needed in our approaches to science and technology as a luxury that we can afford instead of as an element vital to that high level of ardor and effectiveness which is a requirement of our times. We have been well alerted over the past year to at least some facets of the military threat that confronts us in an age when power balances are unusually delicate. Even partly to meet the requirements of defense will demand unremitting effort on an unprecedented scale, extended into an indefinite future. Such effort is an absolute precondition for all else that we may do. But much more than this is demanded of us.

Over the past year we have had some striking exposures of the perilous fallacy which we as a people are all too prone to cultivate:

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the notion that peace is the normal and happy condition of our world, that periods of war and intense struggle are but episodes interrupting our tranquility. The concept that we are to be continuously challenged to reaffirm our values and prove their effectiveness is new and difficult for us to grasp. The analyses which we have had of the continuing rôle that limited military conflict may play emphasize one aspect of this situation, which so far we have taken far too little to heart. Now, before we have fairly assimilated this concept or escaped from a preoccupation with total war, we are required to take a longer and more subtle step of understanding. We must recognize that today *none* of our larger problems will be amenable to clear and final solution. They will instead present lengthy tests of persistent and concentrated purpose.

It has required sober reflection on the events of the past year to drive home once more the truth that except in cataclysmic war the processes of social change and growth in dynamic systems are continuous and involve every part and aspect of the whole. No facet of the national effort, no national resource, can be insignificant or stand apart. The total strength of a nation is involved. In the modern world, the measure of the strength and, in the truest sense, the wealth of a nation is the creativity, originality and ardor of its people. These elements, always in short supply, affect every field of activity. In many, science and technology among them, devotion to intellectual quality, to learning and to a certain kind of intellectual adventure is prerequisite to their healthy growth. In a world where technical achievement is a prominent factor in the total capacity for survival, the scientific capabilty of a people and, above all, their understanding and esteem of scientific values are extremely important elements of strength. Many factors must underpin them—the opportunities for scientific education, the material support available to science and technology, the breadth of comprehension of their nature and proper management. All great states must seek to maximize these components of their national wealth. The way it is accomplished and, above all, the incentives offered for individual growth, must be peculiarly characteristic of each, and will mirror its deepest social values. What are the specific challenges to us?

There can be no doubt that the Soviets have achieved an amazingly effective level of scientific education. There is considerable evidence that on the whole it surpasses our own in the severity of

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the challenge which it offers, the seriousness of purpose which it demands and the thoroughness of its preparation. Its character well typifies the startling kind of innovation that Russia has managed in so many fields. The system is clearly the beneficiary of the older one of Tsarist days—itself adapted from institutions in Western Europe and more particularly, in the nineteenth century, in Germany. The original purpose was to train a relatively limited intellectual minority, bringing to it extremely high standards of performance. Perhaps the most astonishing thing about the Soviet development has been the extension of this system to a huge scale, rivaling our own in massiveness but governed by the philosophy that from its tremendous volume of candidates early and ruthless selection will be made.

It would be folly not to recognize the gravity of the challenge of this development and all that underlies it. It seems likely that Soviet scientific education has already laid the groundwork for a technological advantage in the immediate future that we shall be hard pressed indeed to meet. The system is well adapted to the Russian tradition, fitting closely the philosophy of a nation convinced by its historical background that escape from poverty and obscurity—and latterly, in bolder and more optimistic terms, the achievement of unexampled wealth and power—are to be had only through the rigid subordination of the individual to the group. The incentives to achievement are very great. Talent and dedication receive powerful extrinsic rewards: surcease from grinding poverty and toil, material inducements of a high order, honor and recognition.

Not many years ago the complacent view was widely held that original scientific research can flourish only in a general climate of political freedom, like that of the Western democracies. We should be well warned today that it is quite possible to establish local climates of great substantive freedom, where original research can go forward most effectively, within a political system in which the social responsibility—and indeed the social concern —of those working on the intellectual frontiers of technology is rigidly constricted. Because the ideal of our civilization is the development of the whole man, whose daily tasks may be specialized but whose sense of responsibility and concern embrace the entire fabric of society, a necessary condition for creativeness among us is the wide and unimpeded horizon, the total freedom, of the individual. It is easy to forget that other social and politi-

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cal systems may operate in other ways. If we are tempted to do so, the current Soviet successes in science and technology should serve as urgent reminders that the test is not as simple as we thought.

Yet the challenge, severe as it is, is not insurmountable. We cannot meet it by imitating another system based on the form of numbers or of method but by achieving an equally widespread ardor in the scientific way, an equivalent appetite for its disciplines and rewards, an equivalent appreciation of all that it entails in the context of our own values. Some of the incentives to excellence in scientific training and achievement which are paramount in the Soviet system are not open to us, nor would we wish them to be—escape from hardship, for example, or disproportionately high material reward. But there are other rewards which our society is peculiarly able to afford: the intrinsic satisfaction of intellectual accomplishment attained by personal commitment to the limits of capacity; the excitement of discovery; the satisfactions of service; the identification with worlds transcending individual concerns. There is every reason to believe that once our society is geared to the effort, it is especially well adapted to nourish and expand the ideals of hard individual effort, discipline, adventure, frugality and dedication which the culture of individual excellence implies in every path including the scientific. But the road will not be easy, and we have some special difficulties to overcome, derived in large part from our history.

When a society which has from its beginning emphasized the worth and weight of the individual passes in a few generations from material poverty to great plenty it necessarily acquires some conceptions which may handicap its future. Among them is the conviction that the production of consumer goods and their provision to the individual are of overwhelming importance to society, and hence that the maximizing of this process is one of the most important functions of an industrial democracy. In a world where the true strength of a nation must be measured less in the plethora of its consumer goods than in its resources for production, and less in these than in the quality and creativity of its citizens, such a viewpoint is outmoded and in need of overhauling. The revision cannot fail to lay increased emphasis on the social importance of intellectual attainment and of the means to seek and cultivate it.

There is a deep antithesis between the attitude of the citizen-

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as-consumer—constantly served and entreated to express ever more varied and extensive material wants, upon the satisfaction of which the prosperity of a free economy so largely rests—and that of the citizen-as-creator, geared to making demands on himself to the limit of his capacity in his own interest and for the further benefit of his society. It requires great maturity to combine these rôles effectively. In our present wealthy and complex society it is undoubtedly much harder to cultivate some of the unities of motivation and some of the essentially Puritan ethic which the full prospering of the life of the mind requires. Yet this is what the times demand of us.

The task is huge, but we have resources that can be powerful and important aids if we will but tap them. Perhaps there is no greater strength of a free society than the sense of individual competition that it cultivates among its citizens. In an economy of plenty such competition in the acquisition or dispersal of material things cannot much longer offer us personal challenges that are genuinely satisfying. But to every citizen the keenest sort of competitive challenge—intense and absorbing and immune to satiety—is offered by the world of the mind, in whatever aspect and at whatever level his tastes, aspirations and abilities may dictate. It is only necessary that our scale of values comprehend this dimension and accord it the high place it deserves.

In the special intellectual fields of science and technology there are additional and compelling incentives to excellence. They inhere in the very nature of the scientific way. It is a characteristic of science that it is essentially dual in nature, including two quite disparate facets of human activity. Neither profound philosophy nor practical experiment was novel to Copernicus, nor to Archimedes, nor quite possibly to Amenhotep. What gave the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries immense significance was that these two elements, apparently so dissimilar, were wedded in effective partnership. To these two strands, effectively interwoven, science owes a large part of its intellectually ennobling character on the one hand, and on the other its practical power. Science is a way of life, a view of the world, a challenge and an inspiration to some of the highest and most absorbing efforts of individual self-expression and self-development that man can know. Its rewards lie in the joys of dedication, in the intoxicating adventure of discovery, in its astringent discipline and in the combination which it demands of creativity with critical appraisal.

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These have always been sufficient to bring to the scientific way those minds and spirits which can give it its character, penetration and vitality. This is the very essence of science—highly individual, unfettered and free. Upon our understanding of this fundamental aspect, upon our nourishing of these values, the whole vitality of our science and indeed our future as a dynamic society in good measure rests.

But science is also a way of getting things done, and to this highly practical characteristic, together with the cumulative and explosively self-propagating nature of the knowledge which it gathers, it owes its striking rate of growth. An interesting study recently made in England suggests that the growth-curve is essentially exponential, with a slope to indicate a doubling of the volume of the scientific effort approximately every 10 to 15 years. No comparable study seems to have been undertaken for the United States, but it is unlikely that the figure would be lower. This is not a new phenomenon, for the curve can be extrapolated without much change in slope to the time of Newton. But as with populations, constant exponential rates of growth in science soon result in awesome magnitudes. A doubling of the scientific effort two or perhaps even three times in a generation has resulted in our day in a huge and diversified structure, whose massiveness is only suggested by the eight-billion-dollar expenditure which a recent McGraw-Hill survey has estimated for 1958 for science and technology in American industry alone.

There are several implications of this situation, one of the most vital of which relates to the proper use and cultivation of scientific manpower. Given the degree of training and dedication that the scientific way demands, it is clear that such a rate of growth must severely strain our human reserves. In every society, of course, the greatest burden of scientific innovation must rest with minds innately gifted and with a strongly inborn bent to the scientific way. Like very great talent in any field, such minds will always be rare. We have to accept this fact, recognizing that, while we must do everything in our power to discover and cultivate them, there is a certain level of talent and drive which in the nature of things must remain more sharply limited biologically than socially, whatever we may do. But we must also remember that one such mind can break ground requiring thousands less gifted to cultivate successfully. A very significant part of scientific growth—and especially the pivotal area of testing and proving

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scientific innovation and translating it to practical use—rests with a host of expert but more ordinary intellects of extremely varied quality and kind. Discovering them and training them provide the keenest challenge to our system of education. We also have the strongest obligation to use and appreciate them properly in the years of their maturity. Here the advantages of our social structure, with all the immense diversity of opportunity which it provides, should stand us in good stead.

There is also a requirement for capable management. Where the total demand for scientific talent always threatens to exceed the supply, an efficient use of human resources, a reduction of duplication and waste, and a sharing of talents among industrial, academic and governmental responsibilities become imperative. We are not doing this at present as well as we can or should.

The very size of the scientific and technical effort, and its importance to our national welfare and power, mean that science must inevitably be an important concern of government. In the purely private field alone it has been estimated that fully half of the projected eight-billion-dollar industrial expenditure for 1958 will stem from governmental sources. We have not yet adequately met the problems posed by this volume of science and technology, by its national importance and also by its dual nature. We have no adequate understanding in government of the special nature and requirements of scientific management, different, perhaps, from any enterprise of similar weight and import in a democratic society. We do not fully understand how best to mobilize even relatively small sectors of that effort as a practical instrument without at the same time severely damaging or even destroying the center of its creative being, where flexibility and individual freedom are the very breath of life.

In the past we have never felt the need to mobilize our total scientific strength—just as we have felt no need to mobilize our total economic strength—except in time of war. Then, the effort has been heroic but necessarily improvised. Only since the experience of the Korean War, and more especially within the last year, have we begun to appreciate that this cannot meet our needs, that the means must be more comprehensive and persistent. Even the nature of the task—gigantic, subtle, protean—is not yet understood. But our ability to devise effective ways of meeting it, within our own pattern of values and within the peculiar requirements of science, will affect our national safety and our national power to

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an important degree. Significant steps have been taken in this direction during the past year in the creation of the entirely new post of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and in the intensified duties and widened scope of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

We have made only a start at this gigantic task. We face years of the grimmest sort of military challenge, on land and sea and above all in the air. And since the challenge involves the survival of the free world as a whole, the response must be from the whole free world, in science as well as in other areas. We are only beginning to recognize the necessity of properly coördinating the free world's over-all scientific strength. Some encouraging beginning steps have been taken this year in strengthening NATO scientifically, and progress has been made in implementing the scientific capabilities of the Department of State. We seem to be gaining some appreciation that in view of the development of technologies that bear on military power in the free world we must seek new opportunities to share knowledge with our allies. But with events moving at such speed, we still accept delays that should be recognized as involving the gravest sort of hazard.

One more consequence of the growth of science and its place in our national life is too important to go unmentioned, namely the particular difficulty of communication between the world of technology and those who formulate national policy. In the past, as today, there have been brilliant individuals who have accomplished this liaison effectively when the need was acute. Some had backgrounds of technical education and had contrived to train themselves to the breadth of understanding and judgment required in making high policy. Others, trained in the formulation of policy, managed to acquire scientific literacy. Their task was herculean, for the gulf between the modes of thinking normal to science and those used in judgment of general affairs is greater than can be appreciated by those who have not tried to span them. There can never be more than a handful of men who, coming exclusively from one background or the other, can learn to close the gap effectively in the full tide of adult life. Today a handful is not enough.

Neither is it enough to rely on the mere advice of specialists in one field given to those in another, important though this be. When a sensitive feeling for very detailed scientific nuances may condition policy decisions of enormous import, that bridge of

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communication is too narrow, too shaky. This has been underlined by the difficult task of the Congress in this last year, faced with the responsibility of making policy decisions in scientific and technical matters of the greatest national importance, where nothing in the earlier experience of most of its members helped or could have been expected to help.

There seems only one answer. Just as we must recognize that, for better or for worse, we live in an era when scientific and technical creativity are important aspects of our national wealth and strength, so we must recognize that ipso facto science is an important element of our general culture. And so it is incumbent upon us to see that those who in future may be making decisions of national policy, whether military or civilian, shall have received a sufficiently thorough grounding in the scientific way to be familiar not only with its basic content, but, more important, with its modes of thinking, its peculiar reservoir of skills and its scale of values. And with this goes the complementary requirement: that those who are training professionally for the world of science and technology but who have tastes and abilities that will inevitably confront them at some time with responsibilities in the world of political action must become familiar at an early age with the context of that world and the requirements for successful service in it.

These, then, are some of the reflections that the year has brought. Ahead of us lies the enormous task of preparing ourselves as a nation to live with credit—indeed, just to live—in a world requiring individual and collective excellence, creativity and capacity for innovation, and in which the fullest development and use of our rich resources of science and technology will be one of the conditions of survival. We must meet this high requirement in our own way, without fear, without imitation, in accord with our traditional values. The undertaking will require boldness of mind, appreciation of the nature of the crisis in which we live and the demands it makes on us, and, above all, the discipline and dedication of spirit which we have shown in other times of crisis. In its present intensity, extended into an indefinite future, this demand is new to our experience, but we can meet it if we will. We have, in fact, no alternative.

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DEMOCRATIC PARALYSIS IN FRANCE

By Jean-Marie Domenach

DEFEAT is never so galling as when no battle has been fought. In the critical days of last May, the French left was obliged to retreat without having engaged its adversaries at any point. The fascists were at no time able to rally more than two thousand people in Paris. Observers were surprised at the apparent indifference of the French people. The reason was that events as they unfolded, whether in Algeria or in the higher echelons of power, were beyond their reach. This was a revolution which developed almost mechanically as the various forces involved fenced invisibly until the moment when, with the sole exception of the Communist Party, they came together in support of General de Gaulle.

Despite the intervention of de Gaulle in the rôle of mediator, it cannot be denied that we of the non-Communist left have suffered a defeat in a major strategic battle. That defeat, however, is abstract and incomplete, for the victor does not belong to any camp. It was not a policy that triumphed but a man. And, although this itself is extremely serious from the standpoint of democrats, the man in this case is the only one who can possibly avoid becoming the prisoner of the now dominant forces. Paradoxically, the effect of this anti-democratic coup has been to give French politics a freedom which had been lost, and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that this freedom, however limited, will benefit the cause of democracy. At this juncture much must be left to the "ruses of history."

As I write, the situation itself is characterized by ambiguity at all levels: in Algeria, in the body of opinion rallied round de Gaulle and in the purposes of the General himself. The battle will again be joined but it is not yet clear what positions the various camps will take and what forces they will be able to enlist.

To give a clear picture of the way in which we succumbed to paralysis, I shall recall certain basic facts, the first of which is this: the French left was not the victim of militarists and fascists; it had already committed suicide.

The demise of the French left occurred not on May 30, 1958, but on February 6, 1956. On that date Premier Guy Mollet, who as head of a leftist-oriented government had gone to North Africa

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to seek a liberal solution of the Algerian problem, capitulated to pressure in the form of a riot organized by the colonialists. From that moment on the colonialists knew that they could control French politics; from that moment on the Mollet government and its successors were at the mercy of the ceaseless campaign of blackmail waged by the right. Their hands tied by the logic of the war in Algeria, these governments naturally preferred to give the impression that they were in command of a movement which in fact they could no longer control. Guy Mollet, Bourgès-Maunoury, Robert Lacoste all played on the latent chauvinism of the French; they insulted and mocked the liberal intellectuals; they attacked the independent press.

They did worse: not daring to shoulder their own responsibilities, they entrusted administrative and police powers to the army in Algeria. Parliament voted full powers to Robert Lacoste, Minister for Algeria, and he in turn instructed General Massu of the paratroopers to restore order in Algiers by whatever means he saw fit, including torture—without, however, giving him a written order. Thus the army found itself engaged in politics and police action without any guarantee that it might not suddenly be disavowed by a new government, a turn of events which would have constituted a further setback for it and a further humiliation. It took advantage of the month-long absence of normal authority resulting from the cabinet crisis last May to try to obtain that guarantee. In its own eyes its course was entirely understandable.

We were in an impossible position, then, when the Europeans and the army in Algeria refused to obey the government in Paris. The men whom we were calling on to defend democracy against the insurgents were precisely those who had capitulated to the colonialists, exalted the army and given it full powers. The revolt was the consequence of their policy, and now they were proposing that we should fight the rebels by strengthening that policy. Finally, when the distracted leftist parties sought a new head of government, the name proposed was none other than that of Robert Lacoste!

Nevertheless, we decided to support the legal government of Pflimlin, even though we knew that its resistance to the insurrection was not sincere and was bound to be ineffective. Intellectuals, trade-union leaders, left-wing Socialist leaders, followers of Mendès-France and liberal Catholics, all of us wanted to re-

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main loyal to the end. Our behavior was worthy of Kant and, although I think that we were right, it counted for little from the political standpoint. To wage political warfare, conviction is needed; everyone must know whom he is against and why. Yet the men we were supporting were the same ones we had been denouncing for years. How were we to fight alongside men who had already capitulated, men who had authorized the use of torture and demoralized French public opinion? Our hearts were not in it. I am re-reading now the notes which I jotted down on the night of the great republican demonstration—the only gesture made by the left—which on May 28 brought almost 300,000 people together behind the Socialist and Communist parliamentary leaders. I quote from them to convey some idea of the feelings shared by many of us on that occasion:

"March this afternoon from the Place de la Nation to the Place de la Republique. I shall go. The demonstration will have no effect politically now that Pflimlin has resigned. Yet we must go forth, we must cry out. . . . We cannot simply collapse like this. . . . Without any illusions, I shall march behind the leaders of the party of Budapest and the leaders of the party of Suez and Algiers. . . . They will have brought me out, along with thousands of others, to participate in this dismal parody."

Intellectuals can distinguish between principles and political reality. That process is far more difficult for the masses, who are swayed by simple ideas and the prestige of individual leaders. But anti-parliamentarianism had engulfed all shades of French political opinion in a common attitude of disgust. I heard a worker say, "The Communists are fine; I vote for them, but it's too bad they have to play politics." Democracy had become faceless and meaningless. In our era of mass media even more than in the past the people need faces, symbols, with which to identify themselves; in the multiplicity of parties, the endless merry-go-round of governments, the French people could no longer discern the image of a community or the manifestation of their permanence as a nation.

Hence it was not surprising that the régime should have collapsed like a house of cards. The legally constituted authority around which the left urged the nation to rally was slipping from under our feet. The police, a large part of the administration and a majority of the citizenry could no longer be counted on to defend the régime against military insurrection. Those who did not

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hate it despised it. Except for minority elements among the Socialist parties, the only ones who were resolutely determined to fight for the republican régime were a group who in reality also wanted to bring it to an end, namely, the Communists. A popular mobilization would have enabled them to manœuvre to their own advantage and would soon have brought them into the government. Faced with the alternative of a military dictatorship or a popular front that would probably be dominated by the Communists, public opinion hesitated and buried its head in the sand, not wanting to make a choice. Thus, when de Gaulle offered to mediate, it saw in him a miraculous opportunity to escape its dilemma.

The liberal left was incapable of offering another solution. Without the Communists it was powerless. With them it inspired fear and was itself afraid. Torn between the Socialist leaders who had condoned the use of torture in Algeria and the Communist leaders who had condoned oppression in Hungary, the genuine left was divided and demoralized. It no longer had the self-confidence which it would have needed to summon democratic Frenchmen to what might well have been a struggle to the death. As soon as the risk of death becomes apparent people reveal their strength or their secret contradictions.

II

At bottom the French are glad that, thanks to de Gaulle, they have escaped civil war. People do not want to fight if they can help it, particularly when their standard of living is rising. In this case even the most convinced democrats do not regret that they were spared being put to the test, not only because defeat would have been inevitable in view of the almost total unanimity of the army, but also because principles and the men defending them had not been clearly defined on either side. In the circumstances the solution was a peculiarly satisfactory one, for it seized upon the prevailing confusion and lifted it to a higher plane, to that summit of mystical patriotism where the French are in their element. General de Gaulle was summoned by the cries of the Algerian insurgents and accepted by the army; yet he took into his government the parliamentary leaders of the defunct "system," political figures of the right and the left. In his person he constituted a link between the divided elements of the nation—the civilian authorities and the army, metropolitan France and Algeria.

Yet de Gaulle represents more than the amalgam required to

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restore the unity of the state. On a deeper level he emerges as one of those *réconciliateurs* to whom divided France entrusts herself after times of stress—Henry IV, Napoleon I and Napoleon III. Outside of France people are inclined to think of de Gaulle as a military man, more gifted than his colleagues, to be sure, but exemplifying the outlook of his caste. In reality he is a writer, a poet, far more than he is a soldier. He thinks of himself as synthesizing the history of France, and the majority of Frenchmen in turn look upon him as the living symbol of their nation, the proof that their divisions, however deep, can be surmounted as long as one man is capable of embodying their most contradictory traditions —a conviction which both flatters and reassures them. The monarchic order and the republican dream, Catholic discipline and social progress, feudal chivalry and popular revolt—once before, during the Resistance, General de Gaulle brought together in his person all these diverse elements which make France what it is, and today he is seeking again to impose the same synthesis on a nation disillusioned by party strife and the impotence of the régime.

With de Gaulle at the helm the French feel that they have been removed from the sphere of politics, or perhaps we should say lifted above it to the mystical sphere of *volksgeist* where the genius of a people united makes its mark on history. De Gaulle cannot be claimed by either the right or the left and this is what the French want, for as far as they are concerned abstract disputes have long since blunted the exact meaning of those terms. Everyone can, if he chooses, attribute to him his own hopes and convictions.

For that reason any effort to analyze de Gaullism in the usual political-sociological terms would be inadequate. De Gaulle does not really represent either a class or a social caste. His own psychology is a crucial factor but even more important is the specifically French tradition which he symbolizes, and that tradition rests largely on classic humanism, something fundamentally alien to what we know as fascism.

It is true that de Gaulle was brought to power by the Algerian insurrection, but that progression of events was not the result of a clearly defined will; rather it was the absence of doctrine in the insurrection which made it possible for certain de Gaullists to get the name of their leader acclaimed in Algeria. Naturally the Committee of Public Safety and the "colonels' group" restrict

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de Gaulle's freedom of action; but though he is obliged to put up with them he is not their prisoner, for he can count on another force: the de Gaullists of the Resistance, the pure de Gaullists whose memory of the ordeal they shared has kept their devotion to him alive. Just as Tito's ability to resist Soviet attacks has been thanks to the unswerving devotion of his former comrades-in-arms, so General de Gaulle's *compagnons* constitute a human armor which gives him a certain manœuvrability and independence. This sort of fidelity is more akin to the feudal virtues than it is to democratic loyalty. Yet in moments of crisis when the fragile life of democracy hangs in the balance, such emotions, if they are not distorted by unworthy leaders, can be the means of restoring lawful authority.

What de Gaulle seeks is to carry out a policy of state rather than of party. For him governing does not mean applying a program or conforming to the decision of the majority, but rather making use of whatever best serves his idea of France's interests and France's "mission." Once the parties had shown that they could not muster the will to govern, it became inevitable that this form of authoritarian power should prevail. Paradoxically, the anarchistic state of French politics gives France the opportunity to take positive action, for, given the international situation and France's relative weakness, she can no longer afford the luxury of following any policy that she pleases. The fact is that we had reached such a state of confusion that the demands of reality, the plainest lessons of events, were ignored. Today the French parties, having sunk into hopeless unreality, do not know what position to take vis-à-vis General de Gaulle's policy and will be incapable of offering any alternative policy for some time to come.

This lofty view of the great forces of history and the total absence of an inferiority complex—particularly in regard to Communism—will undoubtedly give French politics a new dynamism. On two points at least de Gaulle can give some satisfaction to the left: by enabling France to enjoy greater freedom in relation to American leadership and by accelerating the emancipation of the Negro peoples of Africa under French colonial rule. On the first point there is a certain ambiguity in as much as recriminations against the United States have become particularly violent among rightists and military men, who ever since the invasion of Suez have been accusing the United States of "sacrificing France to Arab nationalism." The new government's policy towards the

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Arab nations will thus be an important test. It will show whether de Gaulle intends to use French independence for the purposes of reactionary anti-Americanism or to improve relations between the West and the underdeveloped countries.

As far as French Africa is concerned, General de Gaulle's intentions are clear and have found concrete expression in the decision to entrust to Africans the leadership of the territorial governments. De Gaulle has considerable support among Negro leaders in Africa and this strengthens his position among the French leftists.

Nevertheless, the most urgent French political problem lies elsewhere: the war in Algeria. If de Gaulle does not succeed in bringing it to an end within six months, his grand design for the revitalization of France will be compromised.

Like all who had occasion to meet de Gaulle before he came to power, I am convinced that he understands the scope and significance of the Algerian revolt and that he hopes to find a solution for Algeria in which Moslem aspirations and French interests will be reconciled. Indeed, he pictures France, reinvigorated by him, as a nation so generous that there need be no contradiction between the one and the other. France is in his eyes a super-nation capable of embracing a community of free peoples. The question is, will he have the opportunity to apply his concepts? While he has a comparatively free hand within France itself, in Algeria he must reckon with established forces confident of their own strength. His real challenge lies there.

The Algerian insurrection might be compared to a three-stage rocket: launched by the colonialists, it was taken in hand by the military who guided it in the direction of Franco-Moslem "fraternization" and the "integration" of Algeria into France; finally, a handful of de Gaullists came to Algiers expressly to swing the movement behind their leader.

For de Gaulle the immediate problem was to assert his authority over the army and separate it from the colonialists. On the whole he has succeeded. But he has had to pay a heavy price for its allegiance: in order to persuade it to take his orders, he has had to embrace the position of the army and commit himself to the integration of Algeria. In the first stage this concession is not dangerous, since the initial steps which integration entails (equality of political rights, social benefit, modernization of agriculture) are positive steps from any standpoint. They will make life a little

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easier for the Moslems, give them certain legal guarantees and enable them to express their will through the ballot.

But this ambiguous situation cannot long continue. The army is calling for equality as a means of assimilating ten million Moslems into the population of France; unlike the colonialists, for whom the cry of equal rights is only a publicity ruse, the officers of the army wish sincerely to see France assimilate the Algerian people. That is the reason, the justification, for their struggle. Yet assimilation is impossible for two reasons. First, it faces insurmountable material obstacles. The difference in standards of living calls for a drastic change in the economic and social structure of Algeria—in particular, redistribution of land and other measures to which the colonialists are rabidly opposed. Second, assimilation faces insurmountable human obstacles. The armed resistance of the National Liberation Front can be reduced but not eliminated. Most important of all, an underdeveloped people cannot be converted into a modern people without the participation of the masses as well as the élite. If it is to succeed, integration must have the coöperation of the Moslems. Yet it is unlikely that the Moslems will wish to be amalgamated into a state whose traditions and mores are alien to them. They will therefore have to be made to accept integration by force. "Quadrillage," the system of disseminating propaganda developed by officers who believe they learned much about psychological warfare in the camps of Viet Minh, is designed to obtain a forced conversion which will be reflected in 99 percent affirmative votes, totalitarian fashion.

But a fascist orientation in Algeria cannot long coexist with the practice of democracy in France. Fascism has its own law: it creates temporarily a lyrical illusion, a mystic coalescence, but when it finds itself face to face with real obstacles it attributes its setbacks to enemies against whom it then unleashes the fury of the fanaticized masses. Hence I am convinced that Algerian fascism, when it finds itself pitted against the force of things as they are and the resistance of human beings, will turn on the metropolitan country and seek to crush the liberal forces remaining there. Integration can succeed only if it rests on the free allegiance of the Moslems. As that is out of the question at present, integration of the Moslems by force will be followed by integration of the democratic ranks in France into a totalitarian system of power.

The war in Algeria will last as long as Frenchmen refuse to sat-

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isfy the aspirations of the Algerian people; and as long as the war lasts the Algerian situation will continue to breed fascism. "We are Communists without doctrine," one of the colonels in command of the movement has said. Communists without a doctrine are worse than Communists with one. Of course the army is far from being entirely contaminated, but fascism will inevitably spread in the army as long as the war continues.[1] We are in a race against time. If de Gaulle succeeds in terminating the war quickly he will be able to impose on the army not only allegiance of the feudal type but also obedience to his authority in the democratic sense; if not, he will be obliged either to follow the army's lead or to break with it in his turn.

Thus it may be seen that General de Gaulle's freedom is narrowly restricted by the forces which asserted themselves during the May crisis. The Europeans in Algeria have demonstrated their intention of holding on to that land, whatever the cost; the army has shown that it does not intend to suffer another defeat and that it wants to make the Moslems French. As for the National Liberation Front, although it is impressed by the course of events, it has not changed its position. The decisions that General de Gaulle must take in order to bring about a solution can therefore be expected to give rise to serious conflict. That is why he takes refuge behind vague statements and seeks to gain time in which to restore the authority of the state.

Yet no matter what General de Gaulle's intentions and methods may be, what sympathies or fears he inspires, democrats obviously cannot rely on a single individual—and that is the basis of the present political régime. Were he the greatest leader in the world, the situation would still be precarious and in the long run intolerable in a democracy. The attempt to put the guidance of France's policies into the hands of one man, to make them subject to his personal intuition, can be only a temporary expedient. The time is coming when political choices will have to be made, first of all in Algeria. When that happens, the political forces will again come into their own. Personally I think that de Gaulle will have to join battle with Algerian fascism and that

[1] The army is not fascist. The basis upon which fascism rests is the distress of the Europeans in Algeria. But the "psychological warfare" methods adopted by the army after the fashion of Communist armies have their own logic: brainwashing and the propagation of a single "doctrine." Already schools have been set up where young Moslems, in some cases war orphans, are indoctrinated with a view to their serving as propagandists of integration and forming a corps of political agents in the future.

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the left will rally behind him if he does. Some of my liberal friends, on the other hand, think that de Gaulle has committed himself too deeply to the army to be able to impose his policies upon it. Yet whether the army supports de Gaulle or opposes him, a democratic force on the left, cohesive and powerful, must be brought into being as quickly as possible.

III

Unfortunately the French left finds itself in a state of extreme weakness as it faces the present test. The relative victory which it won in the elections of January 1956 has been turned into a rout by its conduct in office. Dragged by Guy Mollet into supporting colonialist positions in Algeria, the left has fallen apart; a Socialist and a Radical minority have kept faith with their principles, but the majorities have brought discredit upon themselves by repudiating their pledges and taking part in the succession of governments which led to the crisis of May.

The confusion attendant upon General de Gaulle's accession to power prevents the left from repairing the breaches in its ranks. It is true that the majority of Socialist deputies voted against de Gaulle, but that vote was in most cases only an expedient whereby they hoped to clothe themselves once again in democratic virtue; the public gave them no credit for their belated and meaningless gesture. The anti-parliamentarianism so characteristic of the French state of mind is always ready to turn on the former majority once it demonstrates its weakness. Meanwhile the situation is not yet sufficiently clear, as I noted above, to permit the left to decide upon the objectives around which it is to rally. On the one hand, de Gaulle is seeking to appropriate part of its program; on the other, the Frenchman's relative satisfaction with social conditions as they are today—while it limits the spread of fascism—also curbs for the time being the aggressiveness of the trade unions.

The slogan "Defend the Republic!" which could have brought the workers out against the paratroopers did not mobilize them against de Gaulle because they were not persuaded that he was really a threat to them. In so far as the public takes an interest in politics, it is thoroughly weary of the late régime and wants a new administration, a modern, strong and stable government. This feeling, from which de Gaullism is now benefiting, should be made use of by the left as well if it does not want to see itself

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swept away. Unfortunately, the left is the prisoner of political machines which lack both vitality and imagination. The only man who could have reinvigorated it, Pierre Mendès-France, has himself been used by the Radical machine and discredited by a campaign of calumny. The only young and dynamic party, the "Left Socialist Union," is still in its infancy. Founded six months ago, it has only ten thousand members and does not include a single member of parliament.

This weakness is the more tragic in that it prevents the liberal left from taking action jointly with a Communist Party which is far stronger than it is. The fundamental paradox of the French situation is that democracy cannot be defended against fascism without the help of the Communists. The cause of democracy can benefit from the weakening of French Communism only if the liberal left strengthens and renews itself. The crisis in the Communist Party, occurring at a time when the liberal left has suffered discredit within the government, has served only to embolden the right. It was at the time of the revolt in Budapest that the extreme right, seeing the French Communist Party demoralized and isolated, resolved to overthrow the régime. Unfortunately their guess was correct and the Communist Party proved itself incapable of resisting. The strikes which it ordered were failures and only a few of its members battled the police with any enthusiasm.

The French Communist Party was the only one to adopt an attitude of unrelenting opposition to de Gaulle. It based its opposition on "the defense of republican institutions," but that legalistic argument did not seem very convincing when Imre Nagy was executed. It was hard to take seriously the Communist Party's indignation at the dismissal of parliament, knowing that the Supreme Soviet is in recess practically all the time. Stalinism continues to predominate in the inner councils of the French Communist Party, and as a result the Communists too are imprisoned within their own attitude of abstraction and negativism. Only social unrest could give meaning and vigor to their protests.

The dogmatic rigidity of the French Communist Party expresses itself in a "united front" policy[2] aimed at bringing together all the opponents of the new government in "Committees

[2] See my article on the "united front" tactic and how it differs from the "popular front" in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1956.

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of Anti-Fascist Vigilance," a name which significantly has just been changed to "Committees for the Defense of Republican Liberties." The Socialists naturally took fright at this threat of infiltration and ordered their followers to withdraw from the committees, with the result that the committees now consist of Communists, partisans of Mendès-France, Catholic trade unionists and people without party affiliation. It is probable that the Communist Party will try to seize over-all control of these committees, a move which would doubtless quickly curtail their further development.

What de Gaulle would like to do would be to influence the French Communist Party through an agreement with Moscow and thus bring the Communists into his government, as in the days of the Resistance. Moscow would doubtless be willing if de Gaulle would emphasize his policy of independent action for France. But the General's insistence on manufacturing a French bomb in order to be able to enter the "atomic power club" antagonizes the Russians and they will probably maintain an attitude of reserve.

Thus the Communist Party creates an insoluble problem for the French left: without it freedom cannot be defended; with it the defense of freedom is compromised. The bulk of the non-Communists fear Khrushchev more than they do General Massu. Hence the problem is to ascertain whether their fear of Communism will lead French democrats from one concession to another until they rally unconditionally to de Gaulle and resign themselves to a disguised form of fascism.

Dictatorship certainly is repugnant to General de Gaulle. Even when he was almost alone in London he surrounded himself as much as possible with the forms of legality. Since then he has repeated time and again the need of providing France with new institutions of government. Now that he has the chance he has set to work to construct a Constitution. This has not taken final form at the moment of writing, but its main objective is clear—to give the executive more power and more stability. It reduces markedly the authority of parliament and gives considerable new power to the President of the Republic, who is to name the Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, the members of the government (who shall not simultaneously be members of parliament). The President also will name the high civil and military officials. In fact, in times of crisis he will exercise full powers.

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Some of these constitutional provisions are acceptable but as a whole they contain important contradictions. To begin with, the Prime Minister is put in an impossible position. Though he is merely the President's adjutant he nevertheless is responsible to parliament, a fact which is bound to lead to serious conflicts between parliament and the President. As André Philip has emphasized, it would be proper for the President to receive such wide powers only in a federal system of government. Yet though the Constitution creates a presidential régime it does not set up real federal institutions. A presidential régime based on the French centralized structure leads naturally to a legal dictatorship.

It is with regard to the overseas territories, however, that the draft of the Constitution is most disappointing to liberal opinion. The hope had been that General de Gaulle would pull France out of the colonial rut by creating a new relationship with the emancipated nations of Africa. But the present plan is to leave the African territories with a choice between integration and a federation that lacks federal institutions. True, the African peoples who are invited to vote in the referendum of September 28 may, by rejecting the Constitution, opt for independence. And during his African tour de Gaulle explained that the possibility of leaving the French community would remain open even after the federation had come into existence. But essentially the choice is still along the lines of the traditional French policy: between voting for independence *against* France or for a form of federation which can hardly be distinguished from integration.

This ambiguous and badly conceived Constitution does not inspire confidence in anybody and does not seem destined to last. Only professors of law are interested in it. Public opinion senses that the essence of the problem lies elsewhere, that the stability of the future régime does not depend so much on the text of the Constitution as on the outcome of the war in Algeria and on party reform.

In reality it is not a referendum which is being prepared so much as a plebiscite on the issue: de Gaulle or the Communists? The weakness of French leftist forces is such that they have not been able in a three-month period to elaborate a third course which would be truly democratic. It is too late to make a serious battle against the referendum, and it will even be difficult for them to rally their forces in time for the elections in October. Certain elements among the Socialists and the Radicals have,

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as a matter of fact, set up a Gaullist movement of the left (the "Republican Reform Center"). Yet for the most part the Socialists, paralyzed by the presence of their leader Guy Mollet in the government, shrink from any decision which might split them. We have succeeded in forming with the Socialist, Radical and Catholic leaders a "Union of Democratic Forces," which is seeking to reunite the liberal left in support of a single positive program; but it is very late and the inertia of the party machines blocks any effort at realignment. In a sense, the shock suffered by French democracy was too quickly abated by the appearance of General de Gaulle to shake the liberal left from its old ways.

The real resistance to fascism and militarism is to be found in the trade unions (particularly the unions of the teaching profession), in the higher ranks of the administration, among many of the justices and the clergy, among the intellectuals and the staffs of the universities. They are not ready to bow to tyranny and it will be difficult to lead France in a direction which they oppose.

Once before, 18 years ago, when the French political régime foundered, it was these circles that formed the ranks of the Resistance. Yet it would be dangerous to count on history repeating itself. Assuredly it would be preferable if the French had the courage to use the democratic tools still available to fight the political battles which must be fought if they are to save their liberty.

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AFRICAN PROSPECT

By Kwame Nkrumah

THE twelve years since the war have brought a staggering change in the tempo of African development. Vast new economic resources have been opened up, export incomes have soared. The whole area has been spanned with new links and communications; where else, I wonder, has the airplane drawn together so much that formerly was isolated? Education has advanced, new African universities have been founded. Above all, political ideas are on the march. In 1939, apart from the special case of the Union of South Africa, only one African state—Liberia—was completely independent. Today eight are independent, while many others stand on the threshold. And everywhere men and women are beginning to search consciously for political means to solve their problems and advance their hopes.

This is a general situation which I feel we in Ghana can, without presumption, help to interpret. As a country we have shared intimately in all the major developments of postwar Africa. New prosperity has flowed into Ghana due to high postwar commodity prices. In Ghana, too, this wealth has been used for sustained development and, with special emphasis, for education. Ghana is the site of one of Africa's great new universities. And Ghana has been a spearhead of African political advance. The agitation for full self-government goes back many decades in our history; but the last decisive phase of the struggle opened as late as 1948. After that, it took only a little more than eight years to bring Ghana to complete independence.

Our sense of sharing in the profound, creative movements of change in Africa has been enhanced by our experiences at the recent meeting of independent African states held in Accra—the first such conference ever to be convened on African soil. I had the honor to preside at this meeting of statesmen from Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic, and after it I visited each of the capitals of the participating Powers in order to consolidate my impressions of our common problems and purposes. Thus it is on the basis both of Ghana's own development and of my own very recent contacts outside Ghana that I feel I can advance a genuine interpretation of some aspects of what we called at our conference the "African

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personality," and also of the African approach to world problems.

There are, above all, three traits that should be stressed. In a continent of the scale and diversity of Africa, it is only natural that there should be divergences and differences and varying points of emphasis. But these three points I believe to be common to all emergent Africa and they must decisively affect its relations with the rest of the world.

The first is our desire to see Africa free and independent. The second is our determination to pursue foreign policies based upon non-alignment. The third is our urgent need for economic development. There is no area in Africa today where these three points are not on the agenda of politics.

There is no need to underline for American readers the reason for Africa's rejection of colonial status. We believe, as do Americans, that to be self-governing is one of the inalienable rights of man. In Africa, if peoples are to be truly independent, their governments must reflect the fact that in all parts of the continent the overwhelming majority of the population are native-born Africans. Even in countries of considerable European settlement, such as Southern Rhodesia, nine-tenths of the people are African. When, therefore, at our recent conference, we called for an end to colonialism, we were doing no more than stating our belief that the fact of a vast African majority should be accepted as the basis of government in Africa.

It is important to underline this point of majority rights. We are often accused of black nationalism, of racialism in reverse. I think I can honestly speak for my own government when I say that we are more concerned with a fundamental human right than with any particular color of skin. Of course, we feel a special sympathy with those who are kin to us in race. But equally we have special relations with other African states, such as Tunisia, which are not bound to us by any racial ties. And we feel ourselves part of a general human community in which man as such, not his pigmentation, is the decisive fact.

We can claim, I think, that in Ghana there is ease and naturalness of contact and genuine mutual respect between people of different races. It is not a forced thing. Visitors coming from other parts of Africa have been impressed by the atmosphere they find of good will and confidence. We certainly do not intend to project into our foreign policy a racialism we do not practise at home. But we cannot accept racialism in reverse and reconcile

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ourselves to the prolonged rule in Africa of minute minorities of alien stock.

Now I am not unmindful of the difficulties. As I see them, they are twofold. There is the general problem that in this century groups drawn from a different race, speech, color or religion find it very difficult to settle down and form a community. The deep division of religion which tore India apart and the recurrent disturbances between Tamil and Sinhalese in Ceylon remind us that the difficulty is certainly not confined to black and white groups in Africa. Since minorities tend to fear majority rule, safeguards and guarantees are needed in Africa just as they are in Asia or elsewhere. These safeguards should be part of the country's constitution, or created by legislation.

The second difficulty lies in the fact that in such areas as Kenya or the Rhodesias the European minority still has something of a monopoly of education, skill and resources, and European activity sustains to a very great degree the whole economic life of the community. Disrupt it and everyone suffers.

For these reasons we at our African conference proposed a *phased* political transfer of power. We asked for the fixing of definite dates for early independence and called upon the administering Powers to take rapid steps to implement the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the political aspirations of the people, namely, self-determination and independence. These steps should, in my view, include a greatly accelerated and enlarged program of education and technical training, the opening up systematically of new opportunities for Africans in agriculture and industry and a rapid growth of African participation in the country's political life. They would restore what we believe is most lacking in Africa's plural societies—and that is the element of confidence and hope on the part of the African majority.

How can Africans believe in talk of partnership if they see so little evidence of the efforts in education and development which are needed to make them effective and responsible partners? They suspect that the talk is double talk, a device to keep them quiet while the rule of the minority is endlessly prolonged. No independent African government can accept this situation. Our conference called in fact for reasonable evidence that the metropolitan Powers genuinely intend to make progress in Africa. Take away that evidence and it may well be impossible to achieve Africa's aspirations in the atmosphere of good will and order which

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have so happily pervaded the process of gaining independence in Ghana.

Does this determination of ours place us in opposition to the West? It is, after all, the old colonial Powers of Western Europe that still exercise control in Africa and it is migrants from Western Europe who make up Africa's dominant European minorities. Perhaps after Africa's concentrated experience of total colonial control you might expect the pendulum to swing back towards a total rejection of the colonial Powers and all their works. Statements have been made in Europe and America that "the whole African continent will be lost to freedom." It is, therefore, important to clear up some of these misunderstandings which give a totally false picture of the mood of emergent Africa. At this point, inevitably, we come to the question of what is really meant by Africa's claim to base its foreign policy upon the principle of "non-alignment."

First of all, non-alignment can be understood only in the context of the present atomic arms race and the atmosphere of the cold war. When we in Africa survey the industrial and military power concentrated behind the two great Powers in the cold war we know that no military or strategic act of ours could make one jot of difference to this balance of power, while our involvement might draw us into areas of conflict which so far have not spread below the Sahara. Our attitude, I imagine, is very much that of America looking at the disputes of Europe in the nineteenth century. We do not wish to be involved. In addition, we know we cannot affect the outcome. Above all, we believe the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed, by keeping one great continent free from the strife and rivalry of military blocs and cold wars.

But this attitude of non-alignment does not imply indifference to the great issues of our day. It does not imply isolationism. It is in no way anti-Western; nor is it anti-Eastern. The greatest issue of our day is surely to see that there is a tomorrow. For Africans especially there is a particular tragedy in the risk of thermonuclear destruction. Our continent has come but lately to the threshold of the modern world. The opportunities for health and education and a wider vision which other nations take for granted are barely within the reach of our people. And now they see the risk that all this richness of opportunity may be snatched away by destructive war. In any war, the strategic areas of the world

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would be destroyed or occupied by some great Power. It is simply a question of who gets there first; the Suez Canal, Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aqaba are examples.

On this great issue of war and peace, therefore, the people and government of Ghana put all their weight behind the peaceful settlement of disputes and seek conditions in which disputes do not become embittered to the point of violence. We are willing to accept every provision of the United Nations Charter. We go further and favor every extension of an international police force as an alternative to war. One of the most important rôles of the smaller nations today is surely to use their influence in season and out of season to substitute the peaceful settlement of disputes and international policing of disturbed areas for the present disastrous dependence upon arms and force. For this reason, at our African conference we underlined our demands for controlled disarmament, we deplored the use of the sale of arms as a means of influencing other nations' diplomacy and we urged that African states should be represented on all international bodies concerned with disarmament.

Thus it is not indifference that leads us to a policy of non-alignment. It is our belief that international blocs and rivalries exacerbate and do not solve disputes and that we must be free to judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that are just and peaceful, irrespective of the Powers involved. We do not wish to be in the position of condoning imperialism or aggression from any quarter. Powers which pursue policies of good will, coöperation and constructive international action will always find us at their side. In fact, perhaps "non-alignment" is a misstatement of our attitude. We are firmly aligned with all the forces in the world that genuinely make for peace.

This is not empty rhetoric, as two concrete examples can help to illustrate—one in the field of policy, another in our international relationships. When the coup d'état in Iraq suddenly heightened the sense of crisis throughout the Middle East and led to the dispatch of American troops to Lebanon, my government at once issued a statement of policy which said that all attempts to pass judgment on what had happened would simply heighten tension and that the task now was to secure a workable solution for the future. This, we suggested, would be based on three principles: the substitution of a United Nations force for the American troops, the holding of free elections in Lebanon under

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United Nations supervision and the subsequent establishment of Lebanon as a free and independent state with a status of neutrality internationally guaranteed on the analogy of Austria. Subsequently I went further and proposed that the entire Middle Eastern area should be quarantined, that the sovereignty of every state should be guaranteed by the great Powers and that the oil resources of the region should be brought under international arrangements similar to those now operating successfully at Abadan.

My second illustration concerns Ghana's continued association with the Commonwealth. Some Americans have expressed surprise that Ghana, after emerging from colonial status, should choose of its own free will to remain within the Commonwealth and thus—amongst others—in partnership with the United Kingdom, which the day before yesterday was still our colonial overlord. But we believe that the evolving form of the Commonwealth is an institution which can work for peace and international coöperation. It is the only organic world-wide association of peoples in which race, religion, nationality and culture are all transcended by a common sense of fellowship. No policies are imposed on it from above. It does not even seek unity of policy. But it provides a unique forum in which men of different culture and different approach can sit down together and see what can be done to lessen tensions and to increase the economic and social well-being of themselves and their neighbors. This is not a bloc. It is not a power grouping. It is a club or family of friends who see their continuing friendship as a strand of peace in a troubled world. It is because the Commonwealth is this kind of association that Ghana was happy to become its first independent African member, on the basis of free association and unfettered sovereignty.

But, as a result of the old colonial link, many of our ties are with Europe. We welcome them. Links with schools and universities, the mutual benefits of trade, the capital invested in our roads and utilities, the service and help of European men and women in many fields—these contribute a web of common interests which we can freely acknowledge, once we are free ourselves. You cannot cancel 100 years of history, and history has brought Africa and Europe into close community. This historical experience can lead to continued coöperation provided independence and equality are recognized in time. It turns to bitterness and enmity only

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when foreign rule is maintained. Hope deferred, they say, maketh the heart sick. But where hope is realized, sane and healthy friendship is the result.

And there is yet another reason why friendship between the peoples of Africa and the West could, under certain conditions, be close and lasting. No responsible African leader would make much secret of the extent to which he needs outside economic assistance in the decades to come. One may sometimes wonder if the Western Powers fully understand the dilemma facing political leaders in the emergent lands. They have gained independence for their peoples. The hazards and excitements of the struggle lie behind. Ahead lies the workaday world in which people must live and eat and hope to prosper. Independence of itself does not change this world. It simply creates the right political atmosphere for a real effort of national regeneration. But it does not supply all the economic and social tools. The leaders are now expected, simply as a result of having acquired independence, to work miracles. The people look for the new schools, new towns, new factories. They expect political equality to bring economic equality. They do not realize what it may cost. In this situation, however poor the country, the new government cannot sit and do nothing. Construction must begin. There must be something to show for independence. And if there is nothing to show, popular discontent may split the country apart.

This is the dilemma of recently-won independence. If independence is the first aim, development comes straight on its heels, and no leader—in Asia or Africa—can escape the pressure. We in Ghana can, I think, approach this vital issue of economic development with a measure of objectivity. Ghana, in part by good fortune and in part, I hope, by good management, is not in the dire straits of some other newly-independent lands. There is as yet no extreme pressure of population on our resources. We have been fortunate in that our export crop, cocoa, has commanded a very high world price since the war and has not fluctuated as violently as some other primary products. And we have pursued a policy which, I believe, has enabled us to gain a maximum benefit from the high postwar prices. We have held the internal price fairly stable at a level about eight times that of prewar and the balance over and above that level has been put aside for general economic development. On the one hand, we have avoided internal inflation. On the other, we have been able to set aside some $700,000,-

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000 for development which, in a country of only 5,000,000 people, gives us some elbowroom for the future.

Yet we are short of much that we need for a really rapid economic advance, the kind of advance our people expect and want. We need technicians. We need experts of all kinds. We have hardly enough teachers for our expanded program of education. We need —and welcome—foreign private investment from all countries to help our people to learn the new industrial skills. This fits in with our determination to diversify our economy, to increase agricultural production, and to industrialize. It is perhaps necessary to emphasize that Ghana does not seek direct financial grants; we want investment, both public and private, only in sound projects which can ultimately repay the original investment. Above all, we need to end our dangerous dependence upon a single export crop, cocoa. Yet to do so and to develop our chief alternative—the export of aluminum—we need outside capital and technical assistance to launch our great Volta River scheme. At present this scheme, which would bring into play our large bauxite reserves and our important hydroelectrical potential, is unhappily stalled by the decline in Western economic activity over the last 18 months.

Yet if Ghana with its real measure of stability and prosperity needs this outside support and stimulus, how much more urgent is the need in other less fortunate communities? On my recent tour of African states, the impressions I gathered were again and again of the direst pressure and necessity. I remember with respect the industrial and agricultural efforts being made in some of the countries I visited, but I remember even more vividly the endless crowds of children we encountered wherever we went. I wonder how even the most active and determined leaders can achieve even a measure of economic stability while the inexorable birth rate presses each year more heavily against the limited agricultural resources. It is surely not surprising that such leaders look outside for economic help. They have no alternative. The pressure of population mounts all the time. They must have help or founder. It is as simple as that.

I believe, therefore, that the Western Powers have the opportunity to play a new and vital rôle in Africa. The colonial phase is dead or dying. But a new phase is opening in which the whole of this continent will struggle to achieve the institutions and opportunities of modern life. Leaders are fully aware of how much

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is lacking. Education is limited in spite of heroic efforts since the war. Since so many areas are only now emerging from a subsistence economy, local capital is often absent. Vital needs in agriculture are not met for lack of basic research or of trained technicians. The endless list is a measure of Africa's need and the Western Powers' opportunity.

Nor is the advantage one-sided. Under the impact of postwar prosperity, Ghana's imports have nearly doubled in little more than five years. A growing African market based upon a steady increase in African productivity is of vital interest to all the great trading Powers of the West and quite especially to Western Europe, which already conducts nearly a quarter of its extra-European trade with the African continent. Although not on so great a scale, American trade and American interests have also steadily increased in Africa since the war. Exports, for instance, have quintupled, and all responsible African leaders wish to extend this trend on the basis of reciprocity and equality. It is the surest guarantee of permanent friendship between Africa and the West.

But Africa's desperate need is not only the West's opportunity. There is a risk here as well. As I have said before and must emphasize again, the leaders of the new Africa have no alternative but to look for outside assistance. The hopes and ambitions of their peoples have been planted and brought to maturity by the impact of Western civilization. The West has set the pattern of our hopes, and by entering Africa in strength it has forced the pattern upon us. Now comes our response. We cannot tell our peoples that material benefits and growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do, they will throw us out and seek other leaders who promise more. And they will abandon us, too, if we do not in reasonable measure respond to their hopes. Therefore we have no choice. Africa has no choice. We have to modernize. Either we shall do so with the interest and support of the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat, but a straight statement of political reality.

And I also affirm, for myself and I believe for most of my fellow leaders in Africa, that we want close coöperation with our friends. We know you. History has brought us together. We still have the opportunity to built up a future on the basis of free and equal coöperation. This is our aim. This is our hope.

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AN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

By Commander Sir Robert Jackson

THE scale of economic assistance granted since the last war is by all odds the greatest single innovation in international diplomacy; it is, in fact, an activity without precedent in the foreign field. It has covered a remarkable variety of purposes, patterns and agencies.

There has been one fully operating international agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which dealt directly with the vast dislocations caused by the war. It was followed by the multifarious activities of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies—in fields such as health, agriculture, child care, the problems of labor, or in specific projects of economic development such as those sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the Technical Assistance Board. In addition, nations have undertaken economic programs on a multi-national or bilateral basis, the supremely effective example being the Marshall Plan, which completed the postwar restoration of Western Europe. Governments have also supplied aid, in capital and trained manpower, on a government-to-government basis. Britain, France and Belgium have provided loans and grants for colonial development on a much larger scale than before the war. The United States, under a variety of programs, including Point Four, has made assistance available in every quarter of the globe. And in recent years a new donor has appeared, the Soviet Union.

What sort of lessons do the scale and variety of these programs of economic assistance entail for the future policy of the West?

The basis of pre-industrial society is, of course, agriculture. Usually it is a static agriculture based upon unchanging traditional farming methods. An indispensable step in economic development is to introduce new methods of farming which encourage growing productivity. This in turn provides a margin of wealth for transfer to other activities and releases manpower

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from the countryside. Japan after 1870 is the classic example of a successful agrarian revolution along these lines.

But no other activities will be developed without a second factor—investment in what the French call "infrastructure." This covers such basic needs as ports, transportation, urban housing and power development which are the preconditions of more varied economic advance. And the human infrastructure must also be provided—education, technical training, health and social services which help to supply the trained minds, healthy bodies and stable social conditions needed for an expanding, confident, well-managed community.

This infrastructure will in turn be related to the type of industrialization which local conditions permit. Local processing of materials depends, of course, upon the availability of power. Heavy industry depends upon ores and fuels, but most economies can envisage at least a modest expansion of light industry to provide consumer goods for the expanding local market. Either in hand or in preparation in all but the most underdeveloped countries are facilities for making some textiles, glass, containers, soap, salt, bread, industrial alcohol and cement.

Now these four factors—agricultural transformation, physical infrastructure, basic social services and the beginnings of industry—have one thing in common. They all require capital, and their rate of expansion depends upon the amount of capital that can be allotted to them. Stagnant economies are characterized by low rates of investment; and, although it may be difficult to establish any absolute investment rate which virtually ensures dynamism, it seems safe to say that economies devoting less than, say, 12 to 15 percent of their national income to productive investment are not likely to achieve much advance. Above that figure they have the chance of achieving what might be termed a "national breakthrough"—in other words, the achievement of enough dynamism for the process of high investment to become self-sustaining, simply because, year by year, the resources available to provide savings over and above popular consumption are tending to increase. Capital is thus the key to growth. How are the countries with underdeveloped economies to obtain it?

One source of wealth for emergent economies is, of course, their export of raw materials. Since dependence upon a single export is one of the hallmarks of underdevelopment, a chief concern must be to open new fields of exports in order to diversify

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a country's export pattern, and meanwhile to achieve as much stability as possible in commodity prices. In the last year, the world commodity index has fallen by nearly 15 percent, certain metals by 25 percent and more. This disturbing decline automatically reduces the margins available for fresh investment in underdeveloped areas. A recent U.N. calculation suggests that falling export incomes about cancelled out foreign aid to free Asia in 1957. A long-term program must bear in mind the degree to which sagging trade counteracts the effectiveness of outside assistance.

In earlier days, capital became available from outside to assist in development. Many in the West still tend to feel that large movements of capital should be automatic, that capital should seek the best areas of investment and respond to opportunities for profit. This would be the "natural" method and governmental activities or action by international agencies are felt to be a disturbing departure from the old free liberal tradition. But we can see today that a number of essential elements in the earlier patterns of international investment are now lacking. In the first place, the world is much less secure. It is not suggested that nineteenth century investors enjoyed—or even sought—perfect security. The very phrase "risk capital" implies the contrary. But today the former prop of "law and order" in large parts of the world—the colonial control exercised by European Powers—has, rightly, vanished. What takes its place is much more uncertain, to say the least.

In the second place, much automatic investment has vanished or is vanishing with the end of colonialism. Large parts of the earlier infrastructure—Indian railways, for instance, irrigation, ports, communications—were provided by the old imperial governments. Sometimes, as with Kenya and Uganda, the infrastructure in the shape of the Uganda Railway actually preceded the economy itself. Nor is this simply an historical point. For example, since 1945, Britain has been providing its colonies with some $50,000,000 to $60,000,000 a year in basic development. France's figure for Africa is about $250,000,000 a year. Yet the British effort is diminishing, the future of the French far from secure.

Another vital fact is that the whole outlook for private capital has changed. The prime motive in Britain's export of 7 percent of its national income in investment overseas for long periods

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before 1914 was the smallness of the domestic base and the wide opportunities overseas for the industrial innovator. In those days, not only raw materials development but railways and harbors, too, brought in good dividends. Private investors erected the infrastructure at the same time that they exploited minerals or agricultural export crops. Today the largest potential investor, the United States, has a vast prosperous internal market and is subject to no automatic pressures to equal Britain's earlier percentage; the equivalent for America today would be an annual export of about $30 billion instead of the combined public and private figure of perhaps $10 billion.

Moreover, basic development no longer earns the dividends. American private investment abroad—which reached about $6 billion in its best postwar year—is overwhelmingly in oil or in mineral development in the secure economy of Canada. For strictly underdeveloped areas, the figure is not much above $1 billion, and it is not devoted to basic development; yet the provision of transportation, ports and power is a precondition of further general growth and for developing private investment in most emergent territories.

The inescapable fact is that the pre-1914 automatic processes of international investment which we would like to take for granted no longer operate fully in 1958. Private investment still has a vital part to play, but the conditions no longer prevail under which it will undertake the whole range of essential development. Simultaneously, most of the governmental agencies of the past are ending or at least reducing their activities.

All this comes at a time when development has become infinitely more than an economic necessity. For underdeveloped lands it has become the test of nationhood, the index of political success, the touchstone of acceptability into the modern community of nation states. In all the states moving out of colonial tutelage into sovereign independence it is *the* fundamental political issue. Sometimes, indeed, growing to independence amid all the toys of sovereign independence evolved by older states, new governments may insist on types of growth which have more to do with prestige than need. But underneath the superficial desire for modernization lies the deeper political realization that their peoples, too, wish to inherit the modern world and that success in economic development is the touchstone of political survival. And beyond this in many parts of Asia is the even more funda-

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mental fact that the alternative to economic growth is decay, misery and starvation.

Let me now try to draw from these facts some conclusions which could perhaps guide the policies and affect the decisions that we in the West will have to face as the great drama of the world's aspirations and despairs continues to unfold.

II

It is fair to say that we have never yet fully formulated a lasting or effective policy in this field. One does not criticize the scale of postwar economic aid, particularly the spectacular generosity of the American effort, in questioning the method—or, rather, lack of method—with which so much of it has been carried out. We have acted so much on the basis of expedients. Here an economy has been shored up for strategic reasons, there defense support has been the main element; then we fit into the pattern the disposal of domestic surpluses; or we respond to a particular crisis—a famine in India—or a particular pressure—the political jeopardy of Jordan. In all this, since the ending of the Marshall Plan, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the element of development from the perfectly legitimate but sometimes less relevant issue of the defense of Western interests.

It is uncertain what impression the totality of our policies makes upon our own people; probably they are for the most part accepted only grudgingly as essential to the cold war. But the impression they convey to emergent nations, even to recipient nations, is extremely confused. Is this a program, they ask, to keep us on the Western side? Are we being drawn into the great-Power struggle?—and then perhaps they recall the rueful African proverb: "When the bull elephants fight, the grass is beaten down." Or, they ask, has the West any real long-term interest in our future? Are there political strings or imperialist overtones? Are the Communists right to warn us? Whom should we believe? Such uncertainties weaken immeasurably the political impact of what we do. Yet how can we answer the queries until we have first formulated clear answers for ourselves?

The Western world must evolve a definite policy to cover its multifarious efforts and commitments. It must explain frankly both to itself and to others just what it is trying to do.

In developing a free-world strategy for economic assistance, our first need is to stop pretending that by some happy chance

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or sudden improvement in the world's economic condition or by an unforeseen cessation of Communist activity we can stop economic aid tomorrow or the day after. The reasons for our adopting a sustained policy are too cogent to be denied. From a negative standpoint, the obvious determination of the Russians to adhere to a world plan makes it impossible for us to isolate ourselves, much as many of us would like to do so. More positively, our economic system always has depended upon expanding markets, high levels of trade and large-scale movements of capital. The old automatic processes have slackened. We must find alternatives, or lose a system which has contributed immeasurably to our own economic well-being. Nor would such a loss simply leave a vacuum of confusion or misery in the emergent territories. In view of their overwhelming political ambition to achieve development and the evident Soviet readiness to supply the means we can have no doubt that the vacuum would be filled—first by their becoming economically dependent upon the Soviet bloc and ultimately by their political subservience. This would occur, moreover, at a time when Western economies—owing to the progressive relative depletion of their resources—would probably be more than ever in need of a world-wide system of supplies and markets.

Thus the passionate desire of emergent territories to develop in fact matches our own economic and political need to see that they do so. Our attitude should not be one of grudging acquiescence or of unwilling acceptance of cold war pressures or—worst of all—a confusion of military with economic objectives. It should be, on the contrary, a determined onslaught upon the world's common problems of low productivity, faulty production, stagnant economies and undeveloped resources. This change of attitude alone could open a new political and economic chapter in our international relations, for we could at last answer squarely the question why we pursue policies for economic development. Our reply would be: because the well-being of the world economy requires it. Every country stands to gain from the preservation and growth of economic and political independence in the less privileged areas; equally so, every country must benefit from healthy and sustained economic development which brings with it better living standards and an expansion in international trade. It is this common purpose and community of interest between all the nations concerned that has never been made clear.

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III

If emphasis on the idea of partnership for development instead of on the rôle of donor and recipient becomes the central theme in Western policies of economic assistance, it is bound to determine in some measure the type of instruments used. Now it is apparent that the sums needed for development are often more easily secured from Western electorates and Western legislatures if the program is placed on a basis of straight national self-interest and administered nationally on a purely bilateral basis. The earlier investments in colonial empires were undertaken for this reason and in this manner. All recent military and cold-war programs have exactly the same basis. Yet the arguments for other aims and other methods are much stronger than we sometimes admit. In particular, the advantages of an International Development Authority have not been sufficiently recognized. It is not suggested that all bilateral arrangements would end, but that a new emphasis should be laid upon international direction and operation of world economic development.

First, let us look at the present system, in which bilateral arrangements predominate. How does the receiving country, passionately concerned for its sovereignty yet equally determined to achieve development, react to offers of aid on a bilateral basis? To generalize from the experience of the last decade, it is either politically embarrassed and goes through considerable internal turmoil, in the course of which the motives and aims of the outside donor are loudly and roundly attacked (a process we have seen in India, for instance, or Ceylon and the Sudan); or it attempts, with some cynicism, to play one donor off against another, thereby bringing itself and the whole region round it into uncertainty and unrest. This is the typical experience of the Middle East.

Against these risks, the Western Powers usually assert that bilateral aid gives them greater control and flexibility of policy. The opposite possibility is rarely considered—that control is, in fact, lessened and flexibility lost. If, for instance, the directing element in the aid available were provided by an International Development Authority, the risk of internal political disagreement and the greater risk of cynical external manœuvre would be greatly reduced.

There would be another subsidiary advantage to the receiving

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countries as regards the crucial point of flexibility of administration. Of necessity, the process of economic development must vary widely from country to country. Hundreds of millions of people are involved—people with widely different racial and religious backgrounds, holding many shades of political opinion and, as in the West itself, divergent views about economic theory and practice. Climate, history, education, diet—a vast number of factors—influence the attitude of these peoples and their governments towards economic development. No single, precise pattern or specific economic philosophy can be applied. What is needed is a very flexible, pragmatic and common-sense approach.

In these conditions, the administering organization must be able to adopt sharply different policies in different countries, sometimes even within a single country. Anyone with real operating experience will know this. This does not mean that waste and inefficiency are inevitable. It is often the insistence of a contributing country on "doing it our own way" (especially in agriculture) that leads most directly to waste and inefficiency. Again, economic assistance given on a national basis almost inevitably and understandably has strings attached, not political strings in the strict sense of the words, but the administrative and operating conditions which a national administration feels it must impose in order to protect its taxpayers' money. More often than not (and perhaps unconsciously) it requires the recipient to follow, or attempt to follow, administrative procedures and economic policies which appear reasonable in the West, but are quite unsuitable in the receiving country. Thus the original operating strings are frequently interpreted as political strings. At best, this leads to political resentment; at worst, it may bring the whole operation to an end and lead, as in Burma, to the refusal of further Western assistance.

On the other hand, a receiving nation is likely to be far more ready to accept guidance and in some cases tolerate even direct pressure from an international administration. Such pressure can be more straightforwardly explained and justified to easily aroused national electorates. Contrary to an often advanced argument, international administration can be less, not more, wasteful than direct bilateral control. Admittedly, this assumes that a future International Development Authority would itself be firmly administered and efficient, which means that governments would have to lend it men and women of proven efficiency

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and stature. But (to give only one instance) the record of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its own sphere has proven beyond doubt that large operating international agencies can achieve levels of efficiency fully equivalent to those of governments or large private corporations.

The majority of governments needing assistance do not want to become anybody's satellite. They want passionately to preserve their new independence. In other words, they want for themselves what we want for them. But for them to receive help directly from individual Western nations creates internal friction; and to rely more and more upon the Communists increases the risk that they will become satellites. The best hope of combining growth with independence would lie in being able to count upon impartial international help. Thus, the Western aim for the emergent nations—which is freedom and independence—can probably best be served not by direct national aid but by international operations. In the same measure, it would frustrate the Communist aim of Soviet domination.

We in the West have not realized the full scope of the new Soviet economic drive. No budgetary or electoral considerations hold the Soviets back in offering aid, ostensibly without strings, in all the world's strategic areas. They have a ruthlessness and a freedom to manœuvre which far surpass anything in Western countries with electoral commitments and long legislative debates. In favoring bilateral methods, we may thus be supporting a principle and a method which help Communism more than they help us. The Soviet bloc will always employ such methods more daringly and flamboyantly than we—for no one asks who foots the bill. It may well be that the international method, in this field as in so many others, offers our last best chance of establishing some sort of rational, objective control over Russia's operations and purposes. In addition, we shall be doing so with the full support of the emergent nations who, if they can find a way, want to be beholden to neither side.

It will be said that the Russians could not be relied upon to abide by the principles and limitations of a joint operating international agency, that their participation would riddle it with intrigue and sabotage and make it quite unable to pursue its general purpose of securing growth in freedom and independence. The risk cannot be denied; but personal experience in working with the Russians in a large operating international enterprise

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indicates that it can be practically eliminated on two conditions. The first is that the most careful and detailed articles of agreement must be drawn up before the agency is established. Such an agreement must contain the sanction of exclusion from the agency because of failure to observe its basic constitution, and on past experience this is something the Russians would respect. However much they sought to exploit every advantage, the operation would at least proceed within a manageable framework. The second condition is that there must be a thoroughly efficient and tough administration at the top of the agency. If the Russians refused to participate, the Western Powers should go forward to establish a multi-national agency with as many participants as could be secured. The Russians would then be in the position of having turned their backs upon the common enterprises of mankind.

If the case for an International Development Authority is accepted, we face the question how it should operate, on what scale and with what objectives. Based on the experience of the last decade, the aim of economic policy should be to create the possibility of the "national breakthrough"—in other words, to create conditions of self-sustaining growth. As we have seen, there are various possible prime movers in this process. Among them, the development of materials and commodities for export and the expansion of domestic medium and light industry are likely to remain the field of private enterprise, local or foreign. This means that the chief fields for development coming within the scope of inter-governmental policy are agricultural improvement, the creation of infrastructure, and the provision of basic social services.

Some of this area is already covered by existing international agencies. In particular, the World Bank has a ten-year record of highly effective work in the field of infrastructure, particularly in transportation and power development. Any new agency would naturally need to coördinate its activities carefully with other bodies and might very often work through them in developing particular programs. Actually, I believe that the effectiveness of these existing agencies would thereby be enhanced. It would be a tremendous improvement, for example, if all U.N. bodies in each of the underdeveloped countries could be administered locally under one representation, giving each national program more shape and pattern.

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This is not a proposal to make outside aid perpetual. The concept of a "breakthrough" implies that the aided economy reaches the point where the processes of saving become largely self-sustaining. The pattern to achieve it would vary from economy to economy, with different degrees of emphasis upon agricultural, pastoral and industrial components. But in each case the aim would be to achieve an economic margin, economic elbowroom, an annual average saving of at least 15 percent of national income; and this would be the aim for which the Development Authority and the local governments would prepare their plans.

IV

To undertake this program with a chance of success would entail commitments stretching over a number of years. The supreme disadvantage of on-again, off-again aid, voted each year in annual appropriations with the half-hope of ending them next year, is that all aid tends to be *ad hoc* and cannot be related to the longer processes of sustained growth. In economies as in human beings, this is a matter not of years but of decades. The United States has recognized this fact in its Export-Import Bank lending and in the Development Loan Fund set up under the I.C.A. But the main effort is still on an annual and hence provisional basis.

This is enough to ensure that the expert manpower needed to put the aid to best effect is also unavailable. Efficient operators, trained officials, men of energy and vision can be spared from their work at home for only a few years at the most. Usually they cannot serve long enough to be fully effective. A core of full-time international officials exists, but the number is small and there are far more technical experts than administrators and organizers among them. For this reason the need for an International Civil Service has been stressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Certainly, a consistent and coherent long-term policy of international economic development will require some such *corps d'élite*. In the past, the old colonial civil services were made up of devoted and selfless servants who would spend their lives in underdeveloped areas, providing the framework of order and giving the spin of energy to local effort. They have gone or are going. For decades to come, the emergent nations will need men without colonial affiliations but with equal devotion to take their place.

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No charter, however flexible, no structure, however workmanlike, will enable the Authority to act unless it also commands an outstanding staff. National governments would be unwise to establish an Authority unless they were ready—as they have not been in the past—to provide enough of their own outstanding officials to administer the organization. Length of service is of paramount importance. As a general principle it would be essential for key men in the Authority—particularly those working in the regional or local missions—to serve for at least five years and the Authority would also require a solid core of officials working in the international field for life. Experience has shown that only in exceptional cases has it been possible for a head of a mission to influence the thinking of local ministers in less than three years. The first couple of years are normally required to develop the personal relationship which is essential to the success of any of the operations contemplated for the International Development Authority.

It is not enough to staff the headquarters and field missions of the Development Authority. Much of its work will be wasted if the new governments cannot also secure trained men and women to work inside their own civil services. The present systems for providing staff to emergent governments—some by means of international recruitment and others under bilateral arrangements—could clearly be improved. Inevitably there is some degree of competition between the United Nations and its specialized agencies; further competition arises with regional organizations, and still more competition exists between individual nations. This does not always make it easy for a country in need of staff to obtain the men it requires.

It would be better if this staff could come almost entirely—although one does not want to suggest an unrealistically ideal solution—from international sources. An International Development Authority would be the logical coördinating body for the provision of staff needed in individual countries to ensure the effective administration of programs and projects.

The Western Powers must start in time. As a legacy of the old colonial régimes, most of the political and commercial contacts of the emergent nations are at present with the West. The new countries are not committed ideologically; they can still choose their help where it seems most natural. But this phase of what one might call unconscious and unplanned Western

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orientation will not last indefinitely. It will end abruptly—as it has in China—if the emergent nations come within the Soviet orbit as a result of faltering policies in the Western world. One wonders whether the absorption of Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere would have been so complete if international economic assistance programs under UNRRA had not come to a stop in 1947.

What must be the scale of operations of the proposed International Development Authority to ensure that in the next decades the world does not go down under a freight of misery, hunger and despair? Only a very general answer is possible, simply because of the variety of economies involved and the immense number of projects entailed in the effective modernization of the emergent nations. Eight years ago, an expert group of international economists put the gap between available and needed capital for the emergent nations at $19 billion. Today, it would be reasonable to think of the original capital that must be available to a Development Authority as in the neighborhood of $25 billion. This sum would be used gradually over the years and loans when made would be at interest rates geared to the low margins and productivity of underdeveloped areas. It might also provide a reserve for disaster, and for various special emergencies such as sudden violent fluctuations in commodity prices. It could be replenished by annual contributions from nations with more than a certain per capita annual income (say, $750). One percent of the national income of the Atlantic nations today would provide about $5 billion a year. In addition, the less wealthy nations should be urged to make contributions proportionate to their resources. In other words, it would probably be possible to base a long-term policy of peaceful world-wide development upon a capital sum equivalent to less than half the arms budget of the Western Powers for one single year and to sustain it with not much more money than Britain spends each year on drinking, gambling and smoking.

I do not think these comparisons are unfair or loaded. The figure of $25 billion may seem vast when measured by our normal reactions to foreign spending. But we have accepted far higher arms figures in our still vain search for security. It must always be a source of amazement that our governments are so ready to face the vast financial requirements of a fantastic defense effort and yet still fail to realize that positive economic policies which

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could secure peace in great areas of the world cannot be purchased at bargain rates.

The countries of the Atlantic community are able to spend over $50 billion each year on arms, and their governments have obtained the support of their people in doing so. One-tenth of that annual expenditure could set alight a new revolution throughout Asia and Africa and in less developed areas of Latin America—and it would be a revolution soundly based on the preservation of political independence and the provision of reasonable economic and social conditions for hundreds of millions of people who today have little or no hope for the future.

V

I should like to end on a personal note. Many of us who spend our working lives dealing with these problems, in one part of the world or another, are at last being driven to fear that the West, in its preoccupation with the hydrogen bomb and sputniks, may well be inviting a world tragedy of another kind. This equally vital and urgent problem of the less developed areas has so far never been faced honestly and realistically by the West.

It is a heartbreaking experience to live with people who so clearly need assistance, and at the same time to know that the great mass of people in the West would respond immediately if they, too, could have the same first-hand knowledge. Here is a great tragedy in the failure of human communications, and increasingly clear evidence that our political institutions have so far shown themselves incapable of dealing effectively with one of the basic problems of our age.

Must one be driven to believe that we have lost our sense of reality, and that we can no longer recognize the obvious? Can we visualize only the inhuman outline of the hydrogen bomb, and not see the obvious needs of hundreds of millions of people all over the world who ask nothing more than that we should give them a hand in time so that they can become persons with a future and so help to evolve a better world?

We talk mostly of these problems in international terms and in terms of national policies and governments. But never let us forget that the ultimate objective is the individual—the ordinary man and woman and child the world over—who asks only that we should preserve life and give hope for the future.

This is a problem from which none of us can escape. Most of

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us know, in our heart of hearts, that we are failing in our responsibilities. Quite apart from the dictates of our conscience—and I believe that there is a public conscience—the scientists and technologists have now made the world too small for the voices of millions of people in Africa and Asia and elsewhere to be stifled simply because they are half-starved and underprivileged.

The governments of the West know the essential needs of the less developed countries. It is evident that we in the West—by ourselves if necessary—have the resources which could satisfy those needs: resources which would not only secure our own survival but also provide fresh hope and new security for the people in these less fortunate lands. Yet we fail to mobilize them. Here is a great tragedy.

It is difficult to emphasize sufficiently the urgency of this problem. Clearly, the West does not regard it as a vital issue affecting national security and as a potential threat to the preservation of peace. People in the West still talk of "uncommitted areas" but fail to provide the resources to maintain them in that position of independence. As each day goes by, and still the West fails to respond, the attitude of governments and people in the less developed countries changes—perhaps imperceptibly, but it changes. At present, it seems to me, it is moving slowly, but as relentlessly as lava from a volcano, away from the West. If that process continues, the uncommitted areas will not long remain uncommitted and the doors of Asia and Africa will be closed to the West.

I make no apology for speaking so personally. It is not only an expression of belief, but the conviction that it is a duty to report the ominous signs of an impending disaster to those who still have the power to prevent it from happening.

In the last analysis, and when all is said, one is left with the belief that this problem will never be resolved until the majority of people in the West are ready to answer strongly and affirmatively when that most fundamental of all questions is asked, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Here is the test of our faith, of our conscience, of our innermost belief in the usefulness and purpose of our own lives. Today we still have the opportunity to act in a way which would do much to achieve peace and security for a large part of the world, and justify our own existence. Will we accept that challenge or will we prove once more that "where there is no vision the people perish"?

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OVERSEAS BASES IN AMERICAN STRATEGY

By Townsend Hoopes

THE present system of United States military bases overseas offers a striking contrast with the situation that existed a decade ago. At that time, we retained occupation forces in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea, with very limited air and ground support facilities elsewhere overseas. A few troops remained in China and Trieste, but were being progressively withdrawn; and we had only three base agreements, in addition to simple transit rights at designated airfields in Iceland and Saudi Arabia. Today, United States forces are stationed in about 35 separate countries and territories, exclusive of additional areas where our military representation is confined to training and advisory missions. Slightly more than one million Americans, including military dependents and civilian employees, are involved in our military activities overseas, and expenditures for the maintenance of these forces and installations are putting more than two billion dollars into local economies each year.

While the swift growth of this base system has not been distinguished by a pristine clarity of purpose, it has in fact proceeded logically and pragmatically from our assumption of a progressively greater responsibility for the military and political security of the non-Communist world. The base system reflects fundamentally our decision to assure the effectiveness of the strategic deterrent, but also our decisions to organize and sustain the NATO alliance, to maintain strong naval forces in Mediterranean waters, to support a collective security system in Southeast Asia, to protect Japan and Korea, to safeguard Taiwan. These decisions in turn have emerged over the past decade from the mounting pressure of the Sino-Soviet threat, from the very great disparity between United States power and the power of our overseas allies, and from an underlying awareness of the suicidal consequences of retreat into "Fortress America."

There can be no doubt that the requirements of our strategic air forces have provided the greatest single impetus to the development and expansion of the base system; for, with the exception of the military build-up in the NATO area, it is correct to say that the rapid development of overseas bases since 1949—and particu-

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larly during the Korean War—proceeded from the need to accommodate the flight characteristics of the B-47 bomber, which is the jet-propelled successor to the ponderous, propeller-driven B-36. While the B-47 is now being replaced, it remains for the time being the backbone of our strategic retaliatory forces. Expansion of existing facilities in Japan, Okinawa and Guam; further development of bases in Canada and Newfoundland; establishment of the elaborate operational complexes in England, Morocco and Spain—all these followed from the decision to rely upon the B-47 as the principal instrument of United States strategic air power. The effective combat radius of that aircraft required forward operating bases nearer to the target areas than could be located within territory controlled by the United States. But in addition the availability of such bases held out the prospect of important strategic advantages. A wide dispersal of United States air power around the Sino-Soviet perimeters would, by forcing a diffusion of the Soviet air-atomic effort, make it more difficult for the Soviets to calculate that they could destroy our retaliatory force by surprise attack. Moreover, carefully selected base areas "close in" to the Sino-Soviet borders would permit approaches from virtually all points of the compass and this would greatly complicate the problem of Soviet defense. In combination, these factors were expected to impose due caution on Soviet policy, at least as regards its contemplation of direct attack upon the United States.

By and large this strategic conception and the base system built to support it have served their intended purpose for the better part of the last decade. If they have eloquently demonstrated that strategic air power alone is an inadequate and almost useless instrument for dealing with the limited military and quasi-military challenges with which the Sino-Soviet bloc has repeatedly confronted us during this period, they have nevertheless proved an effective deterrent to general war; and, viewed in true perspective, that has been the principal task assigned these instruments by United States policy. Now, however, we have crossed over another threshold into a new strategic situation, pushed relentlessly by technological and political change which in these days moves with such incredible speed and presents such a bewildering complexity of political and technical choices as to threaten strategic planners with paralysis. Once more we are face to face with an urgent need to re-assess the fundamentals of our strategic position.

The principal military development which calls forth the re-

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assessment is the dangerously rapid and impressive growth of Soviet atomic striking power which has increased the vulnerability of the overseas bases to a point which now makes their use for sustained operations a very dubious proposition. In the face of this stark new condition, the United States has worked hard to devise improved air refueling and other techniques which would make possible a gradual pull-back of units into the Western Hemisphere and the gradual transformation of the overseas air bases into what are essentially landing fields for pre-strike and post-strike ground refueling. In this effort we have made considerable progress. Moreover, we are developing weapons and techniques which should further reduce our dependence on foreign bases for purposes related to strategic deterrence. One must be careful, however, to avoid giving a misleading impression of the present position. The overseas base system remains very important to the credibility and effectiveness of the Great Deterrent.

Nevertheless, it is correct to say that our strategic striking forces are moving gradually toward an independence of overseas bases, hastened by the developing Soviet ability to make them unusable for this purpose. Because the unfolding of the new situation will present consequential choices regarding new weapons, deployments and money, the United States cannot avoid an early re-assessment of the overseas base system, of its assets and liabilities, and indeed of the fundamental substance and emphasis of the present strategic concept. One desperately hopes it will be conducted with searching deliberation and that decisions will be taken knowingly rather than by inadvertence or default.

In making this assessment, it will be of great importance that those responsible take fully into account *all* of the relevant factors involved, and that they avoid applying—whether out of ignorance, lack of reflection, lack of will or desire for economy—the deceptively simple logic which the unfolding developments, technological and political, might seem to indicate. For while the base system was established and expanded primarily to assure the effectiveness of our strategic air-atomic capability, and is best understood in this context by Congress and American public opinion, in truth it has become a major—if at times a too conspicuous—element of United States foreign policy.

One fact not always appreciated is the wide variety of installations and facilities that go to make up the base system, and the equally broad spectrum of military and political purposes they

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are designed to serve. For example, the island of Guam (which is United States territory), the large base complex in Morocco and the magnificent installation at Thule are principal operating areas for the Strategic Air Command. The bases in Japan, on the other hand, afford not only airfields, but ports, ship repair facilities, tool shops and skilled labor that could be duplicated nowhere else in Asia. In Libya we have large-scale aircraft maintenance facilities and aircraft gunnery ranges to assure that our European air forces remain in a high state of readiness. There are radar stations and air-tanker fields in Canada, an Army communications unit in Ethiopia, and missile testing sites in the Bahamas. This is a measure of the scope and diversity of the base system, underpinned by political and economic arrangements of equal complexity. Though it generates frictions at many points and creates acute difficulties between the United States and the host countries, it remains a major strategic asset. It constitutes the cement in our system of alliances.

At present the inherent liabilities and cumulative frictions are in greatest evidence. The virtually permanent stationing in foreign countries of large numbers of American soldiers and airmen, sustained at higher living standards than the local population and enjoying certain immunities from local laws, has produced resentment and difficulty in the best of circumstances. But this problem alone would not be unmanageable. What now strains and threatens to vitiate many of the base agreements upon which the strategy of alliance rests are the implications of United States military policy in an atmosphere charged with new tensions and marked by a widening appreciation throughout the world of what atomic warfare is likely to mean. From the first, host countries have been sensitive to the inherent dangers of granting bases for use by U. S. strategic air forces. With the progressive development of Soviet atomic striking power—dramatically emphasized by the sputniks —and with the mounting drumfire of harsh Soviet warnings that countries containing American bases will be magnets for attack and destruction in the event of war, the anxiety has grown. In the circumstances, it has become more difficult to persuade host countries that their security is bound up with the physical presence of United States air forces, particularly those less sophisticated countries located at some distance from the Soviet Union and with whom the United States has entered into no binding arrangements for mutual defense. In these cases the unfolding situation,

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aggravated by the rising pressures of nationalism and anti-Western feeling, is serving more often than not to reinforce the instinct for disengagement and neutrality. Last year, for example, the Ryukyuan legislature unanimously passed a resolution calling for the discontinuation of base construction on Okinawa, expressing the fear that this would lead in time to "annihilation of the entire Okinawan population."

A year ago the Japanese Government, determined to attain a position of equality in its relations with the United States, and pressured by a public opinion intensely agitated by the Girard case, demanded and achieved the substantial withdrawal of American forces from Japan. While our prompt acquiescence appears to have made Japanese leaders more aware of the dangerous exposure which a too rapid departure of our forces would create, public opinion remains so sensitive on the question of atomic weapons that it is at best doubtful whether a situation which called for United States military operations in Korea, Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the area could now be supported from bases in Japan. In the Far East as a whole, in Africa and the Middle East, there is instinctive resistance to atomic weapons.

Nor is atomic fear confined to the "grey areas." The last elections in West Germany were distinguished chiefly by a gathering protest against the storage and prospective use of atomic weapons on German soil, and more generally, against their manufacture anywhere. Our European NATO partners remain decidedly cool to the offer of intermediate-range missiles, and Spain has asked pointed questions concerning the vulnerability of Spanish cities located near American air bases.

On the other hand, the military presence of the United States has served, and is serving, to strengthen the resolve of many nations to withstand external Communist pressure and to deal firmly with internal subversion. This was particularly true in Europe during the Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade and the anxious early days of the Korean War when the build-up of NATO forces around a strong American nucleus was a source of special reassurance. It is manifest today in Europe's defiance of Soviet missile threats. It has been, and remains, true in Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Elsewhere, as in Libya, the establishment of a military base provides a means of promoting and defending United States political interests which might not otherwise be open to us. Wheelus Field, for example, serves the needs of our

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strategic and tactical air forces; it also gives rise to an intergovernmental relationship which has enabled us to equip the Libyan Army and to provide economic assistance, two programs which contribute materially to Libyan independence and constitute a measurable counterweight to Egyptian influence.

In endeavoring to assess the exceedingly complicated and fluid problems and opportunities presented by our overseas base system, we would do well to recognize that most of the difficulties are inherent in the relationship created between foreign Power and host country. Opinion in the host country is unavoidably beset by a disturbing ambivalence. On the one hand, it desires the protection of United States military power and the economic advantages that flow from the presence of our armed forces and installations; on the other hand, it wants to assert its national independence by removing the foreign military presence, and indeed anything else that suggests foreign influence and control. The problem is not confined to Asia, but extends to host countries everywhere. The solution does not lie in rapid and total American withdrawal; for the countries concerned are, for the most part, aware of their acute exposure and would be dismayed by the departure of American forces. We must also realize there is most certainly a "peril point" beyond which further withdrawal would gravely endanger our own vital national interests.

To nurture the underlying mutual interest, which is so easily obscured, and to hold in check the state of tension which inheres in the relationship with host countries, we must also appreciate the need to grant meaningful compensation for our base rights. Political and military commitment, carefully selected mutual defense arrangements, various forms of military and economic assistance, trade agreements and technical aid have accordingly become indispensable elements of our alliance strategy and we must be prepared to use them on a continuing basis with intelligence and discrimination. This is a fact of international life to be recognized, even in dealings with our closest allies. In the best of circumstances, we may expect that the host countries are anxious in return to make their own tangible contributions to the common defense. In others, where ethnic, cultural and historic ties are tenuous, our position will depend more heavily on expenditures in the local economy, on various forms of assistance and on an unceasing effort, in face of enormous difficulties and disparities, to create a true sense of mutual interest and mutual trust.

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Broadly speaking, the challenge, after ten years, is still to devise a politico-military doctrine which is compatible with the strategy of alliance, which will nurture solid relations with our overseas friends because they can find it consistent with their real interests.

As we face this challenge anew, there is certainly no ground for optimism. On the face of it, our prospects for maintaining a viable system of overseas alliances were never worse. The balance of power has shifted against us—just how much is difficult to measure—and the Eisenhower Administration seems to watch this ominous development in benumbed passivity. The climate of world opinion is unfavorable. Unreason runs rampant in Asia and the Middle East. Nor can we expect to resolve fully the ambivalence which characterizes public opinion in all the host countries, even among our staunchest allies. Still there is reason to believe that the developing technological situation affords opportunity for improvement. If we can make the proper choices as regards both strategic doctrine and weapons systems it is possible that we can retain, and perhaps enhance, the significant advantages afforded by the base system, while at the same time reducing certain of its severe disadvantages.

II

Let us turn first to the choice of weapons systems. If enough money and the proper allocations are forthcoming without delay, we can still hope to have within seven or eight years—about the beginning of the predictably dangerous "missile lag period"—a respectable force of atomic-powered submarines mounting the remarkable Polaris missile, a compact, solid-fueled weapon with a range approaching 1,500 miles. These submarines, able to operate almost indefinitely beneath the surface of the ocean and, if necessary, to launch their missiles while submerged, offer special advantages in concealment and mobility. As the *Nautilus* and the *Skate* have now indicated, Polaris may enable us to exploit a permanent advantage conferred by geography: namely, that all critical targets in the Soviet Union are within 1,500 miles of large sea areas to which we have ready access. In the Arctic Ocean, the Polaris submarine can hide under the vast area of the ice pack, the edges of which are very close to Russia's northern sea frontier. For these reasons, Polaris is a weapon of special promise and may well become, within a few years, the most dependable means of maintaining the strategic deterrent to general war.

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With sufficient effort, the intercontinental ballistic missile (I.C.B.M.) can also be available within the same general time period. With a range of over 5,000 miles, this weapon could be emplaced on United States territory or in adjacent areas of moderate political sensitivity, such as Newfoundland, Greenland and northern Canada. It would seem most practical, taking into account both military and political factors, to locate the I.C.B.M.s in areas which are remote from population centers and which afford maximum opportunity for dispersal and protection.

Development of weapons such as these would in time render our long-range atomic force independent of forward bases located on foreign soil. This could be expected to give added poise to our posture of strategic deterrence by affording better protection to the striking force and by assuring singleness of political control. In such circumstances, this instrument of ultimate recourse could, in significant degree, be removed as an object of controversy and irritation in the pulling and hauling of day-to-day relations between governments and could be relegated to a position further downstage where, as is appropriate to ultimate power, it could form a quiet but unassailable backdrop to United States diplomacy. The added freedom of action resulting from this development would permit United States diplomacy to pursue its objectives with greater clarity and consistency, to eliminate bases where they are no longer needed, to avoid awkward commitments that embarrass our true purposes, to escape from the present necessity of distorting policy for the sake of retaining base rights in particular places. Secretary Dulles, for example, would be relieved of further need to endorse the colonial status of Goa for the sake of the Azores; and he might more readily agree to repatriation of the few hundred Bonin Islanders who, as a destitute lobby in Tokyo, now comprise a nasty irritant in U.S.-Japanese relations.

Conversely, if we should choose to place significant reliance on the land-based intermediate-range ballistic missile (I.R.B.M.), we will be driven back into an even greater dependence on overseas bases for maintaining the strategic deterrent, particularly on those close to borders of the Soviet Union and Communist China; for the limited range of the weapon would dictate its emplacement. Moreover, the nature of the weapon is such that its emplacement in foreign territory, as a weapon to be used by American forces, would cause a severe aggravation of all the political problems

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that now confront us in the era of the manned bomber. The question of joint control would arise almost everywhere, in part because the technical nature of the weapon lends itself more readily to joint control than does the bomber, in part because of the more obvious dangers involved for the host country. Missiles cannot be put through practice manœuvres, cannot be quickly moved to alternate bases, and cannot "fail safe" if fired accidentally or through a miscalculation of the situation. Moreover, the combat readiness of the liquid-fueled missile is markedly inferior to that of the manned bomber.

Politically and militarily, therefore, the liquid-fueled I.R.B.M. may represent a wrong choice for the United States. It would appear to contribute little to a secure and reliable strategic deterrent. It is not a suitable weapon for limited war. And by straining relations with our friends and allies, it would tend to cast doubt on the reliability of our base rights for any purpose. The slow reaction time of the present I.R.B.M. applies even more to the presently projected intercontinental missile, which is also liquid-fueled. However, the disadvantage would tend to be reduced in the latter case by the factor of greater distance; and by the better warning, stronger active defenses, and singleness of political control afforded by emplacement on U.S.-controlled territory.

A land-based, solid-fueled missile of intermediate range would very likely serve to reinforce the strategic deterrent, if held under the national control of certain responsible allied governments, but there is no space here to discuss the ramifications of this question; nor does such a weapon appear to be an immediate prospect.

III

Let us turn now to the choices of strategic doctrine. Any assessment of the base system must take account of the fundamental geopolitical situation, namely, that the Sino-Soviet bloc, comprising a vast concentration of organized power, animated by a messianic compulsion that manifests itself in a policy of unlimited expansion, and presenting a pervasive challenge to both the values and physical security of the non-Communist world, occupies the center of the world's principal land mass—the Eurasian heartland. Most of the free countries are on the fringe of the heartland, while the United States lies in an island continent at some distance from Eurasia. Given these facts, the problem of defeating the aggressive designs of the Sino-Soviet bloc necessarily involves

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the holding of strategic points all around the Eurasian perimeter. Because the independent countries of Europe and Asia are not strong enough to hold these positions alone, this central task has fallen primarily to the United States. In shouldering the burden, we have unavoidably created a system of overseas military bases designed to impose caution on the enemy, to deter him from expansion in any of several possible directions and by any of several possible means.

As some of us have long contended, the United States is really faced with two distinctive military problems and must possess the will and the means to cope with both if the free world is to survive. The first is to deter the Soviet Union from resort to general atomic war; the second is to prevent the Sino-Soviet bloc from expanding its influence through the conduct of limited military or quasi-military aggression against any additional areas of the free world. While the two problems are intimately related, in fact interdependent, they are not one and the same; nor can both be met effectively with the same military means. Success in the first will depend upon our maintenance and continued development of atomic striking power and continental defenses, and upon our unflinching determination to use that power against a major aggressor, if the provocation is so extreme that no other course of action would be consistent with our continued national integrity. Success in the second will depend on our possession of highly mobile, stringently practised "fire brigades" capable of effective limited action with appropriate weapons, and on our finding the will to defend our interests and those of our friends through the application of military force for rational and restricted purposes. The forces for limited action must comprise a combination of all arms, and must assuredly be prepared to use tactical atomic weapons in certain circumstances. But it seems quite clear that the situations most likely to confront us on the boundaries of Eurasia will call for modern ground forces supported by tactical air and naval forces, and employing primarily what are called "conventional" weapons. The central fact is that these two distinctive elements represent interdependent halves of the only viable military doctrine open to us, and that our default with respect to either is likely to mean the continued decline and ultimate collapse of our fortunes, our purposes and our hopes for mankind.

These comments on strategy are relevant because the overseas

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base system is likely to contribute, in future, to the strength and political solidarity of the free world only if the United States is prepared to accept the doctrine of local defense and limited military action as a necessary corollary to the policy of strategic deterrence. The opportunity presented by the coming of Polaris and I.C.B.M. is the opportunity to remove the issue of general atomic war, with all its attendant anxieties, from the forefront of relations with our overseas allies and to make a fresh approach to arrangements with them, based on the sounder and more politically palatable idea of regional and local defense.

With strenuous effort and some sacrifice, we may hope to devise adequate weapons systems under our own control which will deter general war and thus permit us to avoid general atomic destruction. Yet if we succeed in this endeavor, we may be sure the Sino-Soviet bloc will continue to emphasize a fundamental of their operational theory and practice: namely, to keep the conflict divisible, to carry on relentless advance in small doses, by ambiguity and indirection, scavenging and distorting genuine revolutionary movements, while seeking to avoid confronting the United States with an issue so direct and so morally clear as would provoke a massive response. To meet this threat and thus avoid the continued erosion of the free world, we must have a policy of firmness and precision with respect to the use of force locally; and we must have allies in the forward areas with confidence in the United States and a will to defend themselves.

In Europe, where the "base" is the entire western peninsula of Eurasia, the situation calls for our more explicit recognition that the military threat to NATO takes more than one form; that in addition to the possibility of massive atomic attack, real danger exists in what General Norstad calls the "fait accompli"—the swift forward movement of Soviet shock troops, brushing aside a thin "trip-wire" force and taking effective possession of a West German province. Such recognition should take the form of renewed support for the concept of the "shield" and for SHAPE's efforts to raise this shield to the respectable strength of 30 ground divisions, including a permanent nucleus of strong American forces. It will also be important for us to say more convincingly to our European allies that we intend to fit our military response to the size and nature of a particular threat that may arise; that we do not rule out the possibility of non-atomic and localized response to certain situations in Europe (although we properly

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refuse to give a pledge not to use atomic weapons); above all, that it is our considered policy to do everything possible, consistent with effective reply to aggression in any form, to limit the scope and destructiveness of hostilities that might begin in Europe.

In the Middle East and Asia, the need is similarly for development of a military doctrine that will not repel our friends and allies, but the problem is more difficult here because of the greater disparities in power and technical skill between the United States and the host countries, and because the emergent nations, determined to free themselves from all vestiges of colonialism, are especially sensitive to politico-military arrangements with the West. Yet ironically their need for such arrangements is great and growing, for (with the exception of India) they form an exposed fringe of small states around the Sino-Soviet bloc. All are now militarily weak and (with the possible exception of India and Japan) their military strength is likely to decline relative to that of the Sino-Soviet bloc during the next several years. Accordingly, U.S. military bases on that fringe, or directly behind it, assume particular strategic importance; for without adequate U.S. military presence in these areas, and in such deployments as will make our capacity for action credible, it is certain that almost all of the countries concerned—from Japan around the arc to Iran—would feel compelled in varying degrees to accommodate themselves to the Sino-Soviet bloc.

If we hope to maintain our strategic positions in Asia and strengthen relationships with the nations of the region, several adjustments in our thinking are imperative: there will have to be greater participation by the host countries in defense planning and in operation of bases; and there will have to be more explicit commitments by the United States to defend particular regions and localities by means which do not guarantee the annihilation of the local inhabitants. The United States has spoken much in recent years of its desire to achieve a sense of "mutuality" with its overseas allies, particularly in Asia. But the goal has eluded us, in part because our strategic doctrine and our administrative preferences have aggravated the inherent difficulties of relations with host countries.

In the Philippines, for example, we must deal with men who feel a deep need to assert themselves in their relations with us in order to counteract an impression in Asia that the young Philippine Republic is a docile ward of the United States. They are also frus-

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trated by the fact that independence has not brought them full freedom from reliance on their former guide and teacher, and they resent what they conceive to be our paternalism and tendency to take them for granted. Yet our military activities in the islands appear to be conducted with relative insensitivity to this condition. We have accepted native liaison officers at each base and have agreed to fly the Philippine flag, but aside from these gestures, the bases are regarded as a strictly United States operation. Nor have we tried to define the missions of the Philippine armed forces, nor to relate these coherently to the capabilities and functions of United States forces in the area. The difficulties are formidable and a good case can be made for our reluctance to be drawn deeply into commitments which might deprive us of military flexibility in a major crisis. Yet if we persist in this attitude, we should not be surprised if local public opinion is at best apathetic to our military presence and does not identify it with any vital interest of the host nation.

The fact remains that our hope of maintaining conditions favorable to our presence in Asia depends on our entering into activities and commitments from which we have heretofore held aloof. We must be prepared to share the operation of the bases with the host government, to participate in joint military planning, to designate particular forces for particular defense missions, to encourage local armed forces to assume responsibility for military tasks which fall within their technical and financial capabilities, and to relate these tasks to a coherent plan of local or regional defense.

Even with superlative diplomacy and the utmost good will, we will not succeed everywhere, but will encounter situations that call for more fundamental adjustments to political facts. For example, while holding out every hope of developing over the long term a strong and cordial relationship with Japan, we are nevertheless faced now with the need to adjust our military dispositions in such a way as to permit the support of our solemn commitments in the area from bases outside Japan. A possibility here would be the redeployment of selected forces to certain "back bases" in the central Pacific. From vantage points like Saipan and Tinian[1] we could maintain an effective military presence within the general area, without the disadvantages of concentrating our

[1] These islands are within the Strategic Trust Territory administered by the United States and the establishment there of naval, military and air bases is expressly authorized by Article 5 of the Strategic Trust Agreement.

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forces conspicuously in countries where the present political climate is unpropitious. If a "thinning out" of the forces on Okinawa could also be accomplished as part of such a redeployment, it would serve to relieve the present physical congestion there, and perhaps to reduce the political pressures as well, particularly if it were possible to remove the long-range bomber elements.

IV

The emphasis which has been placed here on the importance of choosing the right military doctrine is necessary in any consideration of the future of the overseas base system. Only if we face up squarely to the problem of limited war, show a willingness to enter upon joint military planning with our non-European allies and declare ourselves ready to commit appropriate forces to local and limited defense actions are we likely to hold together our alliances in Asia and the Middle East. Conversely, only if we retain forward positions of advantage overseas will we be able to maintain a valid capability for limited military action on the boundaries of Eurasia and thus to hold a favorable local power balance in selected areas. Much therefore turns on the doctrine we choose. The long-range or sea-based weapons now in prospect should facilitate our making the right choice by permitting us to remove the disturbing issue of our air-atomic forces from our day-to-day relations with our allies. But they cannot assure it. Unless we can soon transcend the rigidities of "massive retaliation" we are headed for involuntary isolation.

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FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

By Arthur H. Dean

NEWS that the nuclear-powered submarine *Nautilus* had travelled swiftly and silently underseas from Pearl Harbor to the Bering Straits and then some 1,830 miles under the drifting, grinding Polar ice pack and on to Iceland and Western Europe—some 8,000 miles in all—thrilled the free world. The voyage under the ice which permanently shrouds the uncharted bottom of the Arctic basin was done in less than four days. The entire route was through international waters common to all, and almost all of it was in the invisible depths of the ocean.

Not even Jules Verne dreamed of finding an undersea alternative to the elusive Northwest Passage which led Cabot and Hudson and other great sea captains to the very discovery and exploration of North America. The Arctic ice crushed all hopes for a shorter route to the Pacific and the Indies from that time until our nuclear age. Thus, the accomplishment of our *Nautilus*, with all of its strategic and even commercial implications, reaches across the centuries of modern history. The ability to send fleets and to transport cargoes under icebound seas at vastly increased speeds over vastly decreased distances has altered the geographical and geophysical framework of our world. It takes its place in significance alongside the advent of earth satellites. Quite clearly, changes in sea power, and specifically undersea military and perhaps commercial navigation, if the problem of expense can be solved, may be the beginning of a revolution in strategic thinking. A new Mahan is needed.

This voyage, taken in conjunction with the development of a compact, solid-propellant, ballistic missile and of a launching mechanism and a special submarine to fire it, also indicates immense potentialities for a new weapons system. The Polaris submarines, of which several are under construction, will be equipped to navigate accurately for long distances underneath the water, as the *Skipjack, Swordfish* and *Sargo* have demonstrated is possible, though less dramatically than the *Skate* and the *Nautilus*. These new submarines not only pose a serious threat in time of war to a nation's surface commerce but could constitute a highly mobile and elusive striking force capable of launching missiles from beneath the water at targets many miles inland. Our use of Polaris

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would be entirely within our national control and would not involve complicated base agreements with other countries.

The ability of a submerged submarine to fire missiles greatly complicates defense problems, since a land defender cannot know the arc which such missiles will travel. The missile-firing submarine also has the advantage of placing a nation's nuclear striking force as far as possible from population centers.

Today Russia has about 475 submarines, more than one-third of them being long-range types which can carry mines as well as torpedoes. Further, it is fair to assume that in time the Russians can adapt some of their existing submarines to carry winged subsonic missiles such as our Regulus. And we know from our experience with the atomic bomb that once a scientific breakthrough has been achieved in one nation the scientists and production experts of other industrial nations will not be found lagging far behind. Thus, the voyages of the *Nautilus* and the *Skate,* thrilling as they are, undoubtedly mean that in the not-too-distant future the Russians will also operate nuclear-powered submarines which possibly can move under the ice packs into Hudson Bay, or down either the Atlantic or Pacific shores, there to launch solid-propellant missiles against the heartland of the United States.

Such developments highlight the importance of the recent Conference on the Law of the Sea, which convened in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations on February 24, and was finally adjourned on April 28. One of the major proposals made at this Conference was to extend territorial limits from 3 to 12 miles, a step which would have had profound implications—among them, a dramatic increase in the threat posed by submarines. That this proposal was defeated was, as we shall see below, one of the most important achievements of the United States at the Geneva Conference.

Four conventions (and an additional voluntary arbitral convention) emerged from the Conference and are now subject to ratification.[1] They deal with: (a) the territorial sea (the narrow maritime belt adjacent to a nation's coast over which it exercises certain sovereign rights both as regards the sea and the air space above, including coastwise trading, fishing rights for its own subjects, the laying of submarine cables, and rules for navigation);

[1] Each of these conventions is open for signature until October 31, 1958, and will come into force upon ratification or accession by 22 nations. A number of nations signed at Geneva and others have signed since.

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(b) the Continental Shelf (where a coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction to explore and exploit the subsoil of the ocean beyond the territorial limits, if that is feasible); (c) the high seas (all areas not constituting a part of the coastal state's territorial sea or inland waters) and the conventions dealing with, among other things, freedom of navigation on and under the high seas, freedom of fishing in them, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines in them and freedom to fly over them; and (d) conservation of the living resources of the high seas.

These four extremely useful conventions were the result of much debate and hard work, first in the International Law Commission of the United Nations which produced the draft articles that served as working papers for the Conference, and then in the committee and plenary meetings of the Conference itself. As adopted, they represent a significant development in the international law of the sea and, indirectly, of the air, and encompass a surprisingly large area of agreement.

Although the somewhat meager coverage in the United States press gave the impression that the only objective was to determine the legal limit of the territorial sea, the Conference in fact faced a host of other problems. Among these were rights of a coastal state in the adjacent Continental Shelf; the method of determining the base lines from which the territorial sea of a coastal state is to be measured; the right of innocent passage of surface vessels through, or aircraft over, straits which lie within a nation's territorial sea but connect international bodies of water; the existence and extent of a contiguous zone (a zone in accordance with the convention on the high seas adopted at the Conference, not to exceed 12 miles in breadth, in which the coastal state may exercise controls necessary to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations); the conservation of fisheries and crustacea and other living resources of the sea; the right to use the high seas for atomic tests and military manœuvres; the rights of landlocked countries; the terms and conditions of the grant of nationality to ships; and other problems equally involved and more than a little charged with political and economic connotations.

The United States and its delegation realized when they entered the Conference that it would be a difficult one. World conditions seemed favorable for Communist and newly-created nations to upset the existing law of the sea developed and evolved over many

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years largely by the major maritime Powers. To some of the newer countries the fact that most of these were also colonial Powers was a profound source of irritation. Indeed, what we usually regard as a long historical fight for the freedom of the seas may seem to them to have indirectly conferred upon foreigners a right to come within a short distance of their coasts to filch their natural resources without paying any compensation.

For military and political reasons the Soviet bloc was insisting on a 12-mile or even greater limit for territorial seas. No such breadth had ever been recognized in international law, and it was vigorously opposed by the United States and other maritime nations as unduly restrictive. The Soviet Union was also espousing an absolute right of transit by a landlocked country across the territory of an adjacent coastal state, including free access to its ports and duty-free entry of goods. If such a proposition were adopted it could have considerable political significance, especially in case the landlocked country were hostile to the coastal state.

The Soviet Union also was demanding that nuclear tests be banned on the high seas, which would have had the effect of preventing the recent tests at Eniwetok and would have made largely futile the subsequent negotiations on that subject at Geneva. In making this demand, the Soviet Union conveniently forgot that it recently closed Peter the Great Bay—which is 120 miles across—in order to protect two of its missile bases and had otherwise violated freedom of the seas by sealing off vast bodies of waters and terming them inland waters.

The heated dispute over Israel's right of passage through the Strait of Tiran connecting the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea unfortunately colored the attitude of some of the Arab countries toward the law of the sea and caused certain of them to vote for the Soviet proposition regarding the breadth of the territorial sea. And several states which nourish hard feelings toward their former colonial rulers showed a desire to exercise their new-won sovereignty with complete freedom and to make their own decisions regarding the rights of other nations to fish off their coasts, to navigate in their waters or to fly over their territorial sea.

The economic difficulties of many Latin American countries, caused in part by the decrease in the exports of coffee (due to increased production of African coffee), wool, cotton, sugar, tuna, shrimp, lead, zinc and copper, and by the decline in the prices of these commodities, brought their needs in conflict with ours.

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Mexico's approach was colored by her acrimonious and sometimes bloody dispute with our shrimp fishermen, involving questions both of the breadth of the territorial sea and of a coastal state's rights in the Continental Shelf.

There were many other special situations. Iceland, which has been selling a large part of its fish in the Russian and East European markets, favored extending the limit of the territorial seas to 12 miles—a claim which aroused Britain and other Western European nations long accustomed to fish close to Iceland's 3-mile limit.[2] Canada also claimed the right to regulate fishing for 12 miles off its coasts in order to control the abundant fishing off the Grand Banks of Nova Scotia and the halibut and salmon fishing on the Pacific coast. This claim, which ran afoul of the historic rights and practices of other nations, aroused strong feelings among Western European nations dependent in large part on cod for their protein diet.

India, Burma, Thailand, South Viet Nam, Cambodia, Korea and several other states were interested in excluding Japan's fishing vessels from their territorial seas and therefore wished to extend the breadth of their territorial seas. Some had already done so by their own statutes.

Chile, Ecuador and Peru claimed 200 miles of territorial sea off their coasts in order to control the rich tuna and whale fisheries in that area and to protect the marine fauna which feed the birds whose guano deposits provide fertilizer for domestic agriculture as well as for export. Although these claims used the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf as a point of departure, they were grounded primarily on natural law, *i.e.* "The right of conservation of economic factors is inherent in all States." Such claims clearly are not consistent with the Truman Proclamation in respect to preserving the waters above the Continental Shelf as high seas, open to all for navigation and fishing, for these states assert jurisdiction over the waters (and over the air space above them) for 200 miles. In any case, they have a very narrow Continental Shelf, measuring less than 2 miles at points and extending to a distance of 60 to 80 miles in only one section.

Panama wished to protect her claim that the Bay of Panama is an historic water which can be legally excluded from the high

[2] Iceland has since unilaterally extended its claim to exclusive fishing rights to 12 miles off its coast. As this article is being written, the British Admiralty has announced protective measures for its trawlers. France, the Netherlands and other West European states also are not expected to recognize the Icelandic announcement.

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seas, on the theory—denied by us—that she would then be able to bargain over the right of a ship to enter the Canal. The result of this would be in large measure to violate our treaty rights.

The Philippines and Indonesia asserted special rights for archipelagoes. They asked that the waters "around, between and connecting" the islands of an entire archipelago should be treated as internal waters and that the surrounding areas, determined from straight base lines, should be treated as territorial sea. This proposition would have converted vast areas of the high seas into internal waters and would have closed vital navigation and aerial routes between India, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand. The implications to the free world of this doctrine are enormous.

There were other difficulties in the way of reaching an accord at the Conference. There were the usual Soviet tactics of delay, deceit and detour, supported by a bland disregard of facts and by expressions of pious altruism toward the newly-created nations completely at variance with actual Soviet practices. There was the fact that almost all of the nations at the Conference belonged to some recognizable group with similar geographic, ethnic, economic or political interests which they sometimes attempted to assert collectively—the Arab nations, the Afro-Asian group of nations, the Western Europeans, the Latin Americans, the Central Americans, the members of the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union and its satellites. And there was the fact that countries geographically close to the Soviet Union or to Arab states, or those, like Austria, whose international position is governed by special treaties, were led to take a somewhat neutral position on controversial questions.

In addition, at this Conference there were representatives of the landlocked states—Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Laos, Luxembourg, Paraguay and Switzerland—all with interests somewhat different from those of coastal states.

If any accord was to be reached, all of these disparate forces had to be reconciled. Moreover, any conventions adopted had to pass through a time-consuming procedural machinery which required that the amendment furthest removed in substance be voted upon first, followed by the amendment next furthest removed, and so on, until all amendments had been put to the vote of the 86 nations represented. The Soviet and Mexican delegations were past masters at calling for a divided vote which would

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split an integral proposal into several parts and in moving to strike out key words, or key definitions, or of ruining by slight changes the patient work of drafting committees.

II

In spite of these varied and numerous difficulties and obstacles, the Conference reached agreement on a series of complex and controversial issues and produced conventions which represent significant milestones in the development of the law of the sea. Given the scope of the problems involved and the many conflicting interests which had to be reconciled, the results exceeded the expectations with which many of the participants—including the United States—had entered into the Conference.

True, no binding accord was reached on the inordinately difficult, controversial and much-publicized question of the legal limit of the territorial sea. But even here the United States and the other principal maritime nations were successful in preserving the traditional limit of 1 league or 3 nautical miles;[3] for since the Conference was unable to agree by a two-thirds vote either on the 3-mile or any greater limit of the territorial sea, it adopted no provisions which would alter the traditional rule.

When it became apparent that a 3-mile limit would not be adopted by the Conference, the United States offered a compromise designed to accommodate the sincere interests of all the states represented. After conferring with the representatives of many delegations, and supported most constructively by the British delegation, we suggested that the limits of the territorial sea be extended to 6 miles and that recognition be given to the right of coastal states to regulate fishing for another 6 miles, subject to certain historical fishing rights. In plenary session this compromise received a majority of votes—45 for and 33 against—falling short of the two-thirds necessary for adoption, but nevertheless giving the United States at least a moral victory. No other proposal received a majority vote and, indeed, all the others were resoundingly defeated.

The desire of the United States to maintain a relatively narrow territorial sea and, more particularly, to prevent any extension to 12 miles was based not merely on the fact that the 3-mile limit has long been recognized in international law but also on compelling military and commercial considerations. To reduce the area

[3] The Scandinavian countries historically used a league equivalent to 4 nautical miles.

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of the high seas by transforming important waters into territorial seas, closed to free navigation (and with the air space above closed also), would decrease the security of the United States by reducing the efficiency of its naval and air power and increasing the risk of surprise attack. In many straits there would be no high seas left. In the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and in the seas around Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan, an extension of each island's territorial sea would inhibit the operational ability of our fleet and air force. For navigational purposes it would change a large Pacific area into a series of unconnected "lakes" of high seas. Surface warships and transports might operate in the straits connecting the international bodies of water, but this right would not, in the absence of a treaty, extend to an aircraft's right to fly over them or to a submarine's right to operate under the surface of them.

In time of war observance of the rules of international law unfortunately becomes very often a question of expediency. But a nation such as the United States which has regard for the rights of mankind and respect for a legally ordered society cannot lightly envision the disregard of international law as it applies to the territorial seas of neutral nations. As noted above, the extension of the territorial sea of neutral nations might in many instances increase the striking power of enemy submarines. This is because normally submarines cannot safely operate within 3 miles of the shore. However, if the territorial sea were extended to 12 miles, an enemy submarine (particularly a nuclear submarine which could operate silently for long periods without surfacing) would be able to move about undetected in a neutral state's territorial sea, whereas our surface ships could not operate there without violating the state's neutrality.[4]

The operation of commercial shipping by water or air would also be subjected to delay and navigational difficulties. Indeed, it would seem to have been part of the Soviet purpose in backing extensions of the territorial sea to hamper the commerce of the free world. As a continental Power with limited access to the sea, the U.S.S.R. had little to lose by embracing a 12-mile limit.

The proposal would have made necessary new treaties or agreements with states through whose territorial waters merchant ships

[4] Although one of the articles adopted at the Conference requires submarines when navigating in a territorial sea to stay on the surface and to show their flag, it is not realistic to assume that belligerent submarines would obey this law in time of war.

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would then pass. The right and ability of such ships to schedule the most economical routes, to enter and leave harbors freely, and to move at will without interruption or delay would be jeopardized. Similarly, the routes and practices of freight and passenger aircraft would be subject to disruption, and new agreements might be required giving the right to fly over territorial seas newly created from the high seas.

Clearly, then, the rejection of attempts to extend the territorial sea represented an achievement in the preservation of the freedom of the seas and of the air space above them. When it became apparent that agreement on this matter could not be reached, the writer, as chairman of the American delegation, stated:

> Our offer to agree on a 6-mile breadth of the territorial sea provided agreement could be reached on such a breadth under certain conditions was simply an offer and nothing more. Its non-acceptance leaves the preëxisting situation intact.
>
> We have made it clear from the beginning that in our view the 3-mile rule is and will continue to be established international law, to which we adhere. It is the only breadth of the territorial sea on which there has ever been anything like common agreement. Unilateral acts of States claiming greater territorial seas are not only not sanctioned by any principle of international law, but are indeed in conflict with the universally accepted principle of freedom of the seas. . . .
>
> We have made it clear that in our view there is no obligation on the part of States adhering to the 3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of other States to a greater breadth of the territorial sea. On that we stand.

Another complex and controversial problem which the Conference faced was the claim of many nations that the base line from which the territorial sea is measured need not be the actual coast line at low tide but under some circumstances may be a line drawn between points on the shore. Such straight base lines, as distinguished from those following the real shore line, leave areas of open water between the coast and the base line.

The prior law in this connection had been set forth by the International Court of Justice in the well-known Norwegian Fisheries case. It limited the use of straight base lines to the unusual cases "where a coast is deeply indented and cut into," as in the case of Norway's northern coast. Efforts at the Conference to expand this rule to permit states with merely irregular coast lines to extend their territorial seas were resisted.

The convention adopted by the Conference on the question of a nation's rights in its Continental Shelf is the first world-wide

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accord on the subject and is highly satisfactory to the United States. The sea bed and its subsoil adjacent to the coast and extending beyond the territorial limit as far as the depth of the water admits of exploitation of the natural resources are defined as the Continental Shelf in which the coastal state has exclusive rights of exploration and exploitation. Although the convention uses the term "sovereign" when referring to these rights, such rights are clearly limited to the sea bed and subsoil and do not extend to the seas and air space above.

The United States was especially anxious to preserve the character of the waters above the Continental Shelf as high seas. It also was concerned with the assertion by some states that crustacea such as shrimp were within the domain of the coastal state. The Conference defined natural resources as the mineral and other non-living resources of the sea bed and subsoil, together with living organisms which at the harvestable stage either are immobile or under the sea bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea bed or subsoil. The latter provision gives coastal states such as Australia the right to control oyster beds and pearl fisheries.

Another controversy which was successfully resolved by the Conference was the right of "innocent passage" for foreign ships through international straits and such parts of territorial waters as are used as highways for international traffic. The convention adopted makes clear that there shall be no suspension of the right of "innocent passage" of foreign ships, including warships, through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another or to reach the territorial seas of another state. This represents a significant reaffirmation of freedom of the seas and clearly applies to the Arab-Israeli controversy over the Strait of Tiran, giving Israel a legal right of innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea.[5]

Another striking accomplishment was the adoption of a comprehensive convention regulating the conservation of the natural resources of the sea. Significantly, this convention defines conservation as "the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products." It provides for a new system of international coöperation and spells out

[5] The right to make the waters of large bays internal waters and thus not subject to the right of innocent passage was restricted to bays not more than 24 miles wide at the mouth.

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new rights and duties for both the fishing and coastal states which become parties to it. Thus, a state whose nationals fish anywhere in the high seas where nationals of other states do not fish must adopt conservation measures when necessary. Under another provision, if the nationals of two or more states fish the same stocks of fish in a given area of the high seas, these states shall, upon the request of any of them, enter into negotiations to prescribe necessary conservation measures. Once measures have been adopted, other states which subsequently fish that area are obligated to apply them. This convention further recognizes that a coastal state has a special interest in the conservation of the living resources of adjacent high seas even if its nationals do not fish there. Thus, if negotiations with the interested fishing states have not led to agreement within six months, a coastal state may unilaterally promulgate non-discriminatory conservation regulations which will be binding upon other states. In addition, the convention provides for a compulsory and speedy settlement by a special commission of disputes arising under its articles and sets forth criteria to be applied in determining the necessity for conservation measures. Although the doctrine of abstention was not adopted, much progress was made in educating the nations on the need to refrain from fishing certain stocks of fish, especially salmon and halibut, on the high seas.

III

For many years scholars and jurists have worked to establish the concept of a world-wide code of international law of the high seas. They become impatient when international law in this field evolves step by step as did the common law. But it is too much to expect that complete and uniform agreement can be reached easily and quickly among the nations of the world on questions of tremendous economic and security importance.

It must be remembered that so-called historic doctrines of the freedom of the seas do not have the same appeal for newly-formed nations which possess little shipping or lack deep-sea fishing equipment. Maritime nations fish off their coasts without paying license fees, duties or taxes and their heavy trawlers may injure the seines and set lines of the native fishermen.

Solutions to these difficult questions will be found only by a careful and objective sifting of the facts without avoiding the actual issues by reliance on technicalities and historic principles

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which may be inapplicable to the local situation. The United States is in a unique position to be helpful in this respect since it can economically afford a reasonably objective approach. It also can make scientific and research facilities available to the newly-created nations and can help in promoting the doctrines of conservation and abstention.

Many nations did not support the proposal of the United States regarding the breadth of the territorial sea because of constitutional or statutory reasons or because of objections to its arbitration provisions as violating national sovereignty. Nevertheless it was supported enthusiastically by all the NATO nations except Iceland, and by all of the British Commonwealth except Burma and Canada. Many others praised the United States for making a constructive and imaginative attempt to achieve an agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea even though, as was well known, it had wished to retain the 3-mile limit.

The United States thus emerged from the Conference with considerably enhanced good will and prestige due to the sympathetic interest it had shown for the problems of other nations, small as well as great. It would be a mistake to think that the failure to accept one proposal was due to anti-Americanism *per se*. Apart from the Soviets and their satellites, the cause of non-acceptance was generally a divergence of economic interests—the fishing disputes concerning Mexico, the west coast Latin American states and Canada; Canadian resentment of our surplus wheat sales; our restrictions on oil imports which affect oil production in Canada, Venezuela and other countries; the inability of Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations to accept orders from Communist China; local boundary disputes; archipelago questions; our protective tariff policies on mineral and wool imports from Latin America; the Arab-Israeli problem; and many other problems.

We must continue to seek solutions of such problems in a spirit of fair compromise. We must work to overcome the distrust of the newer nations for their former colonial masters and for the great maritime Powers. We must also continue to seek understanding of the problems of the older nations, which are very real and must be examined carefully. All this will take patience, time and much creative effort. The achievements of the United States at the Conference in these respects should not be misread as failure but regarded as what they were, leadership in the free exchange of ideas.

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OPEN SKIES AND OPEN SPACE

By Philip W. Quigg

HARDLY was Sputnik I in orbit last October when the Russians were ready to meet objections that their first artificial satellite infringed on the sovereignty of other nations. No violation occurred, wrote a Soviet legal expert, because in reality sputnik did not pass over other countries; rather, countries passed under sputnik as the earth rotated. "This piece of applied relativity," as *The Economist* called it, was supplemented with a more serious proposal. The Soviet authority went on to suggest that the outer atmosphere, like the open seas, belongs to no one and that freedom of circulation above 15 or 18 miles should be permitted by international law.[1]

Within these two brief propositions are compressed some of the most perplexing problems of the approaching space age. The first must have been offered facetiously since sputnik was moving at some 18,000 miles an hour and would have passed over many countries even if the earth did not rotate. Nevertheless, it drew attention to the fact that space is a realm apart, subject to natural laws of its own but, so far, beyond the reach of man-made laws. The second proposition was directed to a central series of questions now in sharp debate: Should sovereignty extend to outer space? Where does space begin? Can the frontier of space be clearly demarcated? The striking thing about this Soviet article is that it drew the limit of sovereignty about three times nearer the earth than any Western student of the problem has proposed, at a distance well within the atmosphere and within the range of rocket airplanes.

More recently the Soviet press has been silent on questions of space law[2]; in other countries, however, the legal profession has been prolific on the subject. The American Bar Association has set up a Committee on Space Law and the International Astronautical Federation has appointed a committee of four physicists and three lawyers to draft a definition of air space and to recommend a rule delimiting air-space jurisdiction. The latter committee, under the chairmanship of John C. Cooper, will submit its find-

[1] G. Zadorozhnyy in *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* October 17, 1957. Summarized in *Survey of the Soviet Press (28)*. See also *The Times* (London), October 18, 1957, p. 7. Approximately 97 percent of the earth's atmosphere lies within the first 18 miles.

[2] However, *The New York Times* of September 2 reported a return to the subject in a Soviet legal journal in which the freedom of outer space is reasserted.

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ings and recommendations to the Secretary General of the United Nations, which is already involved in space matters. Indeed the legal profession has been so active that a professor of international law was moved to remark, "I am afraid a number of my brethren at the bar are already in orbit. They are traveling very fast and very high in a circular path, and I want them brought back to earth as soon as possible."[3]

It is true that the space lawyers have projected themselves into pretty esoteric realms where there appears to be not only no air, but no cold war, and no generals and admirals to define the national interest. Moreover, the lawyers have forged ahead of the scientists to consider such questions as transactions in space, crime in space, property rights, piracy—indeed all the problems of this planet plus others deemed peculiar to space. For example, Andrew G. Haley, president of the International Astronautical Federation and General Counsel of the American Rocket Society, has developed in some detail the principles of "Metalaw" for dealing with intelligent beings who may be encountered on other planets.

There are, however, a range of questions which will require regulation or agreement in the foreseeable future. These involve such matters as responsibility for space craft, registration of vehicles, assignment of orbits and radio frequencies, and the timing of launchings to avoid radio interference and to minimize risk of accident or collision. It has seriously been suggested that an anti-litter ordinance be adopted providing that after a satellite's radio has gone dead and its usefulness served, a small rocket will push the satellite toward earth, there to be consumed in the atmosphere. Otherwise, it is argued, space will soon be littered with hundreds of satellites, impossible to keep track of, and representing a hazard to navigation. As technology progresses, one can foresee the need for a host of additional regulations analogous to those for air and sea traffic: navigation aids, rules of safety and the like.

Another range of anticipated problems involves questions of liability for injury or damage from falling satellites. Sooner or later, all or part of a satellite is going to survive its fall through the atmosphere and do harm to man or property. Presumably precedents will evolve from air law once responsibility has been acknowledged in principle and providing identification is possible.

Despite the urgency with which some lawyers have painted the

[3] Nicholas Katzenbach, "Law and Lawyers in Space," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1958, p. 220.

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need for prompt agreement on these matters, one must assume that regulations will be negotiated when the situation demands, and not before. For the most part, these are questions in which necessity will ultimately triumph over politics, as they have in the field of aeronautics. Even though Soviet Russia is not a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which imposes comparable regulations for "inner space," she adheres to its rules. Similarly, regulations for outer space are likely to evolve from expediency and as experience demonstrates the need. Thus safety regulations will follow, not precede, the projection of man into space, and questions of liability are more likely to be set by precedents as yet unknown than by international agreement in anticipation of crashing satellites.

II

Much of the disagreement on how to cope with the emerging problems of outer space stems from a difference of approach. Is it better to stage a frontal assault on the problems, hoping to achieve agreement before they become acute, but risking a negative response from which nations will find it difficult to withdraw? Or is it better to count on an accumulation of modest precedents, thereby avoiding a confrontation on particular issues, but risking a measure of chaos if precedents lead in the wrong direction?

This difference of approach is exemplified in the growing literature on sovereignty in space. Some believe that the discussion is an academic exercise which might better be left alone. The majority of those who have written on the subject, however, insist that outer space must not only be declared free but its frontiers defined, as the prelude to all else. The more hopeful among them believe that the freedom of outer space has already been established in law. ". . . The course of international conduct since the satellite flights were announced," Cooper writes, "is consistent with no theory other than the acceptance of the principle that 'outer space' is not part of the territory of any state and may be used by all states as freely as the high seas are now used for surface shipping."[4]

Many other authorities agree, on the grounds that (1) neither the United States nor the Soviet Union asked permission of other states before launching satellites over their territory; (2) no state has protested against such flights; and (3) the United Na-

[4] John C. Cooper, "Flight Space and the Satellites," *Astronautics*, March 1958, p. 70.

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tions has passed certain resolutions in which the principle of national sovereignty in space is implicitly rejected. Among those who agree with this interpretation are the Secretary General of the United Nations and the director of its General Legal Division, Oscar Schachter. Moreover, Mr. Hammarskjold hopes that when the topic comes up for debate this fall, the General Assembly will agree explicitly that outer space is *res communis,* incapable of appropriation by any state.

The conviction that sovereignty should not extend to outer space is, of course, reinforced by the facts of astronomy. In addition to the rotation of the earth, the planet itself is traveling at 66,000 miles an hour around the sun and our solar system is moving at a million miles an hour within its galaxy. Therefore, a given point in space may be said to be "above" a particular state for only a fraction of a second, and even an object orbiting the earth may pass over several states in a matter of minutes.

If it is widely agreed that claims of sovereignty in outer space are undesirable or impractical, the next logical step, it would seem, is to determine where outer space begins, for here it might be proposed that sovereignty should end. An imaginative array of criteria has been advanced for determining the inner boundary of space—the point at which the gravitational force of the sun exceeds that of the earth, or the point of minimum temperature, or as high as the sky remains blue, or the maximum height from which a body if dropped over Texas will fall on Texas. By far the commonest phenomenon for defining space, however, is the earth's atmosphere.

For centuries the conception that the sovereignty of a state extended *usque ad coelum*—up to the skies—was well established in international law. Derived from the Romans, the doctrine was dignified in English law by Blackstone. Although an effort was made at the dawn of the air age to establish freedom of the air comparable to freedom of the seas, the experience of World War I counseled a more cautious policy. In 1919 a Paris convention for regulating air navigation specified that "every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." The Chicago Convention of 1944 used the same language, but the term "air space" was nowhere defined. However, the Annexes to both conventions defined aircraft as "any machine which can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air." From this it has been argued that the delegates intended

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national sovereignty to extend only as high as an airplane can fly —an argument which is used to reinforce the contention that the freedom of outer space has already been established in law.

Others believe that the Paris and Chicago Conventions did no more than restate the *ad coelum* theory in modern terms and that we must start from the assumption that under existing law sovereignty extends to the limits of the atmosphere. This does not prove very helpful when it is realized that the limit has been variously placed from 150 to 60,000 miles from the earth! And since the greatest activity in space—whether of earth satellites, ballistic missiles or space platforms—is likely to occur within the first 1,500 miles, a definition of space which permits sovereignty to extend to the extreme limits of the atmosphere will be largely meaningless.

Consequently some nearer boundary has been sought—one which will fill the requirement that it be clearly definable. Haley believes that he has found it at a distance of approximately 53 miles, the point at which the air becomes so thin that aerodynamic lift is gone and must be replaced by centrifugal force derived from speeds in the neighborhood of 18,000 miles an hour. Cooper agrees that this is a critical line and believes that the situation will become chaotic if some sort of international control is not exerted in space beyond 53 miles. But he proposes that there should be a "contiguous zone" up to 300 or even 600 miles in which nations would maintain sovereignty. The lower limit would embrace the area in which atmospheric drag gradually slows an earth satellite, until it falls to earth. The higher figure is suggested in order to give nations some control over missile flights above their territory—not only military missiles, but ultimately those carrying mail and passengers.

The clarity of Haley's proposed boundary has been muddled considerably by the announcement that the Air Force plans to fly an experimental aircraft to more than twice the altitude at which aerodynamic lift is gone. The X-15 will thus soar well above the perigee of Explorer III (110 miles) and may reach that of the first three sputniks (145 to 150 miles). It will accomplish this, however, much as an old car gets over a hill—by gaining maximum speed on the straightaway and counting on its weight and speed to carry it up the grade. So the X-15 is expected to achieve a speed of some 5,000 miles an hour in level flight with most of its weight supported by aerodynamic lift; then turning upward,

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and with a final booster from its rocket motor, it will coast into the realm of satellites, gliding back to earth immediately, its energy exhausted.

The significance of this vehicle is that it blurs the distinction between aircraft and spacecraft and may indeed be the prototype of future space ships. The first human to be placed in orbit is likely to be borne in a winged craft, not a pure rocket. The wings will give him greater stability and control in take-off and ease his glide back to earth. And before space stations are available to be used as transfer points from aircraft to spacecraft, the descendants of the X-15 may be so highly perfected that flight will be an unbroken spectrum from atmosphere to space. While this does not invalidate the distinction between zones of aeronautical and astronautical flight (even Under Secretary of Defense Quarles has supported the concept as a way of distinguishing between air space and outer space), it becomes somewhat more doubtful that the boundary proposed by Haley will be accepted as the limit of national sovereignty.

III

Whatever the force of logic or of precedents already set, the United States is not about to renounce its right to make territorial claims in outer space. Testifying last May before the Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics, Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser to the State Department, said that the Antarctic affords "a very apt analogy." While the United States has made no territorial claims in Antarctica, and has recognized none, it has expressly reserved its right to do so on the basis of its activities there. As recently as last May, when the United States invited 11 other nations to confer on a treaty for Antarctica, President Eisenhower took the precaution to reaffirm that "my Government reserves all of the rights of the United States with respect to the Antarctica region, including the right to assert a territorial claim or claims."[5]

"So, too, in outer space," Mr. Becker told the Senate Committee, "the United States has already engaged in activities which, it could be asserted, have given to it certain rights as distinguished from those states who have not engaged in such activities."[6] The right to claim sovereignty in space was specified.

[5] *The New York Times*, May 4, 1958, p. 19.
[6] Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1958, p. 966.

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Whatever validity this analogy may have from a legal standpoint, the political and practical differences between space and Antarctica are impressive. Antarctica is a clearly defined continent; outer space, as we have seen, is hardly more than a conception, which so far has defied definition. Occupation of Antarctica, and with it the exercise of political control, is feasible, whereas the means to exert sovereignty in space is unknown and perhaps unknowable. Moreover, a dozen nations have conducted activities in Antarctica, and seven (all of them our allies) have made territorial claims which we cannot disregard. In contrast, only two countries—the United States and the Soviet Union—have thus far established even the remotest claim to sovereignty in space on the basis of activities there. Yet no country has staked a claim, none has renounced the right to do so, and all have an interest in space incomparably greater than that in the Antarctic. Therefore, the arguments for internationalizing space are more compelling and in some respects the possibility is more practicable politically.

Will the moon and planets be other Antarcticas? Certainly no claim of national sovereignty on the moon would be recognized and a legal claim would be extremely difficult to establish. Effective occupation by one country seems highly unlikely. The sector principle by which Antarctica has been divided into so many slices of political pie is inapplicable to a sphere. And in a land without seas one cannot claim sovereignty on the hinterland principle by which so much of the Western Hemisphere was claimed by the European Powers. And, having no modern equivalent in authority of Pope Alexander VI, who arbitrarily divided the New World between Spain and Portugal at the end of the fifteenth century, we must foresee the possibility that one day the Soviet Union and the United States will assert conflicting claims on the moon. Indeed the President's Science Advisory Committee is already concerned that some foolish gesture of nationalism, such as the explosion of an atomic bomb on the moon, will contaminate the oldest of Earth's satellites before scientists can examine its natural environment.

Though most responsible opinion holds that the moon will be of little military significance, earth dwellers would feel exceedingly uncomfortable if one of the major Powers established control there. Precisely because of its limited military potential, it might be possible and desirable to place the moon under interna-

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tional control. This could be accomplished without reference to more complex questions of sovereignty in space. Though certain risks are involved in taking political action where there are so many unknowns, they seem on the whole less awesome than alternative lines of development. Fifty years of exploration of Antarctica have done nothing to reduce the desirability of internationalizing that continent, yet political developments in that half-century have vastly complicated the task.

IV

Thus far we have avoided discussion of what has become the chief obstacle to agreement on outer space, namely, the involvement of these questions in disarmament negotiations. Nearly nine months before the first sputnik was launched, the United States declared in the United Nations:

> No one can predict with certainty what will develop from man's excursion into this new field. But it is clear that if this advance into the unknown is to be a blessing rather than a curse, the efforts of all nations in this field need to be brought within the purview of a reliable armaments control system. The United States proposes that the first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes would be to bring the testing of such objects under international inspection and participation.[7]

At the disarmament conference in London the following summer, this proposal became Point VI of the Allies' 11-point program. Specifically, the plan was to "establish a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes."[8] In almost identical language, this proposal was incorporated in a 24-Power resolution adopted by the General Assembly last November by a vote of 56–9, with the Soviet Union dissenting.

In his correspondence with Marshal Bulganin last winter President Eisenhower reiterated his proposal but indicated a willingness to discuss control of outer space separately from other items on the disarmament agenda. Yet he gave the impression that the primary purpose of the American proposals still was to prevent intercontinental ballistic missiles from entering the arsenals of the world. Indeed, Secretary Dulles made this quite explicit at

[7] Department of State *Bulletin,* February 11, 1957, p. 231.
[8] *Ibid.,* September 16, 1957, p. 453.

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a press conference.[9] Since we did not as yet have even our first small satellite in orbit, and since we were considered two years behind the Russians in the development of I.C.B.M.s, the United States was fair game for Mr. Khrushchev's ridicule. "The thought behind this U.S. proposal," he said in a major speech two weeks before Bulganin's formal reply, "is to ban weapons which can threaten U.S. territory but to retain control of all other types of weapons. . . . the Soviet Union would be prepared to discuss the intercontinental ballistic missile, if the Western Powers would agree to ban atomic and hydrogen weapons, stop testing them and close down the military bases with which the U.S.A. has encircled the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."[10]

We can hardly be surprised at this response. And, however necessary or desirable it may have been to include I.C.B.M.s in disarmament proposals, we can afford to recognize that banning missile weapons is not a prerequisite to agreement on other aspects of control of space. After nearly two years of linking questions involving the orderly development of space exploration with the problem of military missiles, the whole range of space questions is still on dead center, except for limited coöperation achieved through the International Geophysical Year.

The time now seems ripe for the United States to make some specific proposals relating to scientific exploration, navigation and jurisdiction in space. For despite the military potential of many developments in the science and technology of space, the question of missile weapons is clearly separable from more likely areas of international coöperation. As a British authority has pointed out, "The fact that air forces can inflict vast destruction did not prevent the Paris and Chicago Conferences from considering rules of navigation in air space."[11]

That the State Department is coming to share this view is indicated by the testimony of its legal adviser previously cited. Mr. Becker acknowledged that "there are possible arrangements for international coöperation in the peaceful scientific and technological areas of outer-space activity. These arrangements could be pursued independently of control arrangements over military uses of outer space." The international machinery for this, he

[9] See *The New York Times*, January 17, 1958, p. 4.

[10] Speech at Conference of Foremost Belorussian Republic Agricultural Personnel, January 22, 1958, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 5, 1958, p. 20.

[11] Michael Aaronson, "The Legal Control of Space," *The Listener*, December 19, 1957, p. 1019.

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said, "might well be established under the auspices of the United Nations."[12] This would conform to the recommendation of a majority of legal experts as well as opinion within the U.N. itself. Sir Leslie Munro, the outgoing President of the General Assembly, has said that the United Nations "is the proper and, indeed, the only appropriate body to establish a code of law and practice to deal with transit through outer space and jurisdiction over such parts of it as men may reach."[13] He recommended a conference of lawyers, scientists and diplomats preliminary to a full-dress Assembly debate. So far no action has been taken, but the topic is on the agenda this fall—with the full support of the Secretary General.

V

One criticism that may properly be leveled at the space lawyers is that, in trying to anticipate every conceivable legal problem in outer space, they have given very little attention to some of the most immediate ones. For example, perhaps the single most pressing question—one likely to arise within less than a year—is, what will be the Soviet reaction to a United States satellite mounting a camera or television equipment? For two years we have been trying without success to establish the principle of "open skies." Now both the United States and the Soviet Union are working on instruments which will impose open skies with a vengeance—unless reconnaissance satellites can be, and are, shot down.

We do not know the Soviet capability. Indeed we do not even know for certain that Russian satellites have not already relayed photographs of the United States to Moscow. Nor are we likely to know when this has been achieved, while the Soviet Union will quite probably know when our first reconnaissance satellite is put in orbit—if indeed they are not told in advance. Will such an American satellite mysteriously disintegrate on one of its early trips around the other side of the world? And will we be told it "must have hit a meteor"?

The situation is complicated by the fact that the photographing of clouds is a long-established and legitimate activity in meteorology. Here we have a precedent that is not encouraging.

[12] Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1958, p. 964. On September 2, Henry Cabot Lodge, chief United States delegate to the U.N., gave further substance to this possibility in a speech before the American Legion, but he did not specify what areas or instruments of coöperation the Government had in mind.

[13] *The New York Times Magazine*, February 16, 1958, p. 82.

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Many Powers, including the Soviet Union, have for many years used high-flying balloons for meteorological research. Traveling at up to 90,000 feet, they are capable of circumnavigating the globe. In February 1956 the Soviet Union protested passage of balloons through its air space. It first referred to them as propaganda balloons and objected that they were a menace to navigation. But an exchange of notes made clear that its real grievance was not so much against the propaganda balloons being released under private auspices in Western Europe as against United States meteorological balloons which did carry cameras and could have been either scientific or military in purpose. While affirming their scientific purpose, Mr. Dulles refrained from asserting the right of United States balloons to pass through Soviet air space, and so far as is known, the practice was at least temporarily stopped.

History may soon repeat itself. Almost all authorities are agreed that an earth satellite is a very cumbersome instrument for delivering a nuclear bomb on target, but its importance for reconnaissance and for communication, including radio and radar jamming, is not disputed. Since these activities have both scientific and military uses, it is going to be very difficult to distinguish between them. But surely these, rather than missile weapons, represent the topic on which negotiations with the Russians might be important and fruitful.

Consistent with our appeal for "open skies," we might well recommend that reconnaissance by an orbiting satellite be accepted in international law. Although it would be argued that we stood to learn more than the Russians by this device, there would be offsetting advantages for the Soviets. The U.S.S.R. is enveloped in clouds far more than the United States; in some parts of Russia there are only two or three clear days a year. Moreover, world opinion would not take kindly to the Soviet Union shooting down all American satellites, including those gathering scientific data, and as launchings became more frequent the Russians could never be sure which might contain photographic equipment.

The suggested agreement should apply only to satellites in orbit. At such time as space vehicles have a virtually unlimited supply of power (as, for example, when nuclear power can be converted directly into electricity without the intervening heat stage), machines will be able to hover anywhere at any altitude without regard to gravitational and centrifugal forces. For a good

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many years, however, we need not worry about "stationary" spacecraft "squatting" above one country. This could be accomplished today only by a satellite following a perfectly circular orbit precisely on the equator at a distance of some 22,500 miles. Such a satellite might arouse the displeasure of Colombia or Indonesia, but it could play no critical rôle in the cold war, except possibly as a relay station for radio propaganda or jamming.

"We hope," wrote a Soviet air expert, "that the considerations of military danger which have influenced the doctrine of air sovereignty will disappear with the apparition of crafts circulating at a fantastic altitude and with unbelievable speed."[14] That hope, expressed in 1927, is unfulfilled, and the "apparition" is in the heavens. We cannot assure that outer space will be "devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes," but we can encourage these objectives by a number of measures: by supporting the United Nations' interest in discussing specific aspects of space exploration and jurisdiction; by disengaging the missile problem so that possible agreements on space do not get bogged down in disarmament negotiations; and by exercising somewhat more candor in stating what we are prepared to do to achieve the high objectives we have pronounced.

If we insist upon waiting until all the answers are in from outer space, then politically we will not get off the launch pad. Any proposals we make, any agreements we support, will involve risks, but they need not be out of proportion to the mortal danger in which we now exist. Having achieved such sophisticated means of destroying one another here on earth, we should not be daunted by fear of the unknown potentialities of space. If it is inconceivable that one nation can control space from the earth, it is also inconceivable that one nation should be allowed to control the earth from space. To prevent this we must rely heavily on Western science and technology. But we should also avail ourselves of the rule of law where strong public sentiment for it exists, and where national interests provide assurance that agreements will be largely self-enforcing.

[14] Quoted by E. Pepin, "The Sputnik—Legal Problems," Canadian Institute of International Affairs: *Notes*, December 12, 1957 (mimeo.), p. 1.

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AS OTHERS SEE US

An Indian View

By G. L. Mehta

WITHOUT wishing to add to the voluminous literature on the causes, consequences and cures of Indo-American misunderstanding, I feel it worth while to analyze some characteristics and attitudes of the people in the United States, as also its governmental processes; for these are not fully understood in countries like India and are responsible in a large measure for misinterpretations of the policies of governments and trends of public opinion on both sides.

In India, as in other countries in the East, there is the understandable though erroneous tendency to regard the United States and its people as a somewhat bigger and heartier, if rather immature, version of Britain and Britishers. We should remember that direct contacts between Indians and Americans began in appreciable measure only during the Second World War and have been enlarged in diverse ways and in many spheres only since the attainment of Indian independence 11 years ago. And it is only recently that a large number of Indians—students, delegations, exchange visitors, businessmen, politicians and officials—have been visiting the United States. In other words, the American is not yet sufficiently known to the average Indian. In evaluating informed opinion we need not pause to consider the image of America frequently distorted by Hollywood films or by ultra-extrovert tourists. It is the psychological processes, prevailing conditions and historic developments which mold attitudes and underlie the formulation of policies.

What the United States has achieved and what it is today are due primarily to the spirit of adventure of its immigrant population in conquering new frontiers; its political system which emphasizes individual rights and liberty; its economic system built up largely on the enterprise and initiative of individuals; and its technological developments due to the inventiveness and skill of the people. Now, to recognize the importance of these factors in American development is neither to approve of all the ways by which the country was conquered or has been developed, nor ignore the deficiencies, failures and inequities of political or eco-

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nomic processes. Indeed, the systems themselves are continuously changing through the pressure of social forces. But we should recognize that the factors which I have mentioned are fundamental to American outlook and action. Optimism, confidence, a belief that international questions are capable of solution given enough power and wealth; a tendency to disapprove anything that goes contrary to American wishes; an impatience with dilatoriness and a continuous emphasis on action; a reliance on economic incentives as a motive for social progress (an ironic obverse of the Marxist doctrine)—all these and their concomitant characteristics are the products of American historic development and economic growth. They have to be properly understood and assessed —not necessarily accepted—if we are to comprehend American attitudes and policies.

Because of their outstanding success in building up a new country from a wilderness, their high standards of living and their preeminence in the technological sphere, Americans believe that their constitution, their economic system and what they call their "way of life" are the best possible in the world. Many find it difficult to reconcile themselves to other ways and means of living and working. For instance, they cannot understand why Britain with her traditions of *laissez-faire* and her imperial responsibilities should prefer anything approximating "socialism" or why India resorts to state-planning instead of giving free scope to private enterprise. And it came as a shock to most people in the United States that the Communist system in Soviet Russia could excel their own technological achievements, as with the sputnik and the intercontinental ballistic missile. Their bewilderment and disappointment at this achievement were proportionate to their unbounded confidence in the capitalist order's capacity to yield scientific no less than financial dividends.

It is, however, the American people's realization of the fact that for the first time in their history their country has become vulnerable which is ultimately responsible for the trends of American foreign policy, its ups and downs, during the postwar years. For nearly two centuries the American economy was developed and American power was built up without serious challenge or danger from Europe or the Far East. Two oceans surrounded the great continent and enabled its inhabitants to feel themselves secure in their haven and unconcerned with the troubles and squabbles of people abroad. These conditions, which prevailed more or less

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until the First World War, provided the framework for a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. Moreover, the American economy itself has been in many respects so self-sufficient and viable that dependence on other countries for its effective functioning was not essential. But air communications and air power have changed all this. No longer is the United States capable of living in splendid isolation, no longer can it remain physically or politically aloof from the rest of the world. What is more, with the advent of nuclear power, initially developed and used by the United States itself, all frontiers have broken down; and with the realization that the country may have been surpassed in the destructive powers of some weapons and in the range and speed of the means of delivering them, the fear of an "atomic Pearl Harbor" has spread in the nation.

Not merely has the confidence in America's technical supremacy and military prowess been undermined; the very foundations of the American "way of life" seem to have been shaken. We cannot appreciate American attitudes since the Second World War if we do not take account of the deep-rooted distrust, suspicion and fear of Soviet Russia permeating the people. Whether these feelings are wholly justified or whether the Western alliance must not share some responsibility for this murky atmosphere, the fact remains that Americans believe that not only their vital interests but also democratic values all over the world are menaced by Marxist ideology and "Communist imperialism." These feelings—perhaps in part a rationalization of some emotions and interests—constitute the background of American policies.

The conflict between the United States and Soviet Russia which has thus become basic is partly ideological and partly a reflection of power politics. In any case, distrust and fear of the Soviet Union (now accentuated by Soviet technical achievements) are at the root of American strategy and tactics. It is these feelings which make the Government give the first priority to building up an alliance against Soviet and Communist Powers in both military and economic spheres. It is the cleavage which makes them think in terms of "bipolarization" of the world. And from this top priority given to making the world safe from the Communist menace arise many of the difficulties of American foreign policy.

The tendency to divide the world into "free world sheep" and "totalitarian goats" is due in part to an oversimplified interpretation of international developments and to a rigidity of attitude re-

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sulting from sincere convictions and from past experiences of dealing with Soviet Russia. But it is also the product of an implicit belief that if all countries which value individual freedom, the rule of law and democratic processes do not coöperate in resisting the grave danger involved in Communist expansionism, the free countries will be overwhelmed one by one. Responsible opinion in the United States increasingly recognizes that there is also "a non-Communist world" (separate from the Communist and anti-Communist blocs) which might not be aligned in a military sense to either side and refuses to accept the dichotomy of the world in terms of cold war. Informed American opinion also acknowledges the fact that the "free world" is not all free and has many blemishes which it should cure—whether they be dictatorships, colonialism, racial discrimination or gross social and economic evils.

But here arises one of the baffling dilemmas of American foreign policy—the need to maintain the grand alliance with Powers which have different kinds of colonial territories and imperial possessions while sympathizing with and supporting countries striving for national independence. While American opinion realizes that delay in the settlement of "colonial" issues might cause some national movement to slide into the Communist fold, it fears at the same time that through a premature transfer of power a vacuum might be created where the Communists would swiftly walk in. These difficulties arise in no small measure from the divisive nature of power politics and the tensions of the cold war. Nevertheless, I cannot help feeling that there is too much of a tendency in the United States to analyze and interpret international friction in terms of cold war and a readiness to trace nearly all conflicts to Communism. Many of the troubles and disputes in the world today are not due to Soviet Russia—whether it be Algeria or Cyprus, Kashmir or Goa or West Irian, *apartheid* in South Africa or revolutions in Latin America. To attribute these and several other conflicts and problems to Communist conspiracy is to oversimplify many complex issues and contradictory forces in operation. The collapse of parliamentary government in France, for instance, was due in no small measure to the inability of successive French governments to solve the "colonial" problem of Algeria and provide a stable administration in France itself, and not to Communist intrigue. Again, in regard to the rebellion in Indonesia or the formation of the United Arab Republic, the instinctive reaction that the one should be approved and the other disapproved

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because it might weaken or strengthen the Communist bloc is not merely superficial but might well be detrimental to American interests and the democratic cause. True, the Communist bloc is capable of taking advantage of these difficulties of Western Powers, but so can and do other countries; these are unavoidable risks of international politics. To oppose the West, however deplorable or obstinate or shortsighted it might be at times, need not necessarily be castigated as "pro-Communist." Poverty, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, wide disparities of wealth and income, absentee landlordism, caste system—these and other social and economic evils exist irrespective of the Bolshevik Revolution or Mao Tse-tung. The ghosts of Karl Marx and Lenin need not perpetually haunt the lobbies of the Congress and the corridors of the State Department. But the fact is that they do and it is necessary for others to remember it.

What has been termed "frontier psychology" combined with technical achievements and enormous wealth have made the United States optimistic and confident in facing domestic problems. "The difficult we do today, the impossible we postpone till tomorrow," is an expression of this attitude of hope and self-assurance. The same outlook is reflected in world affairs. There is no denying the fact that the two world wars in this century were won for more civilized ways of living by America's massive production and vast resources. Europe's recovery after the second war and economic development in Asia and elsewhere owe much to the aid and generosity of the United States. The collapse of the Western Powers and the devastation caused by the last war imposed heavy responsibilities upon it, transforming it from an isolated continent into a world Power. All this created what D. W. Brogan has called "an illusion of omnipotence" among many sections of the American people. As a result, Americans blame one another for developments for which they in fact have no primary responsibility: Truman, Acheson and Marshall were accused of "losing China;" the Eisenhower Administration is blamed day after day for the weakening of NATO and the Western alliance by French action and inaction in Algeria and North Africa. If a revolt fails in Indonesia or the Communists win elections in Laos, the State Department is held responsible. It seems as though many people fervently believe that America can set right whatever is wrong in the world and that it is her duty to do so. The charge is made day in and day out that American foreign policy has failed because some-

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thing has gone wrong somewhere and developments are not in consonance with the wishes or ambitions or interests of the American people.

But surely even the most powerful country cannot control world social and economic forces, many of which are imponderable and unpredictable; no governmental policy can mold "movements in the minds of men" in other countries which are in various degrees free and independent, especially if that freedom has to be respected. Human motives are not simple and constant and do not operate automatically like pressure of steam in a boiler. No simple explanation or ready-made solution can avail where conditions and traditions differ. We cannot accept the principle, "When in doubt, act!" National pride, suspicion born of past experience, inadequate knowledge, the ambitions or prejudices of those in power, fears of neighbors—a hundred factors, rational and otherwise, play their part in determining the attitudes of people and the policies of governments. Unhappily, in world affairs we are confronted with fluid situations rather than set problems, and while such situations can be bettered or worsened to some extent by governmental decisions or actions, they cannot be solved like $64,000 questions.

This is not an excuse for helplessness, passivity and paralysis; it is a plea for a suspended judgment, patience and calmness when the forces are complex or the conditions dynamic. Totalitarian countries, it is true, have a tactical advantage in this respect because once their rulers make up their minds they can impose their will on their own people or on others whom they dominate or want to dominate. But short of surrendering democratic ideals (and to avoid this is the principal reason for opposition to totalitarianism), powerful countries have to recognize the serious obstacles to their ability to influence events abroad and shape their future. Differences between countries—their conditions no less than their aspirations—set a limit to the capacity of the most powerful countries to shape the destiny of the world. "Leadership" today is a burden which can be borne only in so far as it is shared.

In the economic sphere, "free enterprise" is still a sacred cow for most people in the United States. It is no denial of the material success of the American economy and its considerable achievement of equalitarianism to say that this economy itself has been changing since the great depression. "Capitalism" in the United States has altered in many essentials during the last 30 years; the

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national economy retains several of its former characteristics but it can no longer be sustained without governmental support and intervention at many points, nor without planning, control and regulation in many spheres. Legislation regarding trusts, cartels and monopolies, farm price supports, tariffs, subsidies to shipping and ship-building and more recently to railroads, the Buy American Act, policies to prevent recession from deteriorating into depression and for combating inflation, measures for providing employment through state expenditure—all these are evidence of practical limitations to the operation of *unfettered* private enterprise; they are a recognition of the social obligations of the state and attributes of positive functioning of government in national economy. Responsible persons in the United States also recognize that countries in Asia with entirely different conditions and urgent problems have to follow different paths for social and economic development. But though enterprise and initiative are undoubtedly needed for economic development, individual efforts have to be reconciled with social conceptions and international standards. There is more than one way towards achieving harmony between economic development and social justice.

The Constitution of the United States is in many ways an enigma to foreigners. The processes by which policy is formulated, the public debate and exposition, the execution of policies and the subsequent examination of its performance—all are different from those obtaining in a parliamentary democracy. It is not possible within the compass of this article to deal adequately with the structure and functioning of the Administration and Congress, which are not properly understood elsewhere. The rigid separation of powers under which the executive, the legislature and judiciary are coequal parts of the government, each in its own sphere; the enormous authority and prestige of the executive office of the President elected by the whole country; the existence of a cabinet appointed by and responsible to the President (subject to approval by the Senate), whose members do not sit in the legislature but have to appear and testify before various committees of Congress which are powerful; the constitutional power vested in the Senate for ratification of treaties, which limits the authority of the executive and, in fact, led to disastrous consequences through rejection of the Treaty of Versailles recommended by the late President Wilson and to the country's abstention from the League of Nations; absence of rigid party discipline as in a parliament, with

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the result that on many issues the division of opinion cuts across party lines and one sees Republicans and Democrats voting together and against their own party members and an Administration of their own complexion—all these and related processes and procedures puzzle people abroad.

Foreigners cannot understand, for instance, why the President cannot carry through a program in Congress or why a senator belonging to the President's own party can criticize him publicly and vote against him. These procedures, however, render it necessary for the Administration to proceed on important matters of policy, and especially foreign policy, only insofar as it feels assured of broad Congressional support. Congress on its part is sensitive and responsive to public opinion and to local pressures and constituencies. An important reason for this is the frequency of elections—a Presidential election every four years and the election of the whole of the House of Representatives and of one-third of the Senate every two years. Because of the more frequent election of the House, it tends to be more conservative, more subject to local pressures, more economy-minded and less oriented to international affairs than the Senate. The relationship between Congress on one side and the Administration and the White House on the other is a complex one depending not merely on constitutional forms and conventions but on the personality of the President, his relations and contacts with leaders of his own party and on the nature of the problems concerned.

Public opinion is a force in the United States whose importance should not be under-rated. Its growth can be traced to the early history of the country. Since the territories opened up by the pioneers were far-flung, and since communications were slow and difficult, there has always been a tradition of self-reliance and an assertion of independence against "authority." This has had two consequences. Partly as a result of the reluctance to accept imposed authority and partly because of the democratic instincts of the people, there probably is a higher proportion of elected officers in the United States (such as judges and other categories of officials) than in any other country. Secondly, there is suspicion and distrust of "government" and of "officialdom;" "politics" and "politicians" are looked down upon, which is not healthy in a democratic country; officials are almost invariably called "bureaucrats," while the Federal Government in Washington is described irreverently as "Uncle Sam." There is, of course, no

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monolithic public opinion in the United States; various sectors of "the public" are at cross purposes and nearly all of them operate in voluntary groupings and organizations seeking to influence the State and Federal Governments through lobbying and pressure groups. And the public (or those who speak on its behalf) insist on knowing what is going on and consider it their right to tell the Administration or their elected representatives what is wrong and what should be done. Both the Administration and Congress are keen to learn the responses to their policies from the mail they receive and from other methods like public opinion polls.

The press, a powerful instrument of public opinion in the United States, functions somewhat differently than in other democratic countries. Independent papers are decreasing in number, because of prohibitive costs of printing and production, but also, I believe, owing to the control of advertising exercised by powerful interests. Like other elements in the socio-political life of the country, the press has to meet a variety of insistent demands. The consequent unwieldly size of newspapers has the disadvantage of making it difficult for busy persons to do much more than glance at headlines. Superficial and sometimes even misleading impressions are gained thereby, particularly because the headlines themselves tend to be snappy and sensational and are at times even imprecise. In the formulation of this amorphous "public opinion," the radio and television have now presumably even wider and more direct impact on ordinary men and women than the newspapers and weeklies: they are listened to and watched by countless housewives while cooking or by the family while eating, by taxicab drivers and others going about in cars, and in hotels and restaurants. Through these mass media of communication, as also through "mass circulated" illustrated weeklies and tabloid periodicals, "stereotypes" of foreign countries and personalities gain widespread acceptance.

Thus there seems to be a risk of "indoctrination" through democratic means where there is concentration of power and wealth, where size gets the better of quality and where achievement is measured principally in terms of success and remuneration. I am not suggesting that this "indoctrination" (if, indeed, it can be described as such) is deliberate or organized; nor that the alternative is governmental ownership, control or censorship. But the fact remains that the growing concentration of

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various means of communication is a handicap to those advocating views not acceptable to those in power or not palatable to the vast majority of the reading public. This could be a serious impediment to a calm and dispassionate appreciation of the views and attitudes of other peoples. It is necessary to add, however, that Americans have a sense of fair play and sportsmanship and are prepared, within limits, to give a fair hearing to other people's views. There is a genuine desire to know, to learn, to understand. This intellectual curiosity is in a large measure the expression of the energy and confidence of the people. In spite of the great cities and their large-scale, almost overwhelming organization, Americans always speak of the "grass roots" whence public opinion stems and grows. It is necessary, therefore, for people in other countries not only to understand and try to put their views before the Administration or Congress but also to reach the people and, in order to do this effectively, to know them with all their strengths and weaknesses.

The tasks of peace are more complex, more delicate and less easily understood than the tasks of war; working for peace, unfortunately, does not arouse the same enthusiasm and fervor as waging a war. The search for peace demands understanding, and understanding is not possible without intelligence, patience and tolerance. Understanding between free nations does not and need not mean identity of views any more than between citizens in a democratic country. Moreover, it has to be reciprocal. Often we are so eager *to be understood* that we do not make adequate efforts *to understand*. Could we but see ourselves as others see us, and make others see themselves as we do, some at least of mutual suspicion, mistrust and fear between nations might be diminished. It is in this spirit that this brief and inadequate report has been made, not as a critique but as a contribution to Indo-American understanding. It may be good for Americans to know what an Indian should know about America.

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"THE SOCIALISTIC SOCIETY": INDIA AND JAPAN

By William W. Lockwood

ASIA today presents a fascinating array of experiments in ways of organizing responsibility for industrial development. In one great area, mainland China, the state has been made the chief instrument for achieving the industrial revolution on the Communist model. Outside the Iron Curtain, too, government is everywhere cast in a central rôle, though doctrine is less binding, and wide divergences exist as to how, where and and to what purpose the state is to take the lead in economic affairs. Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, India, Pakistan —these countries run a wide gamut of non-totalitarian choices as between public and private initiative, or blends of the two.

Especially interesting is the contrast between India and Japan in the philosophy and practice of industrial enterprise. Observers have tended to neglect it in favor of the more dramatic confrontation of India and China in their respective Five Year plans. For those who are dedicated to democratic means, however, the contrast between India and Japan may be more deserving of study, since it highlights a range of choices within a basically liberal order. And it concerns the two Powers whose progress will largely determine the prospects for any such order in Asia.

To be sure, Japan is far ahead of India in industrialization. This alone accounts for many differences in the way they organize the functions of innovation, risk-taking and control of industrial enterprise. The Japanese have now risen well above the traditional poverty line of Asia. They possess skills and organization for modern life such as India is only beginning to acquire. But other differences are quite independent of stage of development. They can also be seen in a comparison of present-day India with Meiji Japan before the turn of the century. They relate more to contrasts in ruling philosophies, in social heritage and in natural endowment. With this caution as to interpretation, let us look at the two systems as they are operating today.

II

The visitor to Japan and India today is struck at once with the difference in the climate of enterprise, and in the vigor of

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business and governmental leadership. The driving energy of Japan's industrial upsurge originates mainly in private enterprise, large and small. The cities burgeon with factories, shops and office buildings. Postwar controls have mostly been scrapped. Politicians are cutting taxes. Bureaucrats worry over how to keep investment from getting out of hand. The system operates with few centralized decisions; it looks uncoördinated, even chaotic at times. But it is bursting with entrepreneurial vitality. And, until the recession of last year, it produced one of the most spectacular booms of the postwar world.

India, too, has been making rapid strides since winning independence in 1947. For the most part it is still building the base and making the great structural changes necessary for an industrial "take-off." Here, much more than in Japan, the government makes the news. It is the Congress Party leaders and their civil service colleagues who draft the plans, make the big investment decisions, mobilize resources and alternately rally and lecture the business community to keep in step. Here state initiative seems more resolute than in Japan, more all-encompassing, more democratic in inspiration.

Political declarations reinforce this impression. Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic Party is not very articulate in giving voice to its slogans of "Free Enterprise Capitalism." Its ideologies come into prominence chiefly at election time, and then in well-worn clichés. The Tokyo ministries deal pragmatically with bottlenecks in steel and power, with exchange crises, with rice prices and the like. Yet one looks in vain for any clearly defined center of decision on long-range policy, except as specific issues go to the Cabinet. Special interests pull and haul. Ministries vie for power. Sometimes every interest seems to get attention except the public interest. Even the Economic Planning Agency remains rather on the sidelines. Its researches illuminate the scene and offer benchmarks for departmental planning. But it is hardly invited to share the seat of power. Its New Long-Range Economic Plan (1958–1962), approved by the Cabinet in 1957, is a set of guidelines, a forecast, a hope, not a commitment to action.

By contrast, India's development program is energized more largely by political leadership. Authority at the top remains highly centralized, despite the fragmentation of Indian society. Unified national plans, after wide consultation, are evolved by the Planning Commission, a powerful adjunct to the Cabinet

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which reflects and shapes top party decisions. They are then put forward for execution by the ministries, or by the states of India's quasi-federal system, responding to directives, subsidies or political pressures from the Center. Except in Communist Kerala, this takes place under the ægis of the Congress Party with its articulate avowal of the "Socialist Pattern of Society."

What Congress Party leaders mean by the "Socialist Pattern of Society" one might explore at length. Except as a general feeling that the government must somehow take the lead, one way or another, it means different things to different people. For the party has thus far remained a coalition of groups with divergent interests and outlook. Many a local Congress boss pledges his allegiance to socialism with tongue in cheek, only because it is inexpedient to do otherwise. Political realities at the lower levels of party and government are not necessarily what one might suppose from lofty party declarations or ministerial speeches. Related to this is the fact that the Congress, though it goes to the electorate on a platform well to the left of the conservative politicians who rule Japan, also finds it convenient to finance itself largely with donations from the business and landed classes.

For Prime Minister Nehru himself, however, and for great masses of his followers, the commitment to socialistic ideals is genuine. It means expanding output and jobs for social gain, not private profit. It emphasizes government responsibility to achieve greater equality of income and wealth. And it sees the means to these ends in some blend of social ownership of the principal means of production with social control of those which remain under private ownership. On this platform the Congress Party was re-confirmed in power in 1957. Thus ideological pronouncements at the top underline the contrast already noted between the business leadership and capitalistic orientation of Japan and the political initiative and socialist orientation of India.

While all this will do as a first approximation, the realities deserve a closer look. For the socialist-capitalist dichotomy exaggerates the differences between India and Japan in some respects, and fails to bring out meaningful differences in others.

III

Traditionally, socialism has been identified, first of all, with government ownership and operation of economic enterprise. In this respect neither Japan nor India is much socialized.

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Never in modern times has Japan had a smaller public sector. Many war-born activities of the government were liquidated after the surrender. Under pressure from the Occupation authorities the government even got out of the steel business for the first time in 50 years. Today three public corporations run the national railways, the telephones and the telegraphs and the lucrative tobacco monopoly. Little else remains under state operation, apart from a few special banks and the national forests. Nor do the Japanese people seem unhappy on this score. They remember wartime bureaucracy with distaste. Even the Socialists, the chief opposition party, speak only vaguely of "socializing," *i. e.* controlling, six basic industries in their ambitious Five Year Plan for Japan. They do not press for nationalization. No doubt another war or economic collapse could start the pendulum back again. For the present, however, except on the far left, the Japanese look chiefly to fiscal policy, welfare spending and the regulation of private business to get whatever socialization they desire.

India, by contrast, has ambitious plans to expand the public sector. Little nationalization of existing enterprise has taken place since 1947, it is true, beyond the airlines, the life insurance business and one big bank. The Prime Minister has vigorously opposed it as a misuse of resources. But the Industrial Policy Resolution approved by Parliament in 1956 marks out large areas of industry in which the state is to be exclusively or predominantly responsible for new undertakings. They include large-scale transport and mining, electric power, and the metallurgical, heavy chemical and equipment industries. Under the Second Five Year Plan, also adopted in 1956, a score of industrial projects have been launched in the public industrial sector. They are now expected to cost the government about $1,500 million during the years 1956–61—nearly as much as the $1,650 million of private investment now budgeted for projects approved in the private sector of modern industry.

This new emphasis must be put in perspective, however. The government is confining its attention in practice mainly to a range of strategic, capital-intensive industries too costly and technical for private enterprise alone to develop quickly. In fact, three great steel undertakings will absorb more than two-thirds of all industrial investment in the public sector under the Plan. Even if targets are all met, government plants will account

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for less than 10 percent of Indian industrial output in 1961. As it is working out, a financial crisis has already caused some cutback in plans. Difficulties of staffing and operation may further cool enthusiasm for public management as more enterprises actually go into operation. Meanwhile private investment outlays have exceeded expectations. Indeed, the response of private enterprise to new levels of government spending has been one major source of inflationary pressure and dwindling reserves of foreign exchange. Indian businessmen today, with the chief exception of coal producers, seem less concerned with the threat of public competition than with the complexities of regulation and taxation.

The Japanese government also pioneered modern industry after 1868. Within 20 years it turned over most of its properties —many were losing money—to the rising business class. Whether New Delhi will eventually follow suit is hard to foresee. But doctrine and circumstance are both different in India today. One suspects that the present commitments of the government are nearer the minimum than the maximum, given the climate of opinion and the urge to get along quickly. In any event, this should not obscure the fact that India, like Japan, leaves the management of industry as well as agriculture and commerce mainly in private hands, subject to various public controls and influences—to which we shall now turn.

IV

A second responsibility of government is direct action to influence the rate of capital formation and the direction of investment. Here there are significant differences between Japanese and Indian practice.

If Japan has little public enterprise, the government yet plays a major rôle in capital formation. Some 28 percent of gross national expenditure went into domestic investment during the six years 1951–56—a high rate by any standard. Nearly one-third of this—8 percent of gross national expenditure—was government spending for public works, for social overhead facilities like schools, and for equipping the railways and other state undertakings.

Nor is this all. Important also for industrial recovery has been the way the Tokyo government has enlarged and influenced the flow of funds into private enterprise. Unlike the government of

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India, it has not licensed private capital issues for this purpose. Neither has it resorted since 1950 to formal rationing of bank credit in order to conserve scarce resources for priority industries like shipping and power and steel. Instead, as in Meiji times, it has again set up a number of special institutions to mobilize and channel funds where needed. Some operate mainly with private capital, like the network of farm coöperatives that now reaches almost every village in Japan. Others have been capitalized with public money, though again mainly to finance the private sector.

One such institution of long standing is, of course, the Bank of Japan. The central bank has played a key rôle in re-financing postwar Japanese industry, while struggling none too successfully to restrain inflationary tendencies inherent in the heavy postwar demand for investible funds. Another is the big Japan Development Bank, which lends government funds to basic industries for plant and equipment. On a smaller scale are such institutions as the Export-Import Bank, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Finance Corporation, the Small Business Finance Corporation, the Housing Loan Corporation and the People's Finance Corporation.

Some of this public lending would not have been needed had the government applied sterner controls over private credit. Much private capital has been misdirected into gaudy cinemas and the like. But this is the Japanese way of doing things, particularly when business enjoys such political influence as it does today, and profits so much from the largesse. In any case, without committing the state to direct managerial responsibilities, these specialized public banks have served to break bottlenecks in industrial growth, and to cover special needs in agriculture, small business and housing where ordinary banking facilities are inadequate.

Where does the money come from for these public investments and loans? One major source is the government's postal savings and insurance system, organized long ago for the general public. From this pool of private savings, supplemented by reserves and surpluses from other public accounts, the Tokyo government disposes of huge loan funds amounting to as much as a quarter of the loans and investments of the entire commercial banking system. In addition, Japanese taxes were raised to a high level by war and postwar necessities. There they have stayed with comparatively little reduction, despite a surplus on current ac-

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count in every year since 1947. Over the six years 1951–56 this government surplus—the excess of taxes, tobacco monopoly profits and other current income over consumption expenditure —financed as much as two-thirds of government investment spending, or 20 percent of all gross domestic investment in Japan.

Thus the state in Japan has aided capital formation on a sizable scale, by mobilizing tax revenues and private savings (mostly small savings) in excess of its current spending, and then joining them with other private funds in public and private investment programs serving basic needs of the economy. Besides speeding economic growth, this pattern of finance contributes modestly to public ownership and equalization of wealth, *while at the same time reinforcing private initiative.*

Indian policies in this field lie in between the totalitarian socialism of Communist China and the Japanese tradition of relying mainly on private enterprise and then backing it in high-priority fields with generous doses of government funds and protection. This middle way has much to commend it. The danger is that it may fail to reap the benefits (along with the costs) of either alternative—the drive of unified, coercive planning from the Center, or the diffused initiative and energies of a freer system. Nowhere is this problem more serious than in capital formation. For India has yet to find a way to accumulate capital at a rate satisfactory for economic growth, and to transfer enough private savings to the public sector to fulfill its national plans.

The great effort of the First and Second Five Year Plans, it is true, raised net investment of all types from 6 percent or so to around 10 percent in 1955–57. This approximates Japan's rate of investment in the late nineteenth century, and is about half her present rate. But in India's case rising investment expenditure, public and private, has considerably outrun domestic resources mobilized for the purpose, especially in the public sector. In fact, savings evidently failed to grow at all in 1956 or 1957 from their 1955 level; probably they declined. When deficit finance was used to provide nearly 7 billion out of 15 billion rupees of development outlays in these two years, inflationary difficulties quickly set in. They were lessened only by running up a big deficit on current account in the balance of payments. Before long foreign balances were severely depleted, despite stepped-up external assistance. Growing pressure on food supplies and excessive imports of capital equipment led to an exchange crisis in

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1957–58. This in turn caused a pruning of the Plan and renewed appeals for more aid from abroad. Foreign loans and grants are now to be relied upon to cover as much as 30 percent of all public development outlays during the three years 1958–60. With this help it is hoped to achieve the essential goals of a somewhat straitened but still far-reaching Plan.

Two reflections on India's problem are prompted by earlier remarks on Japanese finance. The first is the need for greater strength and elasticity in the tax system, especially at the state level. Government in India today captures only about 10 percent of the national income in taxes and other current revenue. This revenue is eaten up in military budgets and other non-development spending, which has risen 30 percent in the past three years. Little or nothing is left for capital formation as a result. Yet the Second Plan calls upon the Center and the states to provide five-eighths of India's monetized investment during 1956–61. Lacking savings from current revenue, they must rely on domestic borrowings and deficit finance, plus foreign aid. The shortfall is not surprising. The Planning Commission itself calls growing public savings "an essential corollary—if not a prerequisite—of a growing socialist pattern of society."

Now tax revenue is low partly because the country is poor. Politically, too, it is proving difficult for India as a democratically oriented, quasi-federal union to raise taxes and to keep down expenditures. The Union Parliament has lately approved sharp increases in certain levies, especially excises. But the gains have largely been absorbed in defense outlays and transfers to the deficit-ridden states. Corporation taxes and personal income taxes in urban India are already fairly stiff in the upper brackets, when they are paid. Businessmen complain of their tendency to destroy incentive, and now wealth and expenditure taxes have been added. On the other hand, out of 110,000,000 income earners, only 500,000 pay any personal income tax at all to the Center, as compared to 11,000,000 in Japan. India grants total exemption up to a higher level of income. She then applies lower rates—even with allowance for the new wealth tax—on incomes reaching as high as $12,000 or more.

Particularly noteworthy is the degree to which agriculture escapes taxation. The farm sector still produces nearly half the nation's income, but under the Indian Constitution it is entirely exempt from direct taxation by the Union government. And

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state land taxes have dwindled over a century to the point where they take little more than 1 percent of farm income. Indirect taxes on the farmer, too, are lighter than city people pay. The more prosperous landowners are grossly undertaxed, even though they reap much of the benefit from the development outlays and better farm prices. As a result the states as a group are failing to provide even the modest revenue increases asked of them under the Plans. Their Plan outlays likewise fell 24 percent short of schedule during the two years 1956 and 1957. Yet the Constitution assigns them major revenue rights and development functions, especially in the crucial field of agriculture and small industry.

The great progress already achieved in India's development makes an impressive case for foreign assistance today. In addition (this is not a question of alternatives), she is finding that she must mobilize her own rupee resources more effectively and channel them into priority uses. When it comes to taxes this is a political more than a technical issue, and it is one on which New Delhi and many states are divided. Together with lagging reforms in land tenure, village government and coöperation, it epitomizes the problem of "planning by persuasion" in a political system where major responsibilities are reserved to the states, and where local politicians and allied interests may be cool towards socialistic goals proclaimed by the nation's leaders.

A second problem of development finance in which India invites comparisons with Japan is in the field of banking. With the private sector asked largely to finance itself while the public sector competes with it for funds, India requires strong and diversified banking institutions under broad public control to enlarge savings and channel them into desired uses. The authorities are aware of organizational weaknesses here. They are moving to adapt to new circumstances the conservative banking tradition inherited from the British.

One need has been to strengthen the Reserve Bank of India and the newly nationalized State Bank of India to discharge the twin responsibilities of expanding the supplying of investible funds while checking any excessive tendency to over-investment and inflation. A second is to supplement these two great banks with other specialized institutions employing both public and private funds and technical staffs to support expansionist programs in various fields. For example, a new start is having to

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be made in agriculture, where coöperatives still provide less than 4 percent of farm credit, the government a similar amount and the commercial banks hardly 1 percent. For industry, too, there are now in operation a number of institutions like the National Industrial Development Corporation, the Industrial Finance Corporation, the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation and the National Small Industries Corporation. Through them India will probably move in the direction of the German and Japanese tradition of closer links between banks and operating enterprises in the supply of long and medium as well as short-term credit. It is easier, of course, to create the machinery than to make it function vigorously, for the public as well as private sector, and for small enterprise as well as large. The difficulties encountered lately in mobilizing resources to meet the goals of the Second Plan are a measure of the urgency.

To conclude this point, it is possible that India could usefully draw on Japanese historical experience, not only in the example of taxation, but in the use of various semi-official banks, each autonomously accountable for its own operations but subject to broad policy guidance in energetically financing enterprise in its field. The vigor lately shown by the Indian business class where it is given attractive inducements may suggest some shift of emphasis towards this strategy of development, if it can be designed in such a way as to assure adequate public control.

On the other hand, such a strategy is probably less suited to India than Japan either today or earlier in her industrialization. To many Indians it seems immoral to lend public funds for private profit-seeking—a scruple that deserves to be strengthened in Japan. More than that, there is less strength and initiative in corporate organization outside government, and less of a consensus among India's still fragmented peoples on the goals and means of national development. She needs not only great construction programs which by their nature must fall in the public sector, but also the unifying, morale-building effects of a visibly national program—one which is politicized, publicized and dramatically packaged. Far more than Japan in modern times, she may have to bolster nationalism with socialism to assure political unity.

V

The third aspect of government responsibility, already touched upon, is the regulation of industrial activity left in the hands of

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private managers. In India as well as Japan this continues to form the bulk of industrial enterprise. Both governments, of course, maintain a variety of official controls and supports—technical services, tariffs and exchange controls, labor codes, regulation of company finance and the like. Certain characteristic differences in the atmosphere of regulation and interaction between the state and the business community are interesting to note.

India has much more drastic and sweeping regulations. The government licenses all new undertakings in major industries. It also licenses new security issues, controls imports, fixes certain basic prices like cement and steel, and virtually determines wages through its labor tribunals. In major industries it can even issue sweeping directives to a firm as to how to conduct its affairs, and in the event of non-compliance take over its management for a period up to five years. By contrast, the Tokyo government limits its surveillance and control largely to two strategic sectors: it retains wide powers over foreign trade; and it operates the array of banking supports and controls described above. So dependent are most Japanese industries on overseas trade, and on the big government and private banks, that the Ministries of Commerce and Finance could reach almost anywhere with these control powers if they should care to do so.

India's more severe codes reflect the need to conserve scarce resources and, still more, the distrust of the businessman by the intellectual and civil servant. Deservedly or not, the Indian businessman has yet to establish respectability and win confidence in the degree attained by his Japanese counterpart two or three generations back. On the other hand, the civil servant in the upper brackets enjoys greater prestige than he can any longer command in Japan.

While Indian controls over business are more moderate than the law would permit, Japanese official influence runs well beyond statutory authority. Close, informal association between executives and officials is typical of the basic industries. One wonders whether Yawata Steel really does business any differently today than before the war when it was government-owned. Throughout the key industries there is much consultation and joint planning. It is not always clear who is controlling whom. The balance of power is apt to depend on whether the company is in debt to a governmental agency and therefore vulnerable to

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pressure. As private finance displaces emergency postwar lending by the government, business probably regains greater independence.

Here again an outsider is tempted to conclude that India and Japan could each usefully shift its practices somewhat towards the attitude emphasized in the other. Japan's national interest would be served by greater independence of the civil servant and party politician from business influence. What is good for Sumitomo is not necessarily good for Japan. India, on the other hand, might benefit from a healthier distrust of sweeping grants of power to the bureaucrat, and a new emphasis on educating the businessman to play his part through voluntary compliance and then rewarding him generously for so doing. What is good for Dalmia is not necessarily bad for India.

Finally, in both countries state spending, lending and other favors work commonly to the disadvantage of the little fellow. Usually he is not in the right line, or lacks the right connections. As business re-concentrates in Japan, the government seems more disposed to hasten than oppose the process. In India, too, modern capitalistic enterprise is oligopolistic, and the growing public sector strengthens the tendency. As for small-scale industry, both governments have development programs. But the Indian government has barely begun, and the Japanese government stops well short of what it is really capable of doing. Both ruling parties talk more than they act in this realm, although in Japan this has not deterred small industry from reviving since the war with remarkable vigor.

VI

The heart of traditional socialism is a concern for equality or, more broadly, social security and welfare. The responsibility of the state in this sphere is central to what the Indians mean when they talk about the "Socialistic Pattern of Society."

India's efforts to fulfill this responsibility began with the displacement of the princely class, certain reforms in land tenure, the statutory ban on untouchability and the legal emancipation of women. They were extended to include better protection for factory labor, and the Community Development Program in the villages. They now involve heavy spending on education, medical care and other social services, amounting to as much as a quarter of all public outlays budgeted under the Second Plan. Here demo-

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cratic ideals imbibed from the West join with ancient moral teachings revivified by Gandhi to create the most distinctive and challenging feature of Indian development.

It is no disparagement of these programs to say that they have only begun to scratch the surface; to make a start is the important thing. They encounter appalling difficulties, far greater than in Meiji Japan, of poverty, of social tradition and of size and heterogeneous structure. If the First Five Year Plan failed to bring any significant shift towards greater equality of income and wealth as among individuals, classes or regions, that is not surprising. For the opportunities opened up by change and growth in a society that is at all free are apt to benefit initially those with money, position and education. Meanwhile fiscal policy is a weak weapon for equalizing wealth if the state collects only 10 percent of the national income in tax revenue, two-thirds of it in indirect taxes having a wide incidence. Public ownership likewise is limited in effect when financed mainly by borrowing money from private interests or by inflationary finance. With all that can be done through such measures—and they have a special urgency in India—the basic engine of change must be industrialization, together with the diffusion of education and opportunity throughout a growing economy. This is bound to be a slow process, especially if a people happen to value political freedom.

Japan's experience is instructive in this regard. Historically it shows how long delayed such social gains can be when national leadership is not directed consciously to force the pace and spread more equitably the fruits of progress. Japanese capitalism combined with bureaucratic oligarchy to perpetuate sources of poverty and injustice long after the means to alleviate them were technically within reach. Yet equally modern Japanese history shows how industrialization tends in non-totalitarian societies to set in motion forces working to that end. Today the most striking thing about this island nation, relative to the rest of Asia, and relative to the Japan of a generation ago, is the advance in mass well-being, the rising social mobility, the more equalitarian, more open political and social structure.

It is the lessening of gross inequalities in wealth and income so long characteristic of Japan that is particularly relevant here. Partly this is fortuitous. An immense destruction of property values—the root of inequality—was effected by the war and by postwar inflation. Then came the Occupation reforms: the re-

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distribution of farmlands, the de-concentration of big business, the rise of trade unions, the continuation of stiff, progressive taxation of incomes. Suggestive of the change is the fact that rent and interest accruing to individuals now absorb only 4 percent of the national income, as contrasted with 18 percent before the war. The farming class, with its rice prices now guaranteed by the government, lives nearly on a level with city people today for the first time in history. Social security programs cover over 12,000,000 workers. They fill the place in the national budget once assigned to war and armament.

On the darker side it is of course easy to qualify this picture of Japan. The congestion of urban facilities is almost unbelievable; taxes eat into meager incomes; labor relations are chaotic; chronic monetary instability bears harshly on the small businessman. The ever growing need for more jobs and more imports of food and materials to sustain the swelling population invites deep pessimism for the future, as it has for 50 years. Powerful forces in politics are ready to erode the postwar reforms at every opportunity. Yet the widening of the state's social responsibility and its greater responsiveness to popular concerns reflect structural changes deep in Japanese society. Only another great war or economic catastrophe could turn back the clock very far, and then only by forcing a suspension of constitutional government.

From this perspective on India and Japan no simple conclusions emerge. Certainly no facile dichotomy appears between the "socialist India" of Prime Minister Nehru and the "capitalist Japan" of Prime Minister Kishi. The Indian Congress Party, for reasons both within and beyond its control, preaches more socialism than it practises. Japan, even under conservative leaders, practises more socialism than it preaches. Moreover, the pattern of its policies is now pretty well rooted in a national consensus, and supported by a balance of interest groups and public pressures. India's policy framework necessarily faces a more uncertain future, in so far as it rests more heavily on the will of an enlightened minority.

The sympathetic observer, hopeful of the growing success of both systems of thought and action as alternatives to Communism, will recognize each as an intelligent adaptation to the changing circumstances of the two peoples. He may also suspect that each could learn something of value from the other.

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STABILIZING COMMODITY PRICES

By Sir Sydney Caine

IN recent decades there has been growing concern about the sharp fluctuations of primary product prices, the effects of those fluctuations on particular groups of producers and particular countries, and the measures which might be taken to reduce or offset the fluctuations. The main facts are clear enough and have been set out in the growing literature on the subject, including reports by the United Nations and other international bodies. The prices of agricultural products such as sugar and wheat, of raw materials like rubber, and of metals, have at times doubled within less than 12 months, or fallen in the same period to less than half their previous level.

Obviously such fluctuations have very great effects on both sellers and buyers. For the actual producers, the fluctuations may be even more violent than those indicated by calculations based on world markets, since changes in transport and other costs incidental to getting the product to the market tend to vary less, so that the net return to the original producer suffers a more than proportionate share of the impact of fluctuation. Effects on consumers are less dramatic but still important. In a world in which security and stability are increasingly valued it must appear more and more inconvenient for the individuals concerned to have such very sharp changes in their incomes and necessary expenditures. Especially it must seem *prima facie* destructive of the orderly planning of economic affairs, whether or not one thinks of that planning as an individual or a state activity.

None the less, fluctuation of prices is no new thing. Records of prices over past centuries show innumerable examples of fluctuations just as violent and rapid. Why is it that people are now so much more concerned?

One reason, no doubt, is the general atmosphere of the times, the much greater disposition towards public intervention in economic affairs. People no longer accept price fluctuations or anything else as part of the order of things. They begin much more commonly with an assumption that by taking thought it should be possible to control things better. Especially, perhaps, there is a change in the general feeling about the rôle of prices in the economic and social system. In free economies (and to a quite

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considerable extent in Communist or controlled economies too) prices have two functions to perform. They determine, wholly or in part, the allocation of resources, how much of particular goods will be produced and by which groups of producers, and how much of particular commodities will be consumed and by whom. But in the process of doing that they also determine the total incomes of individual producers. If one concentrates on the first function, prices appear simply a part of the impersonal technical mechanism of the economic system; but if one looks mainly at the second, they appear as a potent and probably malignant influence on the social welfare of vast numbers of human beings. Especially does this social aspect loom large in our eyes when we are faced with whole communities or whole countries dependent on the price of a single commodity.

Greater emphasis on the social or welfare side of economics is perhaps the main reason for the increasing interest in the topic. The nineteenth century was more inclined to let the technical allocation of resources work itself out through the price system and to regard the incidental trials of individuals as part of a penalty worth paying for the over-all increase in output which the better allocation of resources produced. Today we want to avoid the pains while still securing the prizes of expanding output. Unfortunately that is never 100 percent possible, and one of the questions it is particularly necessary to ask about schemes of commodity price regulation is whether they will have untoward effects on the allocation of resources, on total production and therefore on aggregate real incomes.

Let us look, however, a little more in detail at some of the reasons for increased concern. As already noted, the effects of fluctuation are brought into greater prominence because of their international character and because of the way in which whole countries have become specialized in the production of individual commodities. This has meant that not merely the private incomes of individual producers but the whole revenues of the state have become dependent on the prices of one or two commodities. The countries so affected are, moreover, mainly the underdeveloped areas whose special needs are so generally accepted; and the idea of more stable prices for them gets mixed up with the idea of higher incomes for the poorer nations.

A second factor is, perhaps, that when the price of wheat fluctuated in, say, seventeenth-century England, the change was

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normally associated with and offset by an opposite change in the size of the harvest; low prices accompanied big crops and high prices followed small crops, so that the fluctuations in money incomes were less sharp than the fluctuations in price. In the international commodity markets of today, however, even though that may be true to some extent of producers of a particular commodity taken as a whole, it is less commonly true for any particular country. If Ghana has a good cocoa crop and the world price falls, Nigeria will feel the effect just as much even though the Nigerian crop may be no larger than usual. But in addition, fluctuations in prices, particularly of metals and industrial raw materials, are in the short term likely—perhaps more likely—to be brought about by changes in demand rather than by changes in supply, so that it may well happen that producers are actually able to sell less at lower prices than at high. The income fluctuations are then greater and not less than the price fluctuations.

Thirdly, the whole tendency in modern life is towards greater reliance on a steady supply of manufactured goods and more or less sophisticated services, so that what were luxuries for which the farmer of former generations could afford to pay in good times but did not very much mind doing without in bad years, tend now to become necessities which he must have at all times. This last aspect is perhaps particularly important if one looks at the over-all position of countries which have recently developed out of a very primitive level of economic organization. When the West African peasant started producing cocoa, or the Indonesian small-holder started growing rubber, the income he obtained was something entirely surplus to his basic economy. As has been pointed out in an interesting article by Hla Myint in the *Economic Journal* of June 1958, his product in these new lines was derived entirely from surplus resources, that is, resources which were latent and unused. If the income he derived from the use of those surplus resources then varied he had less to spend on what to him were luxuries, but his more fundamental way of life and the supply of his basic necessities were not affected. As time went on, however, both the individual peasant or small-holder and the governments, which began to rake off some of the income for public expenditure, grew more and more to depend on this originally "surplus" income. As Myint says, they became vulnerable.

This growing concern has been mainly about effects on producers. It is at first sight strange that consumers seem to be ig-

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nored, because it is an arithmetical truism that a given price change must affect the expenditures of the consumers of a product by exactly the same amount as it affects the incomes of the producers. One might therefore imagine that gain or loss of welfare among producers would be offset by loss or gain of welfare among consumers. That this is not at any rate apparent is due to several special features in the international economy. First, while there are many groups of producers dependent on single commodities there are no groups of consumers who buy only one commodity, so that the effects of price changes on consumers are much more diffused. A fall in the price of rubber which halves the income of a Malayan small-holder will reduce the expenditure of the average ultimate consumer of rubber by a small fraction of 1 percent. Even to the manufacturer who is the immediate consumer of rubber the cost of the raw material is only a part of his total costs.

Of course sharp price movements do not usually affect the prices of one commodity only. More commonly the prices of many or all primary products move more or less together. When that happens, the effect on consumers ceases to be negligible, but it is still likely to be less than on producers. When we look at the international position and compare the position of primary producing countries with industrial countries the same contrast appears. The comparatively small effect on the industrial countries which are consumers of primary products is further reduced because nearly all industrial countries are also substantial primary producers so that there is an internal balancing effect, while a good many primary producing countries are almost barren of manufacturing activity.

These considerations go a long way to explain the tendency to think only of the effects on producers. But we must not oversimplify. The clear-cut distinction between the primary producing country, poor, undeveloped and specialized in one product, and the rich, diversified, industrial country, can be very misleading. Some countries which specialize in the export of primary produce, like New Zealand or Denmark, rank near the top of the world scale in per capita income. Most countries which export primary produce are themselves large importers of other primary produce, so that they gain as well as lose by a general fall in commodity prices. Ceylon, for instance, exports principally tea and rubber but in turn imports much of her rice and other food sup-

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plies, to say nothing of mineral oils and coal. A highly industrialized country, on the other hand, dependent on large imports of food and raw materials, may find its external balance of payments seriously disturbed by general price changes; this has been a recurring problem for postwar Britain. Finally, the internal problems of countries with a mixed industrial and primary economy cannot be ignored—the problems of cotton-growers in the southern United States or of the United Kingdom's coal-mining areas in the inter-war years.

None the less, the center of the problem, above all the center of concern to the social conscience of the world, lies in the international field, and we must turn back to the implications of international instability. We must first reëmphasize that price fluctuation and income fluctuation are not necessarily identical. Where the main determinant of price for a particular group of producers is the level of their own total output, their income may be more stable if prices are allowed to fall at times of high production and to rise at times of low production, but as has already been noted, this situation is by no means the most usual and it can easily happen that income fluctuations are actually greater than price fluctuations. Again, we must not assume that price fluctuations affect all producers equally. Large groups of producers of many commodities are sheltered to a greater or less extent from the fluctuations of world markets, with perhaps an intensification of the effect on the residual "unsheltered" producers who bear the full effects. Thirdly, we must distinguish carefully between the stability of prices and the actual level of prices. It is very easy for critics of instability, if they look at the problem from the point of view of producers, to think how much better it would be if prices always stayed at their high points or, if they are looking at it from the point of view of consumers, to think how much better it would be if they always stayed at their lowest points. The problem of instability is one of whether, on the assumption of a given average price over a period of years, it is better to have that price prevailing more or less unchanged throughout the period or to have it very much higher at some times and correspondingly lower at others; that is, the problem of instability is not one of the total income available over any given period but of the variations in the rate of flow of income.

It may be argued that if people knew in advance what the average price would be they could adjust their plans accordingly.

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In fact, however, people cannot predict the average over any long future period, and the difficulties mainly arise because of the problems of forecasting and the consequent problems of planning, whether private or public. There is a very natural tendency for producers to assume in times of high prices that the boom is going to last and to make their plans accordingly. They may then be seriously embarrassed by a subsequent fall in prices. This seems to be even more true of governments than of private individuals. Especially in some of the underdeveloped countries, governments seem disposed to pitch their sights very high and to commit anticipated future income far in advance. If it then turns out that they have overestimated their income, all kinds of troubles follow. There may be serious distortion of priorities; there may be waste of resources because projects have been started which cannot be finished; and, perhaps most serious of all, there may be acute disappointment with the failure to fulfill high expectations, leading in turn to serious political disturbance.

Much doubt, however, must attach to the claim that the effect of sharp fluctuation in prices is generally to reduce development or investment expenditure to a serious extent. In the past, countries dependent on the production of commodities which sharply fluctuated in price have achieved a very respectable level of development expenditure, and direct investment in such unstable commodities as rubber and most minerals has been high both in the form of capitalistic investment in mines and plantations and in the form of rapid extension of small-holding products by a multiplicity of very small-scale local investors. Malaya, which in recent generations has had a very high level of capital creation, has always depended on two notoriously unstable commodities, tin and rubber. The creation by West African peasants of the greater part of the world's cocoa-producing capacity went on throughout a period of sharply fluctuating prices. Probably the right conclusion is that fluctuation is not of itself discouraging to investment but that false expectations based on failure to recognize the probability of fluctuation may lead to unproductive investment.

There may also be disturbances to monetary stability, in themselves destructive of confidence and future enterprise, as governments which have overextended themselves in times of high prices face balance-of-payments deficits when prices fall, and yield to the temptation to meet them by eating up their basic monetary

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resources, by exchange controls and all the expedients of the financially imprudent. (Not that all balance-of-payments deficits are a sign of bad management—within limits they may reflect a rational policy of maintaining a stable level of consumption and investment by the sensible use of resources accumulated for that purpose.) Governments which have avoided these difficulties of overextension—the governments, for example, of colonial territories under careful metropolitan control—may well have done so at the expense of undue caution and too slow a rate of investment. Certainly their example of prudence does not generally commend itself to the politically independent territories.

Clearly, therefore, price instability is practically inconvenient, socially disagreeable and politically dangerous to producing areas and, to a lesser extent, to consumers. What, then, can be done to reduce it? Measures of direct action include international schemes of one kind or another, action taken by national authorities acting independently of other countries, and action taken by private concerns or private corporations. The last type of action has been too frequently ignored, and perhaps too much attention has been paid to full-scale international activity. But there are also other wide fields of government action having an indirect bearing on the question of stability—the general techniques of economic stability and special encouragement of particular lines of production.

In the international field the most obvious type of action is a commodity agreement which in principle embraces all producers and consumers and aims at keeping prices within some stated or implicitly understood range of fluctuations. The simplest form of such schemes was that of the tin, rubber and tea agreements of the inter-war years. In each of these the producing countries were comparatively few in number, the commodities were produced almost entirely for export, and the technical resources of production were such that the creation of new capacity was necessarily slow. The schemes operated through production quotas which were varied from time to time with the broad object of maintaining a certain approximate level of prices, whether or not these were formally written into the agreements. These particular inter-war agreements were initially operated entirely by producing interests, and each for a time at least managed to achieve something approaching 100 percent membership.

In later agreements it has generally been policy to include con-

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sumers as well as producers and in some it has been thought essential to add provisions for the operation of buffer stocks designed to mitigate the efforts of short-term fluctuations of the market. Different types of schemes have been developed to suit the special conditions of other commodities, *e.g.* the wheat agreement, which amounted to a mutual promise by exporting and importing countries that they would respectively sell and buy certain quantities of wheat within certain price ranges, but which otherwise left the trade free. In the case of sugar a much more complicated agreement has been attempted which recognizes the existence of protective or preferential arrangements covering the production and sale of a very large proportion of the world's sugar and imposes various special types of restriction within that field, while establishing a more orthodox quota scheme for the comparatively few countries which export to the limited free market.

None of the various agreements of these types could be said to have been a complete and permanent success and those that survive at the moment are all in one degree or another inadequate. They all face two major difficulties, one of economic principle and one of practical administration. The difficulty of principle arises from the fact, already discussed, that one basic purpose of the price system is to take a vital part in determining the amount and location of production and the level and distribution of consumption of particular products. In the end, prices rise because either supply is decreasing or demand is increasing, and they fall because supply is increasing or demand is falling; that is, price changes are a reflection of the changes in the real conditions in the market for a particular commodity. In turn the movement of prices helps to counteract reverse changes on the supply and demand side. If at the extreme the price of a particular commodity were maintained absolutely unchanged, some other measures would have to be taken to offset changes in the real conditions. In particular, of course, the danger which has so often arisen has been that prices have been stabilized at a point where producers find it profitable to produce much more than the market can absorb and either the scheme of stabilization breaks down or quite different steps have to be taken to reduce output. The more effective a scheme is in creating price stability the more certain it is that other incentives or controls will be needed to bring about equilibrium of supply and

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some approach to the economic location of production. Here as elsewhere controls breed more controls.

The administrative difficulties flow from the necessity to establish control. The schemes can be fully effective only if all actual and potential producer countries are brought under control. That is enormously difficult for commodities which are widely produced, and these include nearly all foods and many minerals. Even where production appears narrowly limited geographically, as with tea or tin, it is not long before new producers emerge. In addition, the market conditions for each particular product are closely linked with those of others which are actual or potential substitutes for it. Hence we find still more ambitious projects for a completely comprehensive interlocking scheme of commodity controls. The more complex such schemes become the more they clearly depend on the existence of some kind of world government or, more correctly, some willingness throughout the world to coöperate in agreed regulation of economic affairs. It would be foolishly optimistic to assume that the present trend of world affairs is towards real increase in the willingness to coöperate, and it may be wiser to look at projects of narrower but more practicable scope than to rely on incompletely comprehensive commodity schemes.

There are indeed less ambitious projects of a still international character which may help in particular instances, as, for example, bulk marketing arrangements between pairs or groups of countries, and arrangements as to preferential marketing. These arrangements may be very helpful in bringing stability into particular areas. For instance, the British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement provides a market in the United Kingdom at reasonably stable prices for the great bulk of the exports of sugar from British Commonwealth countries. Unfortunately, schemes of this kind, while they protect certain groups of producers from the effects of fluctuations, intensify the effect of fluctuations on other groups not similarly sheltered. In the case of sugar the remaining free market has been greatly narrowed, and at times of pressure on the market from one side or another it is therefore particularly vulnerable. This was sharply illustrated by the rapid fluctuations in price at the time of the Suez scare, which happened to coincide with fortuitous declines in production of several important suppliers to the free market.

In the national field, action can be taken in the first place by

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marketing boards which may attempt to even out the effect of fluctuations for the producers of a particular commodity. Some of those which have been particularly discussed in recent years have been the marketing boards of the British colonies in West Africa handling the cocoa and oil-seed output of those areas. They have tried to reduce fluctuations from year to year by accumulating surpluses when prices were high and, in theory at least, using those surpluses to maintain prices to the producer when the general market fell. In practice, difficult problems of pricing and management of the accumulated surpluses have arisen. It is doubtful whether the theory of such price management has been thoroughly thought out, and in practice the surpluses have proved rather too tempting as a source of funds.

A second type of national action consists of a system of taxation or levies designed to rake off part of the producers' incomes at times of high prices. This may be combined with a system of refunds or subsidies when prices fall, as has been done at times in the case of Malayan rubber; or more simply it may take the form of accumulating the excess income in good times in the hands of the government, which then has the resources available to continue its own expenditure in less fortunate times.

More generally still, taxation policy may be so adjusted or the tax structure may be so framed as to ensure that the government takes a more than proportionate share of income in public revenues in good times. Where income taxes or consumption taxes of a luxury nature play a large part in the tax structure, this effect may be more or less built in, but in other cases it is conceivable (though it is difficult to find examples of it happening in practice) that the government may simply increase rates of taxes in good times in order to build up a surplus. Similarly, or rather complementarily, the government may plan to offset the effects of fluctuation in actual income as a result of price changes by changes of a contrary nature in its own level of development expenditure. This in fact is largely dependent on a prior revenue policy of the kind already described. That is, if the government is going to spend more in bad times it must have reserves with which to do it. In practice, although some governments have consciously pursued such a policy, it has been much commoner, as already noted, for governments to spend up to the hilt in good times and then find that they are unable to maintain, still less increase, the level of expenditure in times of depression.

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Private action of the same basic nature has, I believe, been of far greater importance than is generally realized by economists thinking too much of public policy. There is every indication that private individuals and business concerns in countries dependent on primary products with markedly fluctuating prices appreciate very clearly the instability of their incomes and do a good deal on their private account to offset that instability by setting aside reserves in good times. This is most obvious in the case of commercial companies, such as mining or plantation concerns, which habitually refrain from distributing the whole of their current profits as dividends when profits are high but put aside reserves so that they are able to maintain dividends at later periods and, more important, to maintain their normal program of development with their own resources. It is less easy to get exact information about the behavior of private individuals, but the indications from figures of bank deposits, including savings bank deposits, are clearly that private individuals also do in practice put aside a very significant proportion of their increased income in times of boom. It is, of course, for this reason that the level of actual consumption in countries with highly fluctuating national incomes is much more stable than might be expected if it were assumed that everybody spent his income as soon as he got it. The private person deposits in a savings bank or simply hoards currency notes; the banks or the currency authorities in turn add to their external assets, and in good times the country runs a favorable balance of payments and accumulates external monetary reserves. In times of depression the private individual spends some of his accumulated savings, the government calls on its external monetary reserves, there is for a time an adverse balance of payments, but there has been a much more stable level of consumption and national expenditure than a mere examination of external income might have suggested.

If it can be achieved, this kind of "do-it-yourself" stabilization is probably the most healthy solution of all. It depends on a certain degree of economic sophistication but not one which is unreasonable to expect in underdeveloped countries, whose inhabitants are, as Mr. Peter Bauer has shown, much more economically wide-awake than many people think. But it is also possible for governments to do something to encourage private prudence by helping to ensure that knowledge of market fluctu-

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ations is widespread and by encouraging the growth of banking and savings institutions and by maintaining monetary stability which will give people the confidence to put aside cash reserves.

Finally, there are indirect actions which the more advanced countries may take to promote price stability. First comes the maintenance of their own economic stability. Nothing would be more likely to diminish violent fluctuations in the commodity markets than confidence in a steady rate of economic growth in North America and Europe.

In ensuring stability, however, it is sometimes forgotten that it is as important to avoid excess demand as to keep demand always at the "full-employment" level. Action by the principal consumer countries can be particularly useful in checking the more feverish booms in commodity markets, as was shown on a large scale during World War II and on a smaller scale by the short-lived but effective International Materials Conference which helped to check the boom in 1951.

Then there are the effects of *ad hoc* decisions by governments regarding their own acquisitions of particular commodities. The most important are stockpiling activities. Generally these are dictated by defense considerations of an emergency nature, but certainly governments may reasonably be expected to take account of the implications for producers of a decision to terminate or liquidate stockpiles no longer required.

The other main field of activity of indirect influence on prices is the wide field of protectionism. When one group of producers is given special favor in a particular area, the market for other producers is narrowed and the impact of changes on price levels is much more severe. Innumerable examples can be found: the classic case of sugar, beginning with the inroads made by the artificial growth of beet sugar over the last century; the special encouragement of wheat producers in nearly all industrial countries; the effect of American synthetic rubber production; and the difficulties of New Zealand butter producers competing with indirectly assisted output in Britain. There is little doubt that the industrial nations could, if they chose, do far more for the primary producing countries by modifying their agricultural protectionism than by any action they are likely to take directly in the field of stabilization.

There thus are a great many things which can be done to remove or mitigate the effects of price instability. In judging

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their respective merits, we do well to go back to our theoretical starting point. Prices are important in the narrower economic sense as part of the mechanism of ensuring the most efficient use of the world's resources; in the social sense as affecting the international distribution of incomes; and in the political sense in so far as the consequences of their fluctuation are more and more important to the stability of governments and their international relationships. Ideally we seek to reconcile economic efficiency with ideas of social justice and political stability. In our assessment of such principles the defect of the international commodity scheme approach is that it secures a measure of political stability and secures that version of social justice which consists in freezing the existing distribution of international incomes at the cost of increasing distortion of the economic allocation of resources. Probably international schemes are most useful as emergency and transitional measures. National price-equilibrating schemes based on marketing boards and the like do the same thing in lesser degree, and with less risk of international distortions, but with long-term dangers to the maintenance of the position of the particular country concerned in the international market. The stabilization of incomes rather than prices through adjustments of taxation and government expenditures, and the stabilization of private spending through individual prudence, involve no interference with the economic function of prices and therefore have the merit of promoting social and political objectives without endangering long-term economic efficiency. Indirect influences through the maintenance of general economic stability and the avoidance of the special interferences of protectionism have the same advantages with the additional merit of helping to remove the purely accidental or artificial causes of price instability. If advanced countries feel a conscientious duty to help the less developed it is in these directions that they can most usefully turn their efforts.

On grounds of long-term advantage, therefore, as well as political practicability in the present state of world organization, it seems better to look to the more limited and indirect methods than to the apparently simple procedures of direct regulation and control of prices and production.

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RAW MATERIALS AND NATIONAL POLICY

By Percy W. Bidwell

THE dominant fact emerging from all discussions of the raw materials position of the United States is its increasing dependence on foreign sources of supply. Less than 50 years ago it produced within its own borders practically all of the basic materials required by its industries and, in addition, had some surpluses for export. The transition from a position of relative self-sufficiency in industrial materials to that of the world's greatest importing nation deserves to be regarded as a major event in modern economic history. It marks the transformation of the United States from an underdeveloped to a highly developed industrial economy. For the seemingly insatiable demands of our manufacturing industries we today use between 35 and 40 percent of the free world's output of basic materials. Our purchases from abroad each year put about $6 billion at the disposal of foreign countries, most of them in the category known as "underdeveloped." In many cases these exports to the United States furnish a substantial share of government revenues and of dollar exchange. This interdependence, while it raises difficult questions of policy, is fraught with great potential benefits both to us and to them.

The over-all objective of an American raw materials policy, according to the Paley Commission, should be "to insure an adequate and dependable flow of materials at the lowest cost consistent with national security and with the welfare of friendly nations." A concise statement of this sort must inevitably employ terms incapable of exact definition (*e.g.* adequate, dependable). It nevertheless is useful as a standard of reference in examining the legislative and administrative measures which have affected the supply of raw materials available to the United States since the war.

In times of national emergency American raw materials policies have attained considerable success. Measures adopted during World War II and in the Korean conflict provided the metals, oil and textile fibers needed to sustain defense production and make victory possible. This was accomplished, moreover, without imposing drastic restrictions on the use of fuels and raw materials for the production of consumer goods. The creation of a great

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new industry for the production of synthetic rubber during World War II, and its successful operation and technical advance under government ownership, were extraordinary achievements. A further indication of the success of the Government's rubber policy was the success with which plants were transferred after the war to private owners, who thereafter successfully operated them without tariff protection, subsidy or other form of government assistance. The development of uranium production with government subsidy, and with government monopoly of supply, was another major accomplishment. Government participation in nickel mining in Cuba resulted in valuable additions to the wartime supply of a critically important metal, even though the postwar history of the nickel venture was disappointing.

In the years 1947–1956 industrial production expanded by nearly 50 percent without encountering (except during the Korean conflict) serious shortages of raw materials. The unprecedented upswing in the national economy in this decade, however, may have been hampered rather than assisted by Congressional and executive activities in the field of raw materials. For optimum economic growth, the nation's industries should be able to obtain their supplies of raw materials at minimum real cost. This principle, however, was disregarded. Concealed subsidies to domestic producers of oil and metals in the form of depletion allowances reduced the federal revenue and, like all systems of preferential taxation, tended to divert labor and capital away from unsubsidized industries, thus raising their costs.

The protection against foreign competition which the tariff afforded to producers of raw materials was insignificant in most cases. Raw materials as a general rule entered free of duty, and on the dutiable items the rates were low. Only on wool and on a few metals were they high enough to raise prices in American markets appreciably. At the end of the decade, however, so-called voluntary restrictions on oil imports constituted a substantive violation of the minimum cost principle. By limiting the supplies of low-cost oil that might be obtained from Venezuela, Canada and the Middle East, the restrictions forced larger use of the more expensive domestic product.

Preferences accorded in government purchasing to commodities fabricated from domestic materials, in accordance with the Buy American Act, furnish a further example of uneconomic raw materials policies. In the stockpiling program, also, the misuse

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of purchases of strategic materials as a means of subsidizing domestic producers of lead and zinc and other materials added needlessly to the costs of the undertaking. The administrators of the program, moreover, failed to take account of technological progress and so accumulated unnecessarily large quantities of certain materials, notably wool and rubber, for which synthetic substitutes had been developed.

The coördination of policies in this field with over-all foreign policy was far from perfect. In some instances, notably the embargo on shipments of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc and the prohibition on all exports to Red China, the policies were in agreement; more often, however, they were in conflict. One of the repeatedly emphasized objectives of American foreign policy is to preserve good relations with countries in the Western Hemisphere and to prevent penetration by Soviet influence. To avoid giving offense to Mexico and Peru and Canada, President Eisenhower for four years resisted strong pressure from domestic producers to raise import duties on lead and zinc. But in 1955, when he imposed quantitative restrictions on imports of oil, he threatened Venezuela's principal export industry. His action added fuel to the smoldering resentment in that country toward other aspects of American economic policy and contributed to the explosion of anti-American feeling that greeted Vice President Nixon in May 1958 in Caracas. The reaction in Canada, also an exporter of oil to American markets, was less spectacular, but it may have been equally profound. Like many Americans, Canadians could not understand how shipments of oil from Alberta into our West Coast ports could actually endanger American security. The President's justification of the restrictions on grounds of national defense seemed to disregard the economic conditions and political arrangements which guarantee that all Canadian fuels and raw materials will be available to the United States in time of crisis. If the principle of collective security has any meaning, it should have been applied in this case.

In general, measures affecting raw materials have displayed virtues and defects characteristic of American democracy. When the Federal Government faced an emergency it accomplished prodigies of improvisation. It mobilized economic and technological resources, accumulated vast stores of strategic materials and, by purchase contracts, tax incentives and loans, greatly stimulated production at home and abroad. These measures were expensive,

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but they produced results. In times of peace, however, or near peace, it is legitimate to require that results be obtained as far as possible at minimum costs. Raw materials policies failed to meet this test.

Congress and the President often failed to adapt measures affecting supplies of raw materials to the changed economic conditions which made the country increasingly dependent on foreign sources. They failed, also, to bring raw materials policies into agreement with the changed position of the United States in world affairs and with the new objectives of American foreign policy. These failures are not to be attributed to ignorance or stupidity, but rather to certain characteristic defects of the democratic process which afflict national policy in many areas.

First is the dead weight of tradition which slows the adaptation of policies to changed economic conditions. Most Congressmen and Senators are acquainted with the facts of export and import trade; most of them, it may be assumed, know that domestic mines cannot provide substantially increased supplies of manganese, tungsten, lead and zinc except at costs which would prove burdensome to fabricating industries. Their speeches and their votes, however, indicate that many of them still cherish the delusion of national self-sufficiency. Likewise, legislators know that the United States needs the diplomatic, economic and military support of allied countries in the free world in the conflict with international Communism, and that simultaneously it is striving to prevent the spread of Soviet influence among the uncommitted nations. Yet Congressional debates often display attitudes on foreign policy which though they might have been relevant to the situation of the United States in 1890 are anachronistic in view of its present difficulties and responsibilities.

More important than tradition in explaining the Government's failure to bring policy into harmony with the changing national interest are the pressures of special and local interests—miners, oil producers, wool growers and others. These pressures, of course, have not been confined to measures affecting the supply of raw materials. The triumphs of well-organized special interests over the national interest are an all too familiar feature of American history.

New policy should not be designed only to remedy old errors. If it is to fit the needs of the next 20 or 25 years, Congress and the President must anticipate the economic, technological and politi-

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cal changes which will modify the conditions of supply and demand for raw materials in this country and in the free world. Should American policy be based on the expectation of world-wide shortages? Or of surpluses? What measures would be appropriate to protect the national interest in each case?

Since wars and the threat of wars can upset predictions based on economic reasoning, certain assumptions are necessary about the probable state of our international relations. There are three possible alternatives: (1) an all-out atomic war; (2) a prolonged third world war fought with conventional weapons; and (3) the continuance of the present state of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An all-out war fought with nuclear weapons would be such disaster that any calculation of trends in demand for industrial materials would be useless. In a protracted war, world-wide in scope and requiring full-scale industrial mobilization, the military demand for certain materials would absorb practically the entire available supply; it would leave only a bare minimum for essential civilian needs and necessitate extraordinary programs of substitution and conservation. As things stand now, the continuance of the present state of no peace, no war, punctuated perhaps by armed conflicts of limited scope and duration, seems the most probable of the three alternatives. This is the assumption, then, which will underlie the following discussion.

II

Plainly, our resources of metals and minerals cannot be renewed. As the richest veins of ore are worked out and the most productive oil fields are drained, real costs will rise. On the other hand, the demand for fuels and the basic materials does not seem to be subject to any comparable limitation, since human wants, except for food, are indefinitely expansible. Thus, it is argued, dynamic demand is bound to collide with relatively static conditions of supply: and the result will be scarcity. An examination of the actual trends in supply and demand shows, however, that the *a priori* reasoning which leads to this pessimistic conclusion is based on questionable assumptions.

Although the increase of population in the United States may not continue at the amazing rate recorded in 1940–1950, the next 25 years will still bring significant gains. Elsewhere in the free world, accelerated rates of increase are predicted. But in in-

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dustrialized countries the demand for raw materials does not expand in proportion to the growth in population. As living standards rise, changes occur in the way people spend their incomes; they devote relatively less of their incomes to commodities and more to intangibles—education and the arts, recreation, medical care, beauty treatments, and other items in which wages rather than materials are the principal costs. In the next decades the changing age grouping of the population—the increasing proportion of older people—will probably reinforce this trend.

We may expect, also, that structural changes in industry will cause the consumption of raw materials to rise more slowly than the index of industrial production. An increasing proportion of American industrial output will consist of highly fabricated products—automobiles and airplanes, typewriters, accounting and calculating machines, radio and television apparatus, and other products in which materials make up a less important element of cost than labor. For these reasons a relatively smaller expenditure on materials will be needed to sustain the expected rise in gross national product. Reasoning in this way, the Paley Commission estimated that in the United States a doubling of the total output of goods and services in the period 1950–1975 would require only a 50 to 60 percent increase in supplies of materials.

Defense production will show the same sort of change. Expenditures for military hardware (if we assume no significant relaxation in U.S.-Soviet tension) will increase, but probably without a proportionate increase in the demand for metals. Ballistic missiles and their accessories are highly fabricated products that require relatively heavy inputs of labor. In their consumption of metals they may have the same relation to the airplanes (which they will partially displace) as the plane had to the destroyer and the battleship. Moreover, the new weapons will not require greatly increased quantities of any single material. In addition to aluminum and titanium, it has been reported that they will use alloy steels containing chromium, nickel, molybdenum, vanadium, columbium, cobalt and tungsten.

Rising standards of living in the industrialized countries of Western Europe and in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan will add to the drain on the supplies of materials available to the free world. Patterns of consumption in these countries, however, are similar to those of the United States, and probably will become increasingly so; hence the growth of their materials

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consumption, relative to gross national product, will presumably resemble ours.

Economists have traditionally held that agricultural production, including food and raw materials, is subject to the Law of Diminishing Returns. After a certain stage in production is reached, further increments of output, *other conditions remaining constant,* can be obtained only at the expense of disproportionately large inputs or other economic factors. But in the next 20 to 25 years the real costs of rubber, wool and other raw materials of agricultural origin may not in fact rise, because of changes in "other conditions"—technological advance in seed selection, for example, and in the breeding of animals. Economies of scale may in some instances accompany expansion in the size of productive units.

As regards metals and other mineral resources, the outlook for expansion of supplies from *domestic sources in the United States* is not promising. The declining yield of the older oil fields, the need of drilling ever deeper wells and other circumstances indicate the progressive exhaustion of our petroleum reserves. It seems improbable that the discovery of new oil fields will greatly change the present supply situation within the next 20 or 25 years. We may expect, however, that technological advance will make possible further economies in the extraction of coal and oil, thus stretching out the life of our fuel resources. Within the near future, moreover, atomic energy will supplement fuel oil in the heating of homes, offices and public buildings, and in the generation of power for public utilities and manufacturing. For highway and air transport we shall continue to depend on petroleum, but redesign of internal combustion engines (for example, introduction of fuel injection systems) will bring economies in fuel consumption. Increasing traffic congestion, and perhaps greater reverence for life, may check the trend toward heavier and faster cars.

Geologists do not expect in the near future to uncover new deposits of ferrous or nonferrous ores in the United States as rich and as easily accessible as those exploited in the past 50 years. "The mineral frontier, which seemed endless in its capacity to yield new sources of raw materials, has all but disappeared insofar as new deposits are concerned."[1] The country has been so

[1] Howard A. Meyerhoff, "What Is Involved in Metals Conservation Today?," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* May 1952, p. 40. "The pick-and-shovel prospector will soon strike pay dirt only in western movies," J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, "America's Needs and Resources," New York: 20th Century Fund, 1955, p. 759.

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thoroughly combed by prospectors that surface outcroppings cannot be expected to yield large new supplies. New methods of exploration, it is true, may reveal the existence of hidden deposits, although no one can now foretell how large they will be or whether they can be worked at a profit. New and more economic processes of milling, concentration and refining will probably make possible the more extensive use of low-grade ores.

The outlook for supply is not uniform for all metals. Domestic reserves of two light metals, magnesium and titanium, which have come into greatly increased use in postwar years, appear adequate for foreseeable future demands. Whether or not the refined metals can be produced at a cost low enough to stimulate widespread use will depend on the availability of large supplies of cheap electrical energy. Electric power may also prove a limiting factor in the future expansion of aluminum production.

At the end of World War II, a trained observer predicted that the "potential effect of substitutes on the mineral position of the United States may be regarded as of minor importance." He foresaw no likelihood that plastics would to any significant degree serve to replace metals.[2] But the following decade witnessed the development of an enormous new industry, the production of polymeric materials. Utilizing a few readily available substances —coal and oil, water and, in lesser amounts, chlorine, silicon and fluorine—the chemical industry has produced cheap and effective substitutes for nonferrous metals, for iron and for natural rubber, wood, glass, cotton and wool.

American industries in postwar years have learned to economize in the use of minerals. They utilize a greater variety of resources and new techniques of exploration and discovery, of mining and processing. There is reason to expect that with a continued high level of demand and continued research by private firms and government agencies this progress will continue. Industrial engineers will exercise their ingenuity in substituting for copper, lead and zinc, as these become scarcer, the more abundant light metals, aluminum, magnesium, silicon and titanium.

But even under the most favorable assumptions regarding technological advance, the outlook for the United States would be grim if it had to depend exclusively on its own resources. At-

[2] "Plastics provide substitutes for some mineral products, but as yet offer no likelihood of being put to major use; their ultimate significance as replacements for minerals probably will be small." Elmer Walter Pehrson, "Our Mineral Resources and Security," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1945, p. 654.

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tempts to achieve self-sufficiency could result only in lower standards of living and a decline in national power. If we enlarge the scope of our inquiry, however, and compare the potential raw-material supplies of the free world with prospective demand, we find a very different situation. The formerly abundant mineral resources of the United States have been greatly depleted by a century of rapid industrial expansion and the demands of two world wars. But in the underdeveloped countries, in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, vast supplies still await exploitation. In Canada, new discoveries and the rapid development of mineral industries—uranium, iron ore, oil, nickel, and other nonferrous metals—have revealed large possibilities of low-cost expansion. Increased production of oil in Venezuela, the Middle East and in Africa, of copper in Chile and in Rhodesia and of nonferrous metals in Mexico and in South America, all give promise of abundant supplies at no increase in real costs.

Fear has sometimes been expressed that as the underdeveloped countries become industrialized their consumption of domestically produced materials will cut into the supplies available for the United States and the consuming countries of Western Europe. This is a possible but not a necessary consequence. Industrialization need not check the expansion of raw materials production; the two kinds of economic activity may supplement rather than conflict with each other. But even if industrialization should absorb some of the materials which otherwise would have been exported, the resulting decrease in the next 20 years in the supplies available to industrialized economies could not be large. The underdeveloped countries now account for less than 20 percent of the total free world demand for materials. Even a very high rate of industrialization would not cause a large absolute increase in the quantities of materials they consume.

To sum up: the evidence available does not indicate that there is to be a world-wide shortage of fuels or industrialized materials in the next 20 or 25 years. It will be physically possible for the free world to obtain metals, fibers and other materials in quantities sufficient to satisfy its requirements at real costs which will not exert a downward pressure on the standard of living in the industrial countries.

But the unsolved part of the problem is not one of geology or economics; it is political. The question is not, "Will the supplies physically available in the producing countries be adequate for

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the needs of the free world?" It is, "On what terms will the nations with ore deposits and oil wells allow them to be exploited by American or other investors?" Will they permit extractive industries to produce and export the products freely, or will they impose onerous restrictions? Will their legislation and administrative regulations provide a favorable climate for the inflow of capital, equipment, technology and management skills?

In the coming decades, therefore, American policy regarding raw materials will need to give close attention to the underdeveloped countries—in the Western Hemisphere (Canada as well as the Latin American republics), in the Middle East, in Africa and in Southeast Asia. Our purpose should be to encourage the expansion of low-cost production and to make sure that neither nationalistic policies nor Communist influences deny American industries access on reasonable terms to the basic materials necessary to the continued growth of the American economy.

Lenin and Stalin taught that the underdeveloped countries were stepping stones, first to the domination of Europe and ultimately of the world. The U.S.S.R., accordingly, has been trying to win them over by subversion, by propaganda, and recently by programs of aid and trade. As a source of economic aid the United States has far surpassed the U.S.S.R. In trade, also, in imports of raw materials, we occupy a far stronger position. In both aid and trade the larger dimensions of the American economy provide important advantages. But the outcome of the contest may depend quite as much on our economic policies as on national income and the volume of our industrial production.

The underdeveloped countries will need markets for the expanded production resulting from new capital investments. At present the United States buys about five times as much from them as does the Soviet Union. But its state monopoly of foreign trade enables Soviet Russia to use its import buying as an instrument of political penetration. Its recent purchases from Egypt, for example, have surpassed those of the United States. The United States is not in a position to manipulate trade in this way. Now that stockpile goals have been so largely attained, the Government's purchases of strategic materials from abroad have practically ceased and importing is conducted almost exclusively by business firms in pursuit of profits, regardless of foreign policy objectives.

Nevertheless, the Government does have at its disposal various

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means of influencing trade in raw materials to the advantage of the underdeveloped countries as well as to its own. Our tariff policy should supplement and not conflict with our economic assistance; it should support and not stultify our protestations of good neighborliness. For four years Mexico and Peru, for instance, have been worried by agitation in this country for increased duties on lead and zinc. Canada and Venezuela resent our restrictions on imports of oil.

To get the maximum economic advantage from foreign trade, to obtain adequate supplies at minimum real costs, the United States should abolish all import duties and quotas and adopt a policy of complete free trade in raw materials. In the short run, this sweeping change would not cause a great expansion in imports nor seriously displace American labor and capital. The exporting countries would not at once experience great economic gains. Politically, however, the new policy might accomplish more than hundreds of visits and speeches of important dignitaries in replenishing the sadly depleted reservoir of good will toward this country.

It must be recognized, however, that in terms of practical American politics complete free trade in raw materials is a chimera. Despite this, the present Administration and its successors should make every effort to bring about freer conditions of trade, using to the hilt the powers delegated by Congress and striving to get them enlarged. The President should set his face against attempts to impose further restrictions on imports of raw materials, whether by higher duties or by quotas, and subject to searching scrutiny all claims for tariff protection based on grounds of national defense. If he finds that import competition or any other reason causes production of an essential commodity to fall below minimum defense requirements, he should recommend to Congress the payment of a subsidy, a much less clumsy and less expensive device than tariff protection. Steps in this direction were taken in the incentive payments provided to wool growers in the National Wool Act of 1954, and also in the Domestic Minerals Stabilization Plan proposed in April 1958 by Secretary of the Interior Seaton.

National strength depends upon the best use of all kinds of national resources—the services of scientists and engineers and the initiative of businessmen, as well as on our reserves of oils and metals. Import restrictions and stockpile purchases which per-

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petuate production from high-cost mines or from depleted oil fields weaken rather than strengthen the national economy. They also weaken the system of free enterprise and the efficient functioning of democratic institutions. Every new measure of government aid eventually brings government regulation and provides the camel of government control with more ample accommodations in the tent of private enterprise. In addition, the lobbying and vote-swapping which accompany government assistance to producers of raw materials bring discredit on democratic institutions. It is doubtful whether government assistance provided under such conditions actually promotes either national welfare or national security.

To obtain these objectives, the President and the Congress, instead of dealing with oil, copper or wool separately as occasion arises, must begin to look at our raw materials policy as a whole. They will then be able to coördinate it with foreign policy. American objectives in the field of international relations, both economic and political, cannot be achieved in isolation, but only in close cooperation with other countries in the free world. Our economic and our military potential depends heavily on the economic and military potential of our allies, and on their willingness to lend us their support. Our raw materials policies should therefore assist and not hinder the effective functioning of their economies, and give evidence of consideration for their welfare as well as our own.

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INDONESIA: NOW OR NEVER

By Benjamin and Jean Higgins

FROM a military point of view the Indonesian rebellion which began in February seems to be over. True, most of the leaders of the "Revolutionary Republic" are still at large, hiding in the jungle or in exile. Guerrilla warfare may continue for some time. There may even be sporadic air raids by rebel-hired planes. But effective rebel resistance to the regular armed forces broke down almost as soon as the Djakarta government decided to fight. It is not likely to reappear now.

Meanwhile the basic economic and political problems that gave rise to the rebellion are more serious than ever, and the resort to force has aggravated the underlying grievances of the people in the outer islands against the central government. The government leaders now face the delicate and difficult task of unifying the country, finding a way to provide stable government, and developing the economy in a manner satisfactory to all major groups. If they succeed within the next year, Indonesia can hold her elections in the fall of 1959 with every hope of moving towards "mature democracy." If they fail, they will probably prove to have lost Indonesia her last chance to choose a non-Communist path of economic and political development.

The United States Government and American enterprises in Indonesia steadfastly refused to support the rebels despite their anti-Communist and pro-Western complexion. Perhaps they assessed the chances for the success of the rebels more accurately than these did themselves; perhaps they feared that intervention would create another "Spain," a battleground for the major Powers and thus the beginning of World War III; perhaps they felt simply that to support the legally constituted government was the right thing to do, even if many friends were on the other side. Whatever the reason, the policy will have proven wise in the long run if the West follows through by helping the Indonesian Government to eradicate the causes of the rebellion and to get on the road to becoming a unified nation with a stable and progressive economy.

Why did the revolution fail? How could the revolutionary leaders, men of high caliber and with wide and deep knowledge of Indonesian politics, make such disastrous errors of judgment?

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They were not altogether unreasonable in thinking that they had a chance, but each of their "reasonable" assumptions went wrong. First, they assumed that their leadership would remain united; it did not. Some of those who organized the economic and political resistance to the central government were opposed even to the declaration of an independent revolutionary government. Frictions arose between the military and civilian leaders as well. Second, they assumed that Barlian, Commander of the South Sumatra district, would join them; he did not. Third, they thought former Vice President Hatta and the Sultan of Djogjakarta would support them; they declined. Fourth, they thought that the oil companies would divert their foreign exchange earnings to the revolutionary government, which in return would grant them the oil concessions they had so long been seeking; they refused. Fifth, they thought that the financial position of the Djakarta government was so weak that a squeeze on foreign exchange and tax receipts would bring Djakarta to its knees without any need for fighting; they were wrong. They expected more mass support than they got. Finally, they expected effective assistance from the Western Powers to whom they were friendly; they failed to get it. The revolution might have withstood disappointment on some of these assumptions, but it could not survive being wrong on all of them.

II

Our problem now is to bring Indonesia back to a position of "neutrality in our favor," and the task is by no means hopeless. The majority of the people are still non-Communist. Indeed, anti-Communism has hardened as the strength of Communism has grown. The P.N.I. (Nationalist Party) has thought better of collaboration with the P.K.I. (Communist Party). President Sukarno has recognized that Communists are not easy to use for purposes other than their own and indicates that he can be brought back to the same frame of mind which he held following his visit to the United States in 1956. The recent Cabinet reshuffle constitutes a demotion for several presumed "fellow-travellers." There are still able leaders with whom to work. General Nasution himself, as Chief of Staff, has emerged from the fighting in a strong position, and thus far he has given every indication of being a staunch anti-Communist as well as a resolute foe of corruption and incompetence in government. Prime Minister

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Djuanda is by no means hostile to coöperation with the West. The new Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Finance are capable members of the moderate, relatively pro-Western group. But if these and other factors are to be utilized to save Indonesia for the West we must offer her substantial aid and comfort in both the economic and the political spheres.

Helping Indonesia economically will be easier now than it was in the past. For while the revolution has been a disaster in most respects it has had one beneficial effect: it has compelled the government to be more "development minded." At the root of the rebellion lay the general sense of frustration because eight years of independence had failed to bring improvements in economic welfare. Many Indonesians thought that *Merdeka* (freedom) would automatically usher in prosperity. It did not. And even recognition that action was needed to bring prosperity did not in fact lead to action, because no group emerged with a program commanding enough popular support to be carried through. Indonesian political strength is divided among myriads of parties, splinter-groups and factions. Any two of the four major parties could form a stable coalition government, but no two of them have been able to agree for long and no one of them commands a simple majority. This situation, coupled with the Indonesian tradition that action should represent unanimous opinion rather than the will of the majority, has prevented the adoption of measures to unify the country and raise its standard of living.

Even more paralyzing has been the basic ideological conflict among political leaders. True, successive governments and all parties have declared in favor of "converting the colonial economy into a national economy," but the concept of a national economy differed from party to party and from leader to leader. Only the Communists had a clear idea of what a "national economy" would be. All parties also had the national goal of "organizing the economy along coöperative lines," required by Article 38 of the Provisional Constitution; but this goal, too, lacked clear definition. For some leaders it meant extension to national economic policy of the principles of rice-roots village democracy—*gotong-rojong, kerja sama, ramah-tamah* and *musjawarat desa* (mutual aid, working together, a family-like society, and government by consensus rather than majority). But what this would mean in terms of specific development projects, or monetary, fiscal and foreign exchange policies, or decentralization of powers,

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was never spelled out. For other leaders, including Mr. Hatta, the "coöperative society" was defined in the European fashion of the 1930s as the "middle way" between Communism and unbridled monopoly-capitalism. For them, to extend the coöperative way to the national economy meant quite simply to organize more and bigger coöperatives.

But while there was no agreement on concrete economic and social policies there was agreement that Indonesia was not to be developed on "capitalist" lines. Such ideologies as rugged individualism, free competition and private enterprise had few enthusiastic backers, indeed were associated in the minds of most Indonesians with imperialism, materialism and a ruthlessly exploitative approach to social organization. Indonesians did not want such "capitalism." What, then, was the economic and social system to be? No one but the Communists was quite sure. Meanwhile, it was considered necessary to avoid making decisions on particular projects and policies—such as laws relating to foreign investment, mining and petroleum—lest the decisions prove inconsistent with the ultimate definition of social and economic aims.

Similarly, while everyone agreed that the political system was to be "democratic" they also agreed that it was not to be democratic in the ordinary "Western" sense. No one but the Communists wanted a "People's Democracy." It was to be an "Indonesian" democracy, rejecting, as Sukarno put it, "the principle that 50 percent plus one is right." But what exactly did this mean? In particular, what did it mean in terms of allocation of powers among central, provincial and local governments? No one was quite sure, and the Constituent Assembly might take years to decide. Meanwhile, it was felt that no new institutions should be set up that might prejudice the final outcome.

With such confusion regarding ultimate goals, national leaders dissipated much time and energy in fruitless ideological debate. Pressing economic issues absorbed the attention of only a handful of leaders in the agencies directly concerned. At some point, proposals for effective solution always ran into an ideological or nationalist issue. Whenever it was a choice between an effective stabilization of development policy and satisfying nationalist sentiments, nationalism won.

The continuing paralysis led to increasing disillusionment with the parliamentary process as a way of getting things done. In

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the case of Sukarno, this disillusionment found expression in his proposal for "guided democracy"—or "democracy with leadership," to use the translation preferred in Indonesia. It also led to the growth of Communism, a natural response of peasants and workers to disappointment over the failure of *Merdeka* to bring the expected prosperity. To the simple Indonesian villager the freedom to be won by revolution was not so much political as freedom from hard work, freedom from poverty, freedom from taxes and freedom from the local Chinese money-lender. When independence did not bring these freedoms, Communist and extreme nationalist leaders began talking about "completing the revolution." If we are still poor, they argued, it is because the Dutch and their Chinese lackeys are still running the economy. Only when they are driven out can we enjoy the prosperity we have a right to expect from independence.

This program has a direct and popular appeal. The alternative of patience, hard work and coöperation with the Dutch and other foreigners for a long transition period had no such appeal. The Communists were able to make more political capital of the "complete-the-revolution" slogan than the Nationalists, because they have never been directly represented in the Cabinet and have thus been in a stronger position to criticize the successive governments for corruption and incompetence. Unlike the other Indonesian parties, which are divided between major factions within their membership, the P.K.I. has a single ideology, laid down by a strong, united and capable leadership. Moreover, the experience of Communist movements the world over in organization and infiltration is at their disposal, and they have used it effectively.

To describe the rebellion as an "anti-Communist revolt" is too simple. Certainly the rebel leaders were eager to see Indonesia develop on non-Communist lines; but there was not a single Communist in the legal Indonesian government and Communism could still be fought by constitutional means. The desire for increased regional and local autonomy was one major motive. There was an urge to build upon the "growing points and leading sectors" in the outer islands in order to launch an effective economic development program. There also was the wish to rid the central government of the abuse of party politics and incompetence. But mainly the rebellion, too, reflected disillusionment with the democratic process.

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III

The political and military conflicts of the last two years have hidden from view such progress as has actually been made in dealing with Indonesia's development problems. In May 1956 the National Planning Bureau at last presented a five year plan which was approved by the Cabinet shortly afterwards. In referring to this plan in his speech to the first elected parliament in March 1956, President Sukarno stated that Indonesia was passing from a "survival period" to a "period of planning and investment." Apart from technical flaws in the plan, the failure of economic development to take place in a fashion that might have prevented the rebellion was due to continued diversion of government energies to political manœuvring and to the fact that the plan did not give consideration to the plans prepared by regional and local governments. The latter problem was on its way to solution before the rebellion took place. The National Conference on Reconstruction brought together representatives of the dissident regional governments and central government authorities under the joint chairmanship of President Sukarno and ex-Vice President Hatta. It agreed on the necessity of integration of regional development plans into a new national plan. It also agreed on a reallocation of financial resources and investment responsibilities giving greater autonomy to the regions, and these agreements gained Cabinet approval. The Planning Bureau undertook a study of regional development plans with integration in view.

But with continued emphasis on party politics the rate of progress with revision and execution of the plan was too slow to satisfy the dissident groups in the outer islands. It took the rebellion to persuade the government that economic development must be given top priority. After seven years of neglecting economic development for politics, Indonesian leaders were at last forced to realize that economic development is at the heart of the political problem as well.

This brings us to a consideration of how much liberal foreign aid could do not only to improve Indonesia's economic position but to bring political unity and stability as well.

Indonesia has the absorptive capacity to use effectively at least $100,000,000 per year for the next few years; half, under our commodity surplus disposal plan, to provide Java with food and textiles until the problem of providing alternative employment

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for Javanese peasants can be tackled; and half for highly visible "impact" projects in the outer islands. The latter would include the Asahan Valley development scheme (power, aluminum, pulp and paper, cement, rural electrification, irrigation), the Sumatran highway, the Atjeh railway, improved transport in Celebes and Borneo, land reclamation and mechanized dry-rice farming in Borneo, and the like. While these are being executed more can be planned, and possibilities for developing industries in Java to replace imports can be studied. Such a program would remove one of the major sources of dissatisfaction in the outer islands, reduce the amount of unrest in Java and start Indonesia as a whole on the road to economic development. Two recent developments make Indonesia more receptive to a program of aid than she may have been a year ago. First, the American decision to provide light military equipment has been accepted in Indonesia as a vote of confidence in the government. The failure of the team of East German technicians to put into operation a sugar mill financed by the government has raised doubts about the usefulness of technical and capital assistance from the Soviet bloc.

IV

The political effectiveness of the policy outlined above would be greatly enhanced, however, if we also supported Indonesia on the issue of West Irian (New Guinea). It would help to persuade Indonesians that we are not merely trying to buy their friendship and would deprive the Communists and extreme nationalists of one of their principal rallying cries. Can we pursue this policy with a clear conscience? Let us examine the issue.

The legal basis of Indonesia's claim to West Irian is Article II of the Round Table Agreements of November 1949 between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Article I transferred sovereignty over the rest of the Netherlands East Indies to the new Republic. Article II specifically reserved the question of New Guinea, but stipulated that the "political status" of New Guinea be determined through "further negotiations" within one year. Indonesian governments have interpreted this as a promise that transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea would follow shortly. In addition, Indonesia's claim rests on the widespread antagonism to continuing colonialism anywhere in Asia or Africa.

The Dutch legal position rests on the claim that no transfer of sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea was implied in the Round

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Table Agreements. It is also argued that the Papuans who inhabit New Guinea are racially and linguistically distinct from the rest of the Indonesians. The Dutch also claim that they can do far more for the Papuans than Indonesia can—an argument in itself irrefutable. Holland has provided about one thousand civil servants and pays out some $20,000,000 net every year to administer the country—more men and money than Indonesia could afford.

To these arguments the Indonesians reply by asking whether Holland will do more for the Papuans than she did for the Indonesians during three centuries of rule, and whether she will bow out more gracefully when the time comes than she did from Indonesia. They point to the Dutch Parliamentary Mission Report which admits that no progress was made in the years between 1953 and 1957. They argue that racially and linguistically the Papuans are certainly closer to the Indonesians than they are to the Dutch, and that Indonesia is already a melting pot for dozens of races and languages. They note that Holland has settled only 15,000 Dutch citizens in the area, half of those Eurasians from Indonesia. Finally, they point out that Dutch New Guinea has been part of Indonesian empires for centuries—not only the Dutch East Indies empire, but the old Indonesian Madjapahit empire of the thirteenth–sixteenth centuries.

It would seem easy to accept the Indonesian claim, as the Soviet Union has done, and support it without reservation. But the hard fact is that the Indonesians are not yet ready to administer and develop a backward area; they are having a hard time administering and developing their present territory. The Papuans have a long way to go in economic and political development, and will need plenty of help. There are about three-quarters of a million of them, living in small nomadic tribes and engaged in hunting, fishing and primitive agriculture. The country they inhabit is bigger in land area than the Philippines; the coast is swamp and the interior is mountainous, with poor thin soil and few resources. One might get the impression that all this wrangling must be for a fabulously rich territory. In bitter fact the conflict is about a land which would be a burden on the budget of anyone responsible for it. Oil? Over $50,000,000 has been spent in fruitless exploration. Dutch activities at present consist mainly of simple agricultural and fishing improvements and Christianizing the people.

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The only wholly rational position on the issue has been that of Australia. She would like to see the Dutch remain because she does not want a virtually unprotected area at her back doorstep, where an enemy nation could easily move in and menace her, as Japan did in the last war. Perhaps the Australians are also nervous at the prospect of so unstable a neighbor as Indonesia moving still closer to them.

In other respects the whole controversy over New Guinea adds up to a display of emotional nationalism. The Dutch want to retain it partly as a matter of pride, partly because they want to fulfill their mission to look after the Papuans. With the Indonesians it is pride too, but of a different form. The average Indonesian is probably convinced that a pearl of great worth is being withheld; those who are better informed think the Dutch are trying to trick them again and are determined not to let them get away with it. Indonesians also feel that since they themselves are free of the Dutch they should not allow the Dutch yoke to remain on the shoulders of their brother Papuans.

A trusteeship administered by the United Nations would provide the Papuans with a chance to have their country intelligently developed. It also would meet Australian fears. An aid program could be designed to raise levels of literacy and productivity and provide a cadre of educated people able to administer the country if later in a free vote the Papuans should choose independence from both Indonesia and Holland.

It is difficult to see how Holland would lose from such an arrangement. So far as she may want an outlet for investment and employment for her young men in New Guinea, there should still be such opportunities within the framework of the trusteeship. The big gain for her would be an improvement of the position of the Dutch nationals in Indonesia and the possibility of regaining the $1.5 billion of investments the Dutch still have there. The attitude of the Netherlands Government has greatly damaged the Dutch people and Dutch enterprises still left in Indonesia, as well as those at home who are dependent on trade and raw materials from Indonesia.

But a solution of the West Irian situation is even more important for the Indonesians than for the Dutch. A trusteeship arrangement would avoid the expense of the primary development of the area; and the door would be left open for union with Indonesia later. It would also help the Indonesians to get their own

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house in order. Once the West Irian issue was removed, it would be less easy for nationalist leaders to divert attention away from the real problems at home.

If the Indonesians refuse to have the issue considered again by the United Nations a face-saving alternative might be to make West Irian an ANZUS responsibility for a few years. Technical and capital assistance for developing the area could still be provided through the United Nations and American aid programs. There is some evidence that such an arrangement might be acceptable to the Indonesians; for them the important thing is recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.

The Indonesian Government has a breathing spell of a few months in which to decide how to meet the problems which were responsible for the rebellion: the need to decentralize governmental powers and to develop the country. One hopeful sign is that virtually all Indonesian leaders now recognize that the mere fact of putting down the rebellion solves no real problems, and that vigorous action is needed immediately if Indonesia is to move with any prospects of success toward prosperity as a united and democratic nation. If they fail again, the chances that Indonesia can be saved from turning to the other path—the path of China—will be slim. In this breathing spell the West should offer Indonesia economic and political support in exchange for adoption of a development plan and a scheme for decentralization of powers that show promise of success. This will make it possible for the Indonesian Government to choose the path to mature democracy.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

WAR AND PEACE IN THE SPACE AGE. By Lt. General James M. **Gavin**. New York: Harper, 1958, 304 p. $5.00.

The author, who retired suddenly from the Army last March, here presents his well-argued, and strongly felt, criticism of recent military and strategic policies. Believing that we have slipped into a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Russians, he is particularly critical of the cumbersome pace of the Department of Defense; the division of the services, especially the separating of air and land power; and the failure, as he sees it, to develop a more flexible military establishment to handle the various kinds of warfare that we may encounter.

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. By Ben T. Moore. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958, 263 p. $4.50.

In this book, written in association with a study group of the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Moore analyzes the strategic dilemma of NATO and outlines new and vigorous policies which the United States and Britain must adopt if Western Europe is to be equipped in time to face down the Soviet missile threat. To survive, Europe must go forward from economic unification to build a new strategic unity. The author, now Associate Director of the Twentieth Century Fund, has had long experience in policy-making and negotiation. The foreword is by William C. Foster, formerly head of the Economic Coöperation Administration and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

THE GREAT ARMS RACE. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Praeger, 1958, 116 p. $2.95.

In this concise evaluation of American and Soviet power, based chiefly on his articles in *The New York Times*, Mr. Baldwin concludes that "the great weapons race which has dominated the first decade of the second half of the twentieth century is not confined to the Big Laboratories which produce the Big Bang. The Big Factories and the Big Battalions still have a reduced, but definite, rôle."

ATLANTIC DEMOCRACY. By Charles d'Olivier Farran. New York: Praeger, 1958, 203 p. $5.50.

A useful reference, comparing the constitutions of the NATO members.

LESS THAN KIN. By William Clark. Boston: Houghton, 1958, 168 p. $3.50.

In this study of Anglo-American relations, a British journalist, who is well acquainted with the United States, is chiefly concerned with dispelling several myths about this relationship and with trying to indicate the rather intricate and subtle pattern of views and attitudes in each country.

RADIO FREE EUROPE. By Robert T. Holt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958, 249 p. $5.00.

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A thoughtful and informative discussion of the origins, operation and purposes of R.F.E. It is useful in refuting a number of irresponsible charges directed against the organization, but at the same time it faces some of the real problems implicit in private broadcasting of a political nature.

WORLD CRISIS AND THE CATHOLIC. New York: Sheed, 1958, 231 p. $3.00.

These studies by Roman Catholics of many countries, published on the occasion of the Second World Congress for the Lay Apostolate, deal with a wide range of problems in science, art, international politics, economics and religion.

DIE GROSSEN ENTSCHEIDUNGEN. By Paul Sethe. Frankfurt/Main: Scheffler, 1958, 130 p. DM. 6.80.

A series of brief essays on the major political events in Europe since the sputniks were sent aloft, emphasizing the problems of German partition, by a West German journalist who has gained a reputation by criticizing Adenauer's policies.

GERMANY AND THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA: 1915–1918. Edited by Z. A. B. Zeman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 157 p. $4.00.

An interesting and revealing collection of documents, taken from archives of the German Foreign Ministry captured in 1945, concerning the relations between the German Imperial Government and the Russian revolutionaries in 1915–1918.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT. By Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. New York: Praeger, 1958, 408 p. $12.50.

A revised and greatly enlarged edition of a book first published in 1934.

LES NATIONS UNIES ET LA CONSERVATION DES RESSOURCES DE LA MER. By H. Ph. Visser 'T Hooft. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958, 425 p. Guilders 24.

A study of the legal and political problems involved in defining the rules for the conservation of the biological resources of the sea.

THE MYTH OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. By A. V. Levontin. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1957, 346 p. £6 (Israeli).

An argument that international law is incapable of creating international security, and hence that a system of sovereign states must be replaced by the single sovereignty of world government. The author is a member of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL. Edited and Translated by Hans Gerth. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958, 315 p. $6.00.

The first publication of the minutes of the Fifth General Congress of the International Workingmen's Association held at The Hague in September 1872. The materials were found among the papers of Hermann Schlüter at the University of Wisconsin.

LA PENSÉE DE LÉNINE. By Henri Lefebvre. Paris: Bordas, 1957, 356 p. Fr. 680.

A serious analysis and exposition, by a French Communist, of Lenin's political, philosophical and economic thought.

THE IDEA OF COLONIALISM. Edited by Robert Strausz-Hupé and Harry W. Hazard. New York: Praeger, 1958, 496 p. $5.00.

These interesting essays on the history of colonialism and of recent trends attempt, as one essay says, to put "colonial problems in perspective."

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WORLD POLITICS. By A. F. K. Organski. New York: Knopf, 1958, 461 p. $7.50.

Moving in briskly, with assurances that international relations are to be approached scientifically, the author creates a conceptual framework, discusses the nation, power, diplomacy, international organization, and winds up with a series of predictions on the shape of things to come for the next 70 or 80 years. China, it appears, will probably be top nation.

DILEMMAS OF POLITICS. By Hans J. Morgenthau. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 389 p. $7.50.

Selected essays by a leading student of political science and international relations, written over a period of 20 years but with a definite consistency of perspective and approach.

LIBERALISM: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Theodore Meyer Greene. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957, 219 p. $4.50.

An effort, as the author puts it simply, to "formulate and defend . . . what thoughtful and loyal Americans have always believed and still believe about liberty and the conditions and expressions of liberty."

SOLDIERS AND GOVERNMENTS. Edited by Michael Howard. London: Eyre, 1957, 192 p. 21/.

Essays on the relation between military staffs and civil government in Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Spain, Latin America and the United States.

INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT. Edited by Seymour Melman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 291 p. $6.00.

An extensive analysis by a number of specialists of the technical aspects of possible systems of inspection to assure international disarmament agreements: aerial, fiscal, production, inventory, etc.

THE VOYAGE OF THE LUCKY DRAGON. By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Harper, 1958, 200 p. $3.50.

The story of the ill-fated Japanese trawler that was victim of the lethal fall-out in the 1954 Bikini tests.

THREE STEPS TO VICTORY. By Sir Robert Watson-Watt. London: Odhams, 1957, 480 p. 30/.

An account, overly long perhaps and quite personal, of the development of radar by one of the men chiefly responsible for its creation.

DIE INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, 1955. Edited by Arnold Bergstraesser and Wilhelm Cornides. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1958, 1,055 p. DM. 64.

This ponderous volume is the first publication and first yearbook of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. It consists of many articles by a number of authors dealing with international affairs in 1955 and with developments in the various countries of the world.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955. Edited by Noble Frankland assisted by Patricia Woodcock. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 513 p. $9.60.

This latest volume of documents includes the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung and the Geneva "Summit" Conference.

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RSFSR: RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC. Edited by Thomas Fitzsimmons. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957, 2 v. (New York: Taplinger, $9.75.)

CAMBODIA: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By David J. Steinberg and Others. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957, 345 p. (New York: Taplinger, $7.75.)

THAILAND: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By Wendell Blanchard and Others. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1958, 528 p. (New York: Taplinger, $6.50).

These are the fifth, seventh and eighth volumes of the Country Survey Series published under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files. The stated purpose of the surveys is to examine "in depth the sociological, political, and economic aspects of a whole society . . . to define basic cultural and institutional patterns, and to identify dominant values and attitudes."

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton, 1958, 368 p. $5.00.

A Harvard economist, with a talent for challenging popular assumptions, here argues that undue stress upon production is not appropriate for an economy of abundance such as ours. At times he may overshoot the mark, but it is a most stimulating work.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Charles P. Kindleberger. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, 325 p. $6.50.

An able guide to an understanding of the factors and problems involved in economic growth.

POPULATION AND WORLD POLITICS. Edited by Philip M. Hauser. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1958, 297 p. $6.00.

Essays on the relations between demographic trends and economic resources, levels of living and politics.

ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION. Edited by Brinley Thomas. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, 501 p. $9.00.

These proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association deal with countries of emigration and of immigration, intra-European movements and some of the social aspects involved.

THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS. By Henry H. Schloss. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1958, 184 p. Guilders 15.

A monograph on the origins, structure and operations of the Bank.

L'ÉCHANGE INTERNATIONAL. By Michel Moret. Paris: Rivière, 1957, 371 p. Fr. 1300.

Classical theories of international economic relations are no longer regarded as adequate. The many modern contributions do not all seem to fit together. This is an ambitious effort to survey these problems and to suggest ways of unifying, deepening and enlarging the theory.

The Second World War

THE INITIAL TRIUMPH OF THE AXIS. Edited by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 742 p. $13.45.

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This volume in the Survey of International Affairs for the years of the Second World War is a sequel to "The Eve of War, 1939," and covers the period between the outbreak of hostilities and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

THE MARCH OF CONQUEST. By Telford Taylor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, 460 p. $7.50.

An excellent account of the German campaigns in Norway, the Low Countries and France in 1940, campaigns which, while producing brilliant victories, none the less revealed a number of dangerous weaknesses in Nazi military organization and strategy.

73 NORTH: THE DEFEAT OF HITLER'S NAVY. By Dudley Pope. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1958, 288 p. $4.95.

The story of the Battle of the Barents Sea which led to Hitler's decommissioning his surface fleet in 1943.

DER SEEKRIEG IN DEN OSTEUROPÄISCHEN GEWÄSSERN 1941–45. By Jürg Meister. Munich: Lehmann, 1958, 392 p. DM. 32.

A history of operations in the Baltic Sea, Arctic Ocean, Black and Caspian Seas in the Second World War.

OPERATION SEA LION. By Ronald Wheatley. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 201 p. $7.00.

A monograph on the origins and development of German plans for an invasion of Britain.

THE WINTER OF THE BOMBS. By Constantine FitzGibbon. New York: Norton, 1958, 271 p. $3.95.

A most interesting account of the air attack on London, particularly good in its discussion of the social changes and adjustments produced by the blitz.

REARMING THE FRENCH. By Marcel Vigneras. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1958, 444 p. $4.25.

This volume in the official series, "United States Army in World War II," tells of the rearming of French forces after their reëntry into the conflict, in North Africa and subsequently in France.

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY, 1939–1942. By G. Hermon Gill. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957, 686 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 30/.)

A volume in the series, "Australia in the War of 1939–1945."

ESCAPE FROM CORREGIDOR. By Edgar D. Whitcomb. Chicago: Regnery, 1958, 274 p. $4.50.

An American aviator's experiences as a prisoner of the Japanese.

The United States

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1957. Washington: G.P.O., 1958, 939 p. $6.75.

This volume, the first of a series begun in response to a recommendation of the National Historical Publications Commission, comprises most of the public messages, speeches and statements of the President during the year 1957.

THE ORDEAL OF WOODROW WILSON. By Herbert Hoover. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, 318 p. $6.00.

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In this informed and understanding memoir of Wilson's effort to secure a lasting peace, former President Hoover has made extensive use of his own files of the period. In his judgment, "President Wilson, in the memories of thinking men, is the only enduring leader of those statesmen who conducted the First World War and its aftermath of peacemaking."

AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON. By Eugene C. Gerhart. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958, 545 p. $7.50.

A substantial but rather uneven biography of the late Supreme Court Justice and prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial.

MAINLINE. By George W. Malone. New Canaan (Conn.): Long House, 1958, 126 p. $3.00.

The Senator from Nevada registers his criticism of American foreign policy, especially the Trade Agreements program.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1934–1956. By Allan Rau. Geneva: Droz, 1957, 160 p. Swiss Fr. 12. (New York: Lounz, $4.00.)

This is a useful and clear survey of a continuing problem. The author recognizes the difficulty of devising politically acceptable changes in American farm policy that will reconcile it with a liberal trade policy.

THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. By Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, 593 p. $6.75.

A substantial history of the American Communist Party from 1919 to 1957, omitting, though not disregarding, the underground and espionage activities. The authors have their own political predispositions—the book is dedicated to Ignazio Silone and Milovan Djilas—and the reader may debate a number of their judgments, but they are always interesting and provide much food for thought.

SAC: THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. By Richard G. Hubler. New York: Duell, 1958, 280 p. $4.50.

A popular account of the Strategic Air Command, its history, function and some of the disputes involving it.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1958, 547 p. $7.50.

An "analytical-topical" study of American foreign policy which gives attention to the "conceptual framework," "situational factors" and "continuing issues."

AMERICAN STUDIES IN EUROPE. By Sigmund Skard. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958, 2 v. $10.00.

An extensive survey by country of the study of the United States and American civilization in European schools and universities from the time of the American Revolution to 1957. The author is professor of American literature at the University of Oslo.

Western Europe

EUROPE AND THE EUROPEANS. By Max Beloff. London: Chatto and Windus, 1957, 288 p. 25/.

This report of a study group set up by the Council of Europe was prepared by its Rapporteur-General, Mr. Beloff. It ranges over many issues, from the problem of defining Europe and locating its historical foundations to discussing the various cultural, political and economic tasks confronting the Europeans.

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LES RELATIONS INTERNES ET EXTERNES DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By Raymond Prieur. Paris: Montchrestien, 1958, 311 p. Fr. 2000.

An official of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community discusses a wide range of its problems, primarily in their legal aspects.

LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By Pierre Mathijsen. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958, 208 p. Guilders 12.

A discussion of the various kinds of law that apply in the European Coal and Steel Community including the unwritten customary law that it is developing.

GEMEINSAMER MARKT UND EURATOM. By Hermann Berié and Rudolf Miller. Herne (Germany): Verlag Neue Wirtschafts-Briefe, 1957, 379 p. DM. 19.80.

The complete text of the treaties, including appendices and protocols, with an introduction and commentaries by two West German civil servants. The volume is indexed and contains a reference table summarizing each of the treaty's articles.

LA RÉFORME DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE. By Pierre Duclos. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1958, 525 p. Fr. 3800.

An analysis of the history of reform efforts, mostly abortive, in the Council of Europe since 1949.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN MARKETS. Compiled by J. Walter Thompson Company. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957, 287 p. $18.00.

An extensive guide to Western Europe as a market for business ventures.

THE HOUSE WITHOUT WINDOWS: FRANCE SELECTS A PRESIDENT. By Constantin Melnik and Nathan Leites. Evanston (Ill.): Row, Peterson, 1958, 358 p. $5.50.

An hour-by-hour investigation of the election by the French Parliament of the second President of the Fourth Republic, a procedure that took seven days in December 1953. The purpose of this detailed examination was to illustrate the intricate patterns that make up parliamentary life.

CONTRE LA GUERRE CIVILE. By Edmond Michelet. Paris: Plon, 1957, 104 p. Fr. 390.

This book, by a close associate of General de Gaulle and now Minister of Veterans Affairs, is chiefly interesting for possible clues to future French policy. It reportedly has been read with approval by the General.

FRENCH SOCIALISM IN THE CRISIS YEARS, 1933–1936. By John T. Marcus. New York: Praeger, 1958, 216 p. $5.00.

An analysis of the reaction of the French Socialists to the rising threat of Fascism in the years immediately preceding the victory of the Popular Front, years in which "the basis of the Socialist party's attitude had been set."

ANDRÉ TARDIEU. By Louis Aubert and Others. Paris: Plon, 1957, 215 p. Fr. 990.

A collection of essays in commemoration of a leading French statesman who died in 1945.

LA BELGIQUE ET LES NATIONS UNIES. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1958, 372 p. $3.00.

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An addition to the series of national studies on international organization being prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

THE QUEST FOR SECURITY. By S. I. P. Van Campen. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958, 308 p. Guilders 19.

A solid study of Netherlands foreign policy in the years 1945–1950. Documentary appendix.

SOUTH NORWAY. By Frank Noel Stagg. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, 232 p. 25/. (New York: Macmillan, $5.75.)

The fifth and last volume of an excellent series of regional histories of Norway. The author died shortly after the completion of this book.

SVENSK KRIGSHANDELSPOLITIK UNDER ANDRA VÄRLDSKRIGET. By Gunnar Hägglöf. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1958, 317 p. Kr. 28.50.

A detailed and expert account of Sweden's foreign trade relations during the Second World War. The author, then chief of the commercial department of the Swedish Foreign Office, has since been Swedish Ambassador in London.

BONN IST NICHT WEIMAR. By Fritz René Allemann. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1956, 439 p. DM. 16.80.

Probably the best study of the Federal Republic's development to 1956, by a Swiss journalist who has an exceptional understanding of the German scene. The book lacks an index.

THE POLITICS OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION. By Herbert J. Spiro. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 180 p. $4.00.

Though this is a short book, it provides a very thorough examination of the German arrangements for worker participation in management. The ideology, the law, operation in practice, and the political, economic and social effects are all examined. Much of the material is first hand. Perhaps the author attaches a bit too much importance to co-determination, but he makes a reasonable case for his view that it is having a significant influence on political and social attitudes and behavior.

DER KAMPF UM DIE MONTAN-MITBESTIMMUNG. By Erich Potthoff. Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1957, 150 p. DM. 9.80.

A labor union economist who was directly involved describes the adoption of the co-determination laws giving labor a voice in the management of Germany's coal and steel industries.

AUF DEM BAUCHE SOLLST DU KRIECHEN—DEUTSCHLAND UNTER DEN BESATZUNGSMÄCHTEN. By Richard Tüngel and Hans Rudolf Berndorff. Hamburg: Wegner, 1958, 427 p. DM. 16.80.

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A massive regional investigation of industry, communications and transport.

L'ITALIA E L'ALTO ADIGE: DALL'ACCORDO ITALO-AUSTRIACO DEL 1946 ALLA NOTA AUSTRIACA DEL 1956. By Carlo Battisti. Florence: Le Monnier, 1957, 161 p. L. 1000.

A somewhat polemical treatment of postwar Austrian-Italian differences relating to the Alto-Adige. Documentary annex.

VENT'ANNI DI RESISTENZA AL FASCISMO. By Armando Gavagnin. Turin: Einaudi, 1957, 553 p. L. 3000.

An autobiography of an activist in the anti-Fascist resistance in Italy, eventually a member of the "Giustizia e Libertà" group.

THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY. By Edward C. Banfield with the assistance of Laura Fasano Banfield. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press (for the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago), 1958, 204 p. $4.00.

Taking a village in southern Italy as a case study, the author poses the question whether a backward society has the psychological, cultural and moral conditions to support a more advanced and extensive political and economic organization. The conclusions are quite pessimistic.

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An extensive account—published in Spain—of the vicissitudes of the exiled political movement after the defeat of the Spanish Republic in the Civil War.

LIQUIDACIÓN DE LA MONARQUÍA PARLAMENTARIA. By Ramiro de Maeztu. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1957, 336 p. Ptas. 60.

This thirteenth volume of the works of Ramiro de Maeztu covers his writings in the last years of the Spanish Monarchy, from 1926 to 1931.

FACTORES DEL DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO ESPAÑOL. By Higinio París Eguilaz. Madrid: C.S.I.C., Instituto Sancho de Moncada, 1957, 457 p. Ptas. 120.

An extended examination of Spanish economic development, past and prospective.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Raymond L. Garthoff. New York: Praeger, 1958, 283 p. $4.50.

The author of "Soviet Military Doctrine" (1953) here offers a comprehensive study of contemporary Soviet military thought, showing how earlier doctrine has been adapted to the nuclear age (*e.g.* massive land forces will still be decisive after an exchange of devastating nuclear blows), and how Soviet strategy has prepared itself intellectually as well as materially for every kind of warfare. An important book.

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THIS IS THE CHALLENGE. By William Benton. New York: Associated College Presses, 1958, 254 p. $3.95.

A collection of articles and speeches by former Senator Benton on the subject of Soviet education, science and technology, and what Americans must do to meet the challenge.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGETARY SYSTEM. By R. W. Davies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 372 p. $8.50.

A historical account, tracing the shifting rôle of the budgetary system as the Soviet economy evolved.

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A brief but interesting exploration of Khrushchev's rise to power, based on much careful sifting of exceedingly elusive but significant clues.

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A useful study of Soviet literary policy and resistance to it in a relatively little studied area of the Soviet empire.

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On the question of the Soviet-Polish frontier in the course of the Second World War. The documentation is largely familiar.

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This chronicle—notes and diaries found in the rubble of the ghetto after the war—is translated from versions published in Warsaw in 1948 and 1952.

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A somewhat uneven reference work, in part bilingual, including lists of Lithuanian organizations, periodicals, and a who's who of prominent figures this side of the Iron Curtain.

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These highly important memoirs of the late Prime Minister and President of Finland focus on Finnish-Russian relations. The first volume covers the winter war, the second the period of the uneasy armistice.

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The author of a history of Russian foreign policy in the First World War here traces Finland's relations with Russia from the beginning of Russification at the turn of the century to the end of the Karelian insurrection of 1921–1922.

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Historical, statistical and other information relating to the regions east of the Oder and Neisse.

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DAS LAND DER SCHREIBTISCH-PYRAMIDEN. By Walter Wannenmacher. Frankfurt/Main: Montan- und Wirtschaftsverlag, 1956, 280 p. DM. 12.80.

Observations and reflections of an economist who spent a decade, from 1945 to 1955, at forced labor in Czechoslovakia.

THE NINETEEN DAYS. By George Urban. London: Heinemann, 1957, 361 p. 30/.

A solid account of the Hungarian Revolution. The author is a professional broadcaster, most of the narrative is based on B.B.C. materials, and much attention is paid to the whole question of broadcasting and propaganda.

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A miscellany of essays and review articles, including contemporary themes.

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An important and pioneering inquiry into the relation of pressure groups and special interests and the membership of the House of Commons. The author feels that pressure groups are necessary to the operation of a complex society, but that this rôle must be carried out with responsibility.

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An interesting study of British foreign policy and of the policy-makers in the Foreign Office from 1919 to 1951: the general theme is the waning of the old order of political and diplomatic life—from Lord Curzon to Burgess and Maclean.

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In this analysis of the rôle of the House of Lords in Britain's present parliamentary system, the author concludes that contrary to expectations of both Left and Right, the House has developed increasing vitality and is indeed a useful and significant political instrument.

L'ANGLETERRE CHANGE DE CAP. By Raymond Las Vergnas. Paris: Hachette, 1957, 284 p. Fr. 600.

A personal interpretation of the great objective and subjective changes in Britain since the Second World War.

BRITAIN'S POSTWAR DOLLAR PROBLEM. By Elliot Zupnick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, 256 p. $5.50.

Carrying its analysis up to 1951, this careful study looks at fundamental issues as well as purely financial developments and suggests possible solutions to Britain's dollar problem along the lines of more effective development of a multilateral system of trade and payments.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING BY PROGRAMME AND CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Gilbert Walker. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 175 p. $3.75.
A study of economic planning under the postwar Labor Government.

THE SCOTTISH OFFICE AND OTHER SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. By Sir David Milne. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 232 p. $3.40.
The author of this contribution to the New Whitehall Series on major departments of the central government is Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Scotland.

EVOLVING CANADIAN FEDERALISM. By A. R. M. Lower, F. R. Scott and Others. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1958, 187 p. $3.50.
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THE AUSTRALIAN WHEAT-GROWING INDUSTRY 1788–1948. By Edgars Dunsdorfs. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 547 p. $10.00.
A detailed historical and economic analysis.

The Middle East

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A massive physical, economic and cultural geography, including the Middle East and the Soviet Union. Many elaborate maps.

THE RISE OF MODERN ASIA. By Ian Thomson. New York: Pitman, 1958, 265 p. $4.95.
A general survey of the twentieth-century transformation of Asia.

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A collection of essays by some 34 specialists on recent political and social trends in the Middle East.

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE ARABS. By Don Peretz. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1958, 264 p. $5.00.
An able study of the development of Israel's policy toward the Arab refugee problem: many more problems emerge than answers.

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A brief description of the origins and subsequent development of Israel, by a member of the editorial staff of *The Times* of London.

TÜRKEI. By Werner Uhrenbacher. Berlin: E. Schmidt, 1957, 226 p. DM. 18.60.
A convenient economic handbook.

DESTINATION MECCA. By The Sayed Idries Shah. London: Rider, 1957, 192 p. 18/.
A pleasant if not very revealing account of travels through the Islamic world from Tangier to Kabul.

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A doctoral dissertation, making use of some Iranian sources.

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South and Southeast Asia

THE DIPLOMACY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1945–1958. By Russell H. Fifield. New York: Harper, 1958, 584 p. $7.50.

A wide-ranging study, by a professor of political science at the University of Michigan, of the diplomatic problems and crises connected with the emergence of independence movements in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Indochina and Malaya.

THE HEART OF INDIA. By Alexander Campbell. New York: Knopf, 1958, 332 p. $5.00.

A lively if frequently rather sordid picture of the Indian subcontinent today—based on a journalist's travel notebooks.

INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, FEBRUARY 1950–DECEMBER 1953. By K. P. Karunakaran. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1958, 266 p. $4.00.

The second volume in a series covering the main international problems which engaged the attention of Indian statesmen.

A HISTORY OF MODERN BURMA. By John F. Cady. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958, 682 p. $7.50.

This substantial history focuses on the political evolution of Burma during the last century and a half. While inevitably the impact of British colonial rule receives major attention, Cady's central theme is the growth of Burmese nationalism and the struggle for independence. Based almost entirely on English language sources, the work nevertheless retains an admirable objectivity and constitutes a major contribution to the field.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CAMBODIA. By Martin F. Herz. New York: Praeger, 1958, 141 p. $3.00.

An unpretentious sketch by an American Foreign Service officer formerly stationed in Phnom Penh.

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A brief explanation by the former Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia.

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A detailed study from the records of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company.

JOURNEY TO JAVA. By Harold Nicolson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1958, 335 p. $5.00.

In this pleasant travel book Sir Harold Nicolson, who was given a two-months' cruise to Java as a 70th birthday present, chats about the scenery, his fellow passengers, his shipboard reading and his own reflections.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CHINE ET RUSSIE. By Édouard Krakowski. Paris: Colombe, 1957, 412 p. Fr. 1500.

An effort, not altogether successful, to illuminate Soviet-Chinese relations through a parallel study of the history of the two countries.

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DIE VERTRÄGE DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA MIT ANDEREN STAATEN. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1957, 105 p. DM. 9.50.

A useful calendar of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, together with selected texts over the years 1950–1957.

RETURN TO CHINA. By James Bertram. London: Heinemann, 1957, 251 p. 25/.

A relatively favorable report on Communist China today by a New Zealand journalist with prewar experience in Peking and Yenan.

CHINA AUF EIGENEN WEGEN. By L. L. Matthias. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957, 240 p. DM. 12.

A report on a visit to China in 1955–56, including a trip to Sinkiang.

HOKKAIDO: ITS PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. By F. C. Jones. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 146 p. $3.40.

A discussion of the economic resources and industrial prospects of Japan's northern island.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN POSTWAR JAPAN. By Solomon B. Levine. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958, 200 p. $4.25.

A study of the Japanese managerial system, the trade-union movement, collective bargaining and government regulation.

THE JAPAN BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA AND WHO'S WHO. Tokyo: Rengo Press, 1958, 2,124 p. Yen 6500. (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, $20.00.)

Biographical sketches in English of some 12,000 historical and contemporary figures in Japan.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1958, 246 p. $3.00.

A further addition to the series of national studies on international organization being prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Africa

ALGERIA: THE REALITIES. By Germaine Tillion. New York: Knopf, 1958, 115 p. $2.50.

A very brief but exceptionally perceptive and illuminating analysis of the roots of the Algerian problem, by a French ethnologist. The picture she gives is a dark one, the problems of population and social dislocation are enormous, and the time is very late. As she observes, "There are a lot of victims but few criminals —and the possible solutions seem to me to contain the germs of yet further tragedies."

THE QUESTION. By Henry Alleg. New York: Braziller, 1958, 123 p. $2.95.

An account, which was banned by the Gaillard government, of the interrogation and tortures undergone by a French Communist editor at the hands of paratroopers in Algiers.

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An extensive physical and economic geography.

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ETHIOPIA TODAY. By Ernest W. Luther. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 158 p. $4.00.

A brief general survey of contemporary Ethiopia: its government, economy and culture. The author was for several years economist for the State Bank of Ethiopia.

THE MAKING OF MODERN UGANDA. By Kenneth Ingham. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, 303 p. 25/. (New York: Macmillan, $5.75.)

A history of Uganda from the establishment of British rule to the present. The author is professor of history at Makerere College, the University College of East Africa.

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An informal report on a three-months' tour of South Africa, Rhodesia and East Africa.

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Latin America and the West Indies

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TRUJILLO, LITTLE CAESAR OF THE CARIBBEAN. By Germán E. Ornes. New York: Nelson, 1958, 338 p. $5.00.

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ARGENTINE: UN MONDE—UNE VILLE. By R.-M. Albérès. Paris: Hachette, 1957, 350 p. Fr. 900.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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

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